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Abstract 
 
This thesis is focused on economic returns to education in China. It takes education as a 
key point to develop three aspects: earnings returns to education, the influence of 
education as one of the social-economic factors associated with the Body Mass Index 
(BMI) related to health, and the determinants of subjective well-being. A panel data-
based analysis including continuous and discrete dependent variables (ordered 
probit/probit) is used in this research.  
 
The first part examines the earnings returns to education in urban China for four years 
covering the period 1989 to 2000. We find, in common, with others that such returns 
were small in 1989, but have increased steadily since then. We also find that the returns 
for women exceed those for men and go some way to reducing the gender earnings gap. 
Crucially, however the returns to education decline with the length of time since the 
individual left school which is consistent with the hypothesis that education enhances 
ability and skills which in turn enhances earnings, but that the value of such skills 
deteriorates over time. Finally we find evidence for gravity effects by which earnings 
decline as distance from Beijing, and more noticeable, Shanghai increases.  
 
The aim of the second part is to examine the impact of socio-economic status (SES) on 
the BMI, a formula based on the ratio of height to weight, linked to health, using a four-
year (1991, 1993, 1997 and 2000) panel data set. To an extent we confirm the results with 
respect to the linkage between SES and health found for other countries. However, 
 XII
instead of using the existing specification of BMI, we explore the healthy BMI range 
based on a self-reported measure of health in China. This leads to a slightly different 
formulation for the BMI and a substantially different healthy range. We also find that this 
healthy BMI has a significant impact on health together with SES. Because of potential 
simultaneity between education and health we estimate a relationship between SES and 
health change. We find a significant relationship between education and changes in health 
status.  
 
The final part studies both happiness and life satisfaction in mainland China. We explore 
the extent to which SES and social capital influence subjective well-being. The results for 
happiness and life satisfaction are similar, but not identical. To an extent we confirm the 
results of others with respect to other countries. Hence we find a U-shaped relationship 
with respect to age and positive influences of income and health on well-being. We also 
include a variable which reflects the degree of choice/control over their lives people feel 
they have. Crucially, for social capital variables, we find that individuals who are 
involved in more voluntary organizations have higher levels of happiness, and those who 
are a member of Communist party are also more satisfied with their lives. Finally, 
education has a limited positive impact on subjective well-being, however, it is also the 
most significant determinant of social capital variables across individuals.  
 
In the thesis we specifically discuss the problem of endogeneity which is traditionally 
tackled by the use of some instrumental variable method. Recently much of the work in 
this genre including work relating to education, has been criticised from the perspective 
 XIII
of weak instruments. Throughout we suggest alternative approaches and each is specific 
to the context in which it is used. Each of these alternatives is in itself based on certain 
assumptions which can in turn be questioned. Their value lies more in that they present 
extra evidence on the impact of education, rather than they unambiguously provide a 
solution to the endogeneity problem. Economics is not an exact science and it is the 
accumulation of evidence which is important. In our case our evidence is that education 
matters, and it matters not just with respect to earnings, and by implication productivity, 
but also with respect to health and subjective well-being. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
The importance of human capital as a source of economic growth has been recognized in 
economic literature dating back to Adam Smith (1776). However, it was not until the 
1960s that the human capital theory was formally developed by Schultz (1961), Becker 
(1964) and Mincer (1974). These economists rekindled the human capital concept by 
affirming its links with economic growth and by emphasizing its importance in 
explaining earnings differentials (Laroche, et al., 1999). Thus the human capital 
contributions focused largely on differential earnings of individuals as they related to 
skills. The most natural way to identify differential skills was the amount of education 
completed by individuals (Hanushek and Welch, 2006). A benchmark model for the 
earning returns to education has been developed by Mincer (1974), and a great deal of 
work based on this model has been done for many countries.  
 
For decades, the primary argument for justifying education has been based on its direct 
impact on labour market productivity and earnings. Yet it is widely perceived that the 
effects of education spread beyond this to include social benefits for both individuals and 
societies, such as better health, higher levels of welfare or lower crime rates, etc. Such 
benefits result in better equipped individuals to take care of themselves and consequently 
create a better society in which to live. According to Behrman, et al. (1997), the 
quantification of these social benefits is difficult, but more systematically analyzing these 
benefits not only would improve our understanding of the full effects of education but 
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also would improve the informal basis for considering policies related to education.    
 
This is the central focus of our thesis with specific reference to China focusing on three 
specific issues. In the next section, we generally describe the background and theoretical 
issues related to these three topics. In section 2, we outline more specifically the purpose 
and the key questions of the thesis. We also briefly introduce the data sets we use in our 
empirical work. The last section outlines the following chapters.  
 
1.1. Background and Theories 
 
1.1.1. Human Capital 
 
The concept of human capital is central to much of the research on the economic returns 
of education, we thus start with briefly introducing the human capital theory. It is the 
theoretical foundation of our first empirical topic. In human capital theory, education is 
an investment of current resources in exchange for future returns. The benchmark model 
for the development of empirical estimation of the returns to education is the key 
relationship derived by Mincer (1974). Empirically, this involves regressing the natural 
logarithm of earnings against educational attainment and work experience. Note that 
experience is included as a quadratic term to capture the concavity of the earnings profile. 
Mincer’s derivation of the empirical model implies that, under the assumptions made, the 
coefficient of education can be considered as the private monetary return to education as 
well as being the proportionate effect on wages of an increment to education (Harmon, et 
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al., 2003). 
 
However, there exist difficulties in this analysis. For example, the coefficient on years of 
education may not (only) reflect the effect of education on productivity if it is correlated 
with unobserved characteristics that are also correlated with wages. In this case, the 
education coefficient would reflect both the effect of education on productivity and wages 
and the effect of the unobserved variable that is correlated with education. For example, 
‘ability’ may be unobservable and may be correlated with the ability to earn money in the 
labour market. 
 
There have been a number of approaches dealing with this problem. Firstly, measures of 
ability have been incorporated to proxy for unobserved effects, such as intelligence 
quotient (IQ) scores. The inclusion of direct measures of proxing ability should reduce 
the estimated education coefficient, so that the coefficient on education then captures the 
effect of education alone. The usual finding is that the coefficient on education is not 
strongly affected by the inclusion of additional right-hand-side variables (see, e.g., Weiss, 
1995). Secondly one might explore within-twins or within-siblings differences in wages 
and education with the assumption that unobserved effects are additive and common 
within twins. This approach is clearly restricted by data availability. A final, and the most 
common, approach deals directly with the education-earnings relationship in a 
two-equation system by exploiting instrumental variables (IV) that affect education 
directly, but earnings indirectly only through the impact on education. However, the IV 
method can not always be applied to the empirical work as either necessary instruments 
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may not be available, or they are subject to weak instruments bias.  
 
1.1.2. Health Capital 
 
Building on the human capital theory, Grossman (1972) provides a formal model to 
analyze health capital. According to this approach, the main distinction between health 
and education is that health increases income through adding healthy working days while 
education works through improving productivity (Zhao, 2005). Grossman’s model has 
become the standard model to study health demand and health determinants, and our 
second topic identifies such determinants in China applying Grossman’s model.  
 
An extensive review of the literature conducted by Grossman and Kaestner (1997) 
suggests that years of formal education completed is the most important correlate of good 
health. This finding emerges whether health levels are measured by self-evaluation of 
health status, mortality rates or physiological indicators of health. In a broad sense, the 
observed correlation between education and health may be explained in one of three ways 
according to Grossman (2000). Firstly, there is a causal relationship that runs from 
increases in education to increases in health; secondly, the direction of causality runs 
from better health to more education; and thirdly, there is no causal linkage between 
education and health, instead, differences in one or more ‘third variables’ affect both 
education and health in the same direction. Similar to the last section, the ‘third variable’ 
explanation is relevant if the unaccounted factors which affect health are correlated with 
education, such as inherent health. It is clear that the second and third explanation 
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challenged the causal relationship between education and health.  
 
Another important aspect which is commonly involved in this context is the concept of a 
healthy weight range, which is based on a measurement known as the Body Mass Index 
(BMI). The BMI is calculated as weight in kilograms over height in metres squared 
(weight (kg)/height (m)²). The World Health Organization (WHO) has devised a 
classification where by persons with BMIs below the range 19-25 are considered 
underweight, those with BMIs above this range are considered overweight or “at risk”，
and those with BMIs greater than or equal to 30 are considered obese (Bell, et al., 2002). 
The general finding suggested in the literature is that a healthy BMI tends to lead to better 
health (see, e.g., Duetz, et al., 2000; Beydoun and Popkin, 2005). However, there is a 
possibility that different ethnic groups have similar health risks at different levels of BMI. 
For instance, instead of more than (≧) 25, the overweight status among Chinese is 
defined as a BMI≧24 (Wildman, et al., 2004). The issues relevant to BMI are also 
related to our second topic. In particular we seek to analyse i) the validity of the basic 
formula, ii) whether it is applicable to all people regardless of age and gender, iii) the 
parameters of the healthy range and iv) the socio-economic determinants of the BMI. 
 
1.1.3. Social Capital 
 
Helliwell (2001) argued that the working definition of social capital refers to the 
networks, norms and understandings that facilitate cooperative activities within and 
among groups of individuals. Similarly, Halpern (2005) argued that most forms of social 
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capital consist of a network, a cluster of norms, values, and expectancies that are shared 
by group members; and sanctions that help to maintain the norms and network. Much of 
the interest in social capital amongst economists has been fuelled by a definition that 
includes not only the structure of networks and social relations, but behavioural 
dispositions (such as trust, reciprocity, and honesty) and institutional quality measures 
(Woolcock, 2001). Recent work has sought to break the notion of social capital into 
different sub-types, and perhaps the most important of these distinctions is between 
‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ (Gittell and Vidal, 1998). As Putman (2000) argued, some forms 
of capital are (i.e., bonding social capital), by choice or necessity, inward looking and 
tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups; other networks (i.e., 
bridging social capital) are outward looking and encompass people across diverse social 
cleavages. However, many actual situations are characterized by social capital that mixes 
these two types in different proportions (Helliwell, 2001). 
 
The interest in social capital has been driven in recent academic research, although it is 
difficult to ideally measure it as is e.g. years of education for human capital. A large 
number of studies have emerged documenting a relationship between the form and 
quality of people’s networks and a range of important outcomes, including economic 
growth, health and welfare. The standard measures of social capital used in these studies 
are mainly the number of non-professional organizations that an individual belongs to 
and individuals’ general trust levels, namely the extent to which most people in a given 
community, region or nation trust each other (Glaeser, 2001). Furthermore, in all studies 
of differences amongst individuals as to the extent of their connectedness and trust, 
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education levels are uniformly the strongest and most consistent of explanatory factors.  
 
According to Putman (2001), although social capital has a multitude of potentially 
measurable consequences, we are not yet in a position to rule out all other explanations 
for these patterns. For example, it is also possible that the causality runs to social capital 
instead of from social capital. This is an important and indeed interesting enough field 
that it is worth paying more attention to. The linkage between some social capital 
measures and subjective well-being is closely related to our third topic.  
 
1.2. Purpose and Approach of the Thesis 
 
The main areas of concern in this thesis lies with the impact of education on different 
outcomes in China based on the individual level. They correspond to the three main parts 
to the thesis, i.e. i) earnings returns to education, ii) the influence of socio-economic 
status (SES) and BMI on self-reported health, and iii) the impact of SES and social 
capital on subjective well-being. Figure 1-1 summarizes the thesis.  
 
A central question in this thesis is how causal inferences can be drawn when only limited 
observational data are available. Motivation for causal inference in econometric models is 
especially strong when the causal variables themselves reflect individuals’ decisions and 
hence are potentially endogenous. Therefore the inferences on such causal relationships 
need to be drawn based on both economic theory and econometric techniques. The 
problem of endogeneity is traditionally tackled by the use of some instrumental variable 
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method, although recently much of the work in this genre has been criticised from the 
perspective of weak instruments. Throughout the thesis, we suggest alternative 
approaches, and their value lies more in that they present extra evidence on the impact of 
education, rather than they unambiguously provide a solution to the endogeneity problem. 
Indeed it is reasonable to argue that, such is the nature of the endogeneity problem with 
respect to education based on a lack of data on e.g. pure ability, there is no ideal solution. 
 
Figure 1-1 Diagram of the Thesis Representation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The broken lines indicate the possibility of reverse causality or the ‘third variables’ affecting both 
outcomes.  
 
Apart from education a second focus of the thesis is on China. How does education 
impact on earnings, health and well-being in China? Are these impacts comparable with 
those found in other studies, primarily of developed market economies? This is important 
if we are to understand how the results of such research can be generalized across people 
in different countries. But in addition China is emerging as a major economic power, and 
Education 
Income 
Health 
Other Socio- 
economic 
Variables Social Capital 
Subjective 
Well-being 
Body Mass 
Index 
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an understanding of that country and its people is also important. 
 
The approach in this thesis is both structural and parametric. Economic theory is used to 
formulate the models and to provide empirically testable hypotheses in some cases. The 
emphasis is on the empirical analysis. A lot of effort has been devoted to stretching the 
statistical methods to obtain consistent estimates.  
 
The data we use for the first two parts, corresponding to the fourth and fifth chapters 
respectively of the thesis, comes from the Household Survey and Physical Examination in 
China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The CHNS was collected mainly by the 
Carolina Population Centre and it is designed to examine the effects of the health, 
nutrition, and family planning policies and programs implemented by national and local 
governments and to see how the social and economic transformation of Chinese society is 
affecting the health and nutritional status of its population. The sample from the 
Household Survey for the first part of the work covers the years of 1989, 1993, 1997 and 
2000, and the Physical Examination for the second part covers the years of 1991, 1993, 
1997 and 2000. Both of these are panel data sets and they cover much of the period of 
China’s economic reform process, thus allowing for a comparison of some major 
variables across the nineties in China. 
 
The third part utilizes cross-sectional microdata of World Values Survey (1990, 
1995-1997, 1999-2000), which is designed to enable a cross-national, cross-cultural 
comparison of values and norms on a wide variety of topics. For the relevance of this 
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thesis, these data contain information on attitudes to quality of life, social involvements 
and trust levels which were not commonly available in a Chinese context.  
 
1.3. Chapter Outline 
 
The next chapter reviews China’s economic reforms and existing regional inequality 
related to income, health care and education. China’s transition from a centrally-planned 
to a market economy began at the end of 1978 motivated by the realizations of the need 
for a rapid expansion of an economy characterized by low allocative and technical 
efficiency. Economic reforms have brought significant changes to China’s labour market 
and market determined wage rates. However, it has also led to a growing inequality of 
income, specifically between urban and rural areas, as well as between inland and coastal 
provinces. This chapter presents the transitional background to evaluate the implications 
of our econometric results for the returns to education in China.  
 
The theoretical framework and empirical background relevant to educational returns are 
presented in chapter 3. We mainly focus on two representative theories: human capital 
theory and the concept of health capital. Specifically we examine the possibilities that 
education may not have a causal impact on earnings and health. In addition, we also 
generally discuss the measurement and measurable consequences of social capital. The 
discussion of these theoretical and empirical issues introduces the main research themes 
and corresponding hypotheses, which are analyzed and tested in the following three 
chapters.  
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Chapter 4, 5 and 6 form the main part of the thesis. The empirical findings from the 
analysis of economic returns to education related to earnings, health and subjective 
well-being are presented in these three chapters. Chapter 4 estimates the private returns to 
investment in years of education in urban China. Within the commonly used logarithmic 
wage functional framework, we focus on the potential biases, mainly unmeasured ability, 
in the endogeneity of educational choice which is mostly ignored for developing 
countries. We deal with this in a slightly different way to others as we do not have 
suitably strong instrumental variables available in our dataset. We assume that the impact 
of education itself on earnings may be because education either (i) enhances ability and 
productivity or (ii) because it reflects ability. If the former is true then in a changing 
world, skills, including educationally enhanced skills, will date and hence the value of 
education in enhancing earnings should decline as the period since formal education 
completed increases. We found strong evidence for this in the regression results with the 
assumption that the value of education as a signal does not decline with age.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the impact of SES and BMI on self-reported health. Specifically, we 
attempt to establish the causal nature of the relationship between education, income and 
health. Based on the possibility of unobserved individual heterogeneity, we apply a 
recently-developed statistical method for estimating an ordered logit model with 
fixed-effects as well as an ordered probit model with random-effects. We find, 
specifically for the income, the magnitude and significance of the coefficients in 
random-effects and fixed-effects models are very close. In addition, also as a robustness 
check, using an approach based on the relationship between SES and the change of health 
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status we find the SES characteristics of people whose health status is deteriorating.  
 
BMI is more closely related to health behavior than self-reported health, and it is another 
important aspect included in this chapter. We question the general calculation of BMI 
(weight(kg)/height(m)²), and we extend it to include the impact of both gender and age. 
Based on this analysis we calculate alternative BMIs. In addition, we also examine the 
‘healthy range’ in China based on our new measures of BMI and further estimate its 
impact on self-reported health together with SES.  
 
Education and health are the two most important investments individuals make. Both 
investments make individuals more productive, and they also have a considerable impact 
on their subjective level of well-being. Chapter 6 estimates the impact of SES and social 
capital on happiness and life satisfaction for China. As throughout the thesis, we also 
focus on the impact of education on social capital. We use social involvements and the 
trust level to measure the social capital. Specifically, we separate participation in 
voluntary associations and political parties based on the Chinese context. This chapter 
thus adds one more piece to the accumulating international evidence on subjective 
well-being.  
 
In the concluding chapter, we sum up all the findings and explore the policy implications 
using the evidence revealed in this thesis for educational practitioners and policy makers. 
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Chapter 2 Economic Reforms in China 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The realizations of the potential for rapid expansions of an economy with low allocative 
and technical efficiency motivated the economic reforms inaugurated in 1978. These 
reforms were the stimulus for economic development in China, which firstly began in 
rural areas. The key to the reforms in rural areas was the dissolution of communes across 
the country and the implementation of the household responsibility system, which 
provided new opportunities for farm families to take control of their labour allocation 
decisions. For example, rural households were allowed to accumulate funds to invest in 
small-scale industry. Non-farm employment was largely increased and a massive flow of 
migrant workers from the rural areas to the urban areas began in the mid 1980s (Meng, 
2000). Since 1984, the focus of the reforms has gradually shifted to urban areas. The 
reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is seen as the core of urban reform. During the 
1990s, Deng introduced the concept of the ‘socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics’ by transforming the ownership system into a mixed structure with the 
public sector dominant and various types of ownership coexistent (Guo, 2003). In 1990, 
the share of total urban employment in state units was 62.3%, but by 2000 it had declined 
to 38.1% 1 . Meanwhile, beginning in 1997, the government moved forward with 
                                                        
1 Data come from China Statistical Yearbook, collected by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, 2001. 
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aggressive restructuring and privatization of SOEs, leading to substantial layoffs, 
retirements, and exits from the labour force (Maurer-Fazio, 1999).  
 
Amongst the developing countries, China has made rapid progress in economic growth, 
and its annual GDP growth rate has increased on average by 9.5% each year between 
1989 and 2005. At the same time, economic reforms have had a great impact on income 
distribution which led to the growing inequality of income in the 1990s (Uchimura, 2005). 
There are large inequalities in wage income between urban and rural residents, as well as 
between different regions. As Han (1998) argued, the urban-rural inequality has been the 
biggest contributor to the whole problem of inequality in China followed by inter-
regional inequality. A key dimension of inter-regional inequality is that between inland 
and coastal provinces. In addition, there are other dimensions of regional inequality on 
human development related to income inequality, such as health care and education 
attainment. The reasons for this are related to both economic and political factors.   
 
This chapter will proceed as follows: In section 2, we generally review the situation of 
China’s labour market in the pre-reform era. Section 3 focuses on the two primary aspects 
of China’s reforms pertaining to the labour market and to the wage-setting system and 
ownership system for SOEs. In section 4, we investigate the main causes of inter-
provincial inequality and rural-urban inequality based on income, health care and 
education attainment. We conclude this chapter in section 5.  
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2.2. Labour Market in Pre-reform China 
 
2.2.1. Pre-reform Labour Arrangements and Employment 
 
Before economic reform was initiated in 1978, China did not have labour markets in the 
conventional sense or as assumed in human capital theory. In the late 1950s to the late 
1970s, under the planned allocation of labour, major employers such as SOEs, 
collectively-owned enterprises (COEs) or government department were not allowed to 
recruit freely. The labour allocation process began with the central and local 
government’s annual plan for labour quotas. The distribution between employers and 
employees was totally done through the government labour bureaus without much 
reference to the needs of individual enterprises or the characteristics of workers. 
Individuals were not allowed to find jobs by themselves, and the wages and salaries of 
workers and managers were determined not by their performance but by their education, 
age, position, and other criteria according to a national wage scale (Lin, et al., 1996). In 
other words, labour at that time was not considered a commodity and wages were not 
perceived as being the price of labour (Meng, 2000). Furthermore, the state enterprises 
remitted all their profits to the state and the state budget also would cover all losses 
incurred by enterprises. The employers had no autonomy in the employment/dismissal of 
employees as full employment and lifetime tenure, at least in SOEs, were typical features 
of this system. Thus a person’s first job was normally his/her only job, the so called ‘iron 
rice bowl2’. According to Meng (2000), by having such an authoritarian structure of job 
                                                        
2 According to Ding and Warner (2001), the ‘iron rice bowl’ was characterized by a system of 
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allocation, and by restricting rural-urban migration, the ideological goal of full 
employment was achieved when the economy was running smoothly3.  
 
China’s population remains predominantly in rural areas and over 80 percent were 
classified as rural by the 1980 census. Rural-urban labour migration was strictly restricted, 
as well as inter-regional migration. The restrictions on labour mobility were implemented 
through the household registration system (Hukou) which was set up in the mid-1950s. 
People were forced to register with local authorities to gain residency, and a place of 
work, and spend their lives in the place where they were born. In short, individuals were 
tied to their birthplace. For example, urban enterprises were restricted from recruiting 
labour from another province unless labour could not be found locally (Brooks and Tao, 
2003). More specifically, rural people were excluded from working in the cities, and 
received no social benefits. Only approved urban registered residents were allowed to live 
and work in urban areas. More important, only urban Hukou holders were entitled to 
receive welfare benefits including housing, medical care, pensions and sometimes 
schooling and hospital treatment, provided mostly by the SOEs as an internal social 
security system (Meng, 2000). It is clear that a great imbalance existed between the 
treatment of the rural labour force compared to that of the urban one. There were some 
exceptions, such as rural university graduates or army officials, who could gain urban 
Hukou residency. Before the reforms, these seemed to be the only opportunity for young 
people to leave the rural registration. This system effectively constrained the development 
                                                                                                                                                                     
unified job allocation, guaranteed life-long employment, and cradle-to-grave welfare. 
3 The periods, when the economy was running smoothly, did not include the Great Leap Forward 
(in the late 1950s and early 1960s) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969). For detailed 
discussions see Meng (2000).  
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of a national labour market. Meng (2000) argued that these restrictions generated serious 
problems for the Chinese economy including considerable hidden unemployment in the 
countryside and low productivity and inefficiency in the cities.   
 
2.2.2. The Urban Grade Wage System 
 
As mentioned, China’s urban labour market was characterized by a system of centrally 
fixed wages and lifetime secured employment. The grade wage system which was 
introduced in 1950s was based on the Soviet model, and continued with hardly any 
changes until the late 1970s. This complicated wage system can be roughly broken into 
three sub-systems: i) the eight-scale wage structure for production workers, ii) the post or 
job-type wage system, for employees mainly in light and service industries; and iii) the 
responsibility wage system, mainly for administrative and managerial personnel in 
enterprises4 (Ding and Warner, 2001). Wage grades were based on personal criteria such 
as seniority and qualifications, including educational levels and work experience (Shan, 
1991). This wage-setting system provided a precise wage for each individual based on the 
predeterminated wage grades (according to these personal criteria). Enterprises had no 
right to determine their employees’ wages, instead, they were given an annual total wage 
bill quota by the Ministry of Labour and Personnel, and this wage bill quota was a direct 
function of enterprises’ employment allocation, i.e. the fixed employment quota 
multiplied by the precise level of wage for each individual employed in the enterprise 
(Meng, 2000). Further, the wage levels differed by regions. For example, Beijing, the 
                                                        
4 According to Kidd and Meng (2001), this wage system consists of eight levels for factory 
workers (ranking in ascending order) and 25-28 levels for carders (ranking in descending order).  
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capital of China, was ranked in region 6, whereas Shanghai was a more expensive region 
and was placed in region 8. According to Meng (2000), the higher the rank, the higher the 
wage levels.  
 
China has adhered to a ‘low-wage policy’ to increase capital accumulation for investment 
in heavy industries. Wage increases were awarded only according to government 
regulations apart from accruing to seniority5. Employees in industrial enterprises could 
also get a uniform pay-rise in nation-wide ‘wage increase campaigns’ that occurred 
infrequently when the financial condition of the state could afford a general increase 
(Qian, 1997). Wages generally didn’t increase for very long periods. According to Ding 
and Warner (2001), the statistics show that the annual growth rate of the real wage-
income earned by workers in state enterprises was only 0.3 percent during the period 
1953-1977. The situation was even worse during the Cultural Revolution. In the 
meantime, the wage difference between managers and workers, as well as between 
intellectual and physical labourers was kept low as egalitarianism was another feature of 
this system. Since wages were separated from enterprise performance and individual 
efforts, their role as an effective means of motivating employees and rewarding hard 
work was seriously undermined (Ding and Warner, 2001). 
 
 
 
                                                        
5  According to Meng (2000), for example, after 3 years at apprenticeship level, individuals 
received an increase in wages to level 1 for production workers (8 levels in total), and 3-5 years 
later, their wage level would automatically increase by a level.  
 19
2.3. Labour Market Reforms 
 
2.3.1. Changes of China’s Labour Market 
 
According to Kidd and Meng (2001), it has been argued by many Chinese economists 
and policy makers that the major weaknesses of the pre-reform labour market in China 
were two-fold: 1) a system of guaranteed life time employment encouraged over-staffing, 
shirking and low productivity, and 2) the wage grade system rewarded individuals’ 
personal endowments (such as education and work experience) without regard for their 
actual labour productivity. One issue which is necessary to mention is the consideration 
of education and work experience by the grade wage system, which appears to be similar 
to that in a market economy. However, there is an essential ingredient missing as argued 
by Meng (2000). Human capital theory assumes the existence of a labour market with 
few imperfections and that each individual decides how much education to obtain to 
increase his/her marginal productivity and subsequently their future earnings. It is clear 
that in pre-reform China, the linkage between human capital and labour productivity is 
broken when enterprises are not able to hire/fire employees; or when employees are not 
able to choose jobs which may suit their abilities/interest. Generally speaking, there was 
no mechanism to encourage individuals to work efficiently, thus a high level of human 
capital stock was not linked to high productivity. The realizations of the low productivity 
and inefficiency with the pre-reform labour arrangements motivated the labour market 
reforms inaugurated by the late 1970s. One of the greatest challenges facing China was 
the development of a well-functioning labour market. Such a labour assignment system 
 20
should allow employers and employees to choose each other in the light of their needs to 
obtain actual matches between them.  
 
In 1980, a more flexible labour market strategy began to emerge. Instead of directly being 
allocated by the government labour bureaus, urban job-seekers were allowed to find work 
in the state, collective, or newly-recognized private sectors, and enterprises were granted 
greater flexibility over labour allocation and more autonomy in hiring/dismissal decisions 
(Brooks and Tao, 2003). In 1986, the introduction of labour contracts allowed state 
enterprises to hire workers on short-term contracts rather than provide permanent 
employment. As a result, the share of workers on labour contracts increased, further 
stimulated by additional reforms in 1994 which the Labour Law of China promulgated, 
coming into effect on January 1995, which represented a new breakthrough (Ding and 
Warner, 2001). The share of workers on contracts almost doubled between 1994 and 1997, 
to about one-third of urban workers (Brooks and Tao, 2003). By the end of 2000, the 
labour contract system had been implemented in urban enterprises of every description. 
Restrictions on the mobility of workers between enterprises have also been removed.  
 
Following Deng’s southern trip in 1992, with the deepening of the labour market reform, 
non-state sectors emerged and developed rapidly due to the opening of the economy to 
private and foreign investors. There was a strong trend to leave the government or state 
sector, moving to the non-state sectors. As mentioned, the share of total urban 
employment in state units declined from 62.3% in 1990 to 38.1% in 2000. In the latter 
part of the 1990s, the government moved forward with aggressive restructuring and 
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privatization of SOEs to resolve the problem of inefficiency, leading to substantial layoffs, 
retirements, and exits from the labour force (Maurer-Fazio, 1999). Large numbers of 
redundant employees in SOEs had been laid off, being called xiagang 6 workers. An 
estimated 25 million state-owned enterprise and collective employees were laid off in the 
period 1998-20027. As part of a reemployment program, the xiagang workers could enter 
reemployment centers to obtain job training and search assistance. As long as they stayed 
in the reemployment centers, they were provided with minimum income support for up to 
three years, although they sometimes did not receive that in practice (Yueh, 2004). In 
March 2005, considering that the structural change of state-owned enterprises had almost 
been completed and that the peak of xiagang workers had already gone, all the 
reemployment centers of the SOEs were closed within the year. Instead of xiagang, the 
laid-off workers would then be regarded as ‘unemployed’.  
 
Beginning with the reform period in the late 1970s and accelerating in the late 1990s, 
reforms to the household registration (Hukou) system have been implemented by the 
Chinese authorities. Restrictions on obtaining urban residence permits have been 
gradually relaxed. The extension of the temporary residence system to towns and small 
cities provided legal channels for rural labourers to move between their rural homes to 
unskilled jobs in urban areas. Further introduced in 1992, the “blue stamp” hukou policy 
permitted wealthy individuals to buy an “urban” designation by investing large sums of 
money in urban areas. Apart from this, millions of rural Chinese migrants also migrated 
                                                        
6 Xiagang workers are one form of laid-off workers who are officially registered as part of their 
enterprise or work unit, but do not go to work or receive a wage (Yueh, 2004). 
7 Data come from China Statistical Yearbook, 2003. 
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to urban areas without any formal registration8. Despite these reforms, both unregistered 
migrants and those holding temporary residence permits faced severe limits on their 
ability to obtain public services such as subsidized health care or education8. In 1997, the 
authorities initiated an experimental program in designated small towns and cities to give 
migrants an equal chance of being recruited and also allowed those who had either ‘a 
stable job or source of income’ or a ‘stable place of residence’ for over two years to 
obtain an urban hukou (Brooks and Tao, 2003). Since 2001, many provinces and large 
cities have also begun to allow migrants who satisfy certain criteria to obtain local hukou 
in urban areas. Brooks and Tao (2003) further argued that estimates of the migrant 
population vary, ranging between 80 million and 150 million between 1990 and 20009. 
According to official statistics, the urban population share has increased from about 26% 
in 1990 to 39% in 2002. In addition, of the total growth in the urban population in the 
1990s, 55% was due to migration (Chan and Hu, 2003). Migration has been partially the 
reason behind increasing urban unemployment. Because of Chandrasekhar and Ghosh’s 
(2006) rationale, unemployment in terms of absolute numbers of people has risen steadily 
since 1985, reaching a high of 7.7 million in 2002. 
 
2.3.2. Wage-setting Reforms of SOEs 
 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the wage-setting reforms have been implemented to 
                                                        
8  Detailed discussions see China’s Household Registration System: Sustained Reform Needed to 
Protect China’s Rural Migrants, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, October, 2005.  
9 According to Brooks and Tao (2003), the National Bureau of Statistics estimates there were 
about 80 million permanents migrants (i.e., those living in urban areas for more than six months) 
between 1990 and 2000. No reliable data are available for the number of temporary migrants, 
with estimates in the range of 30-75 million.   
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introduce incentives to work and encourage efficiency (Meng, 2000). These are along two 
dimensions. Firstly, in 1985, the enterprise’s total wage quota system was changed to a 
‘floating’ total wage system. The floating system relates the enterprise’s total wage bill to 
its profitability and economic performance, and it provides profit-oriented incentives 
(Yueh, 2004). The new system further allows enterprises to retain part of their profits to 
contribute to their employees’ welfare system (Kidd and Meng, 2001). This clearly 
indicated the increasing level of enterprise autonomy associated with the labour market 
reforms. In 1993, the minimum wage was set up but there were no unified standards 
nationwide. The standards of minimum wages shall be fixed and readjusted with 
comprehensive reference to the following factors: (1) The lowest living costs of localities; 
(2) Average wage level; (3) Productivity; (4) Situation of employment; and (5) 
Differences between regions in their levels of economic development10. 
  
The second dimension involved linking the wages of individuals to their labour 
productivity within enterprises confined by the total wage budget. In 1994, the new 
Labour Law was introduced to give enterprises more discretion over wage determination. 
It is possible for larger income differences to arise, to let employers pay bonuses to more 
productive workers. The ‘wage plus bonus’ system was the most frequently adopted and 
the importance of bonuses has been increased gradually (Meng, 2000). Previously, there 
had been six components of the wage in enterprises including the basic wage, bonuses, 
benefits and subsides, overtime wages, supplementary wages and an unnamed component, 
mainly based on hardship (Yueh, 2004). These categories have been replaced by two 
                                                        
10 These factors come from the Labour Law of the People's Republic of China, Chapter 5: article 
49.  
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components of wages: fixed wages, including the basic wage, seniority wage, insurance 
and a housing fund; and bonuses, based on both individual productivity and enterprise 
profitability (Yueh, 2004). As a result, the share of bonuses in total wages for all 
enterprises rose from 2.4 percent in 1978 to 23.3 percent in 1993, and then declined to 
about 16 percent in 1997. In 1994, there seems to be a turning point when the share of 
fixed wage starts to increase again (Meng, 2000). However, due to high supervision costs, 
bonuses have often been distributed on an egalitarian basis within work units (Chen, et al., 
2005). As argued by Ding and Warner (2001), the general wage level of SOEs is still 
below that of private and foreign-invested enterprises11. SOEs are facing difficulties in 
keeping skilled labour and experienced managers, engineers, and marketing personnel 
from moving to private and foreign-invested companies in pursuit of more attractive pay 
packages. This makes it necessary to look at the sectoral differences when estimating 
returns to education in the fourth chapter.  
 
2.3.3. The Ownership Reform of SOEs 
 
Reforms to SOEs have taken a series of different stages since the late 1970s. According to 
Guo (2003), the first stage, from 1979 to 1987, centered on the decentralization of 
management or an expansion of managerial autonomy of SOEs by introducing to 
enterprises ‘mandatory planning reduction’, ‘profit-retention mechanisms’ ‘profit-tax 
                                                        
11 On the other hand, Chen, et al. (2005) argued that when non-wage benefits are taken into 
account, workers in SOEs earn significantly more than workers in urban collectives or domestic 
private enterprises. Because of the duality of the Chinese economy, foreign-invested enterprises 
have to pay higher wages to attract skilled workers. 
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reform12’, and ‘production responsibility systems’ under which enterprises could operate 
more autonomously and efficiently. The second stage, from 1987 to 1992, centered on the 
separation of ownership and management by introducing a system of ‘contracted 
managerial responsibility’, attempting to clarify the responsibilities and benefits between 
the state and managers. It is clear that such efforts focused on devolving more powers 
down to enterprise managers and giving them profit incentives without making 
significant changes to the existing ownership structure (Green, 2003). Since 1992-1993, 
the third stage reforms centered in the establishment of a ‘socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics’ by transforming the ownership system into a mixed structure 
with the public sector dominant and various types of ownership coexistent (Guo, 2003). 
Starting from the mid-1990s the official reform objective is the creation of a ‘modern 
enterprise system’ (MES) with clarified property rights based on separated government 
and enterprise functions. The central idea of the MES is the commercialization of SOEs 
by way of transforming them into joint stock companies and limited liability companies 
(Opper, 2001). 
 
To a large extent, restructuring followed the direction of the official guiding principle: 
“seizing on the big and letting go the small”. Based on this, the state decided to reduce 
state ownership of small- and medium-size enterprises by mostly selling off or 
contracting out those running losses. One issue needs to be mentioned, as argued by 
Chairman Jiang, the aim of ‘letting go the small’ is not simply to sell them off or abandon 
them, but to invigorate them. The preferred route for reforming large SOEs is converting 
                                                        
12 From 1983, profit remittances to the government were replaced by a profit tax. See Lin, Cai and 
Li (1996).  
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them into shareholding companies restricted by the central government. Different 
measures were implemented including mergers, acquisitions, leasing, auction, bankruptcy, 
formation of shareholding companies or cooperative, and joint ventures. Such reforms 
have transformed the Chinese ownership system into a mixed structure including state-
owned enterprise, collective-owned enterprises, foreign-invested enterprises, private-
owned enterprises, individual enterprises, domestic joint-ventures, shareholding 
companies and others (Chen, et al., 2005). It is necessary to emphasize that the state 
sector has indeed shrunk, however, it continues to be dominant in the national economy. 
Guo (2003) further argued that China’s ownership reform should be characterized by an 
increased role of the market and competition, but not by the replacement of public 
ownership with private ownership as in a capitalist system.   
 
2.4. Regional Inequality 
 
2.4.1. Income Inequality  
 
China’s economic growth has been highly impressive since the 1990s compared to other 
transitional economies. By 2005, with an average annual economic growth rate of 9.5 
percent, real GDP had expanded to 9.7 times that of GDP in 1980. The economic reforms 
have had a significant impact on income distribution, and at the same time led to a rapid 
increase in income inequality although it is a historic issue13. According to Benjamin, et 
al. (2005), it should come as no surprise that inequality rose as China moved from an 
                                                        
13 According to Huang, et al. (2003), before the Communist government took over mainland 
China in 1949, the coastal areas had already become more developed than the interior areas. 
 27
ostensibly egalitarian socialist economy to a more market-oriented one. It is mainly 
reflected by regional inequality, including intra-rural and intra-urban inequalities, and 
specifically inter-provincial inequality and rural-urban inequality which we are going to 
generally describe in this section. A key dimension of inter-provincial inequality is that 
between inland and coastal provinces. We will begin with this. The China’s economic 
reforms were introduced gradually towards making the economy more market-oriented 
and opening up to the outside world. Since Deng, the chief architect of China’s economic 
reforms, believed that China could not achieve rapid economic growth in all regions 
simultaneously (Jones, et al., 2003). The new strategies were designed to allow a portion 
of people and areas to grow rich first. In other words, the economic reforms shifted the 
focus from encouraging full regional development to developing only the coastal regions 
in the southern and eastern parts based on their readily accessible geographic location 
(Huang, et al., 2003).    
 
The central government further established the special economic zones (SEZs) of 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen (1980) (see Figure 2-1), 14 open coastal cities 
(1984), Hainan island (1988), Shanghai Pudong District (1990), free trade zones in 
coastal cities (1993), open border cities and open free trade zones such as Yangtze Delta 
and the Pearl River (Jones, et al., 2003). The introduction of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and technology  concentrated  on these limited regions together with granted 
preferential policies14 by central government, which has brought rapid economic growth 
to them (Okushima and Uchimura, 2005). During the period of 1985 to 2000, more than 
85% of the cumulative FDI was located in the coastal (or eastern) regions (Wei, 2003/2). 
                                                        
14 For detailed discussions on these ‘preferential policies’ see Jones, et al., 2003.  
 28
The emphasis on coastal development has led to a rapid rise in the income inequality in 
China. For instance, in 2000, per capita GDP and the total GDP of Jiangsu province, one 
of the eastern coastal provinces, were 4.4 times and 8.6 times15 larger respectively than 
Guizhou province, one of the western provinces where economic development has been 
relative slow. See Table 2-1.   
 
Figure 2-1 China Special Economic Zones 
 
 
 
Source: University of Texas Libraries, map collection. 
                                                        
15 Data come from China Statistical Yearbook, 2001. 
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Table 2-1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Per Capita GDP by Regions 
 
Eastern GDP (100M yuan) Central GDP Western GDP 
  1996 2000 2005   1996 2000 2005   1996 2000 2005 
Beijing 1615.73 2478.76 6886.31 Jilin 1337.16 1821.19 3620.27 Shaanxi 1175.38 1643.81 3675.66
Shanghai 2902.20 4551.15 9154.18 Heilongjiang 2402.58 3253.00 5511.50 Sichuan 4215.00 4010.25 7385.11
Tianjin 1102.40 1639.36 3697.62 Inner Mongolia 984.78 1401.01 3895.55 Guizhou 719.83 993.53 1979.06
Hebei 3452.97 5088.96 10096.11 Anhui 2339.25 3038.24 5375.12 Yunnan 1491.62 1955.09 3472.89
Liaoning 3157.69 4669.06 8009.01 Jiangxi 1517.26 2003.07 4056.76 Gansu 714.18 983.36 1933.98
Jiangsu 6004.21 8582.73 18305.66 Shanxi 1305.50 1660.92 4179.52 Qinghai 183.57 263.59 543.32
Zhejiang 4146.06 6036.34 13437.85 Henan 3683.41 5137.66 10587.42 Ningxia 193.62 265.57 606.10
Fujian 2606.92 3920.07 6568.93 Hubei 2970.20 4276.32 6520.14 Xinjiang 912.15 1364.36 2604.19
Shandong 5960.42 8542.44 18516.87 Hunan 2647.16 3691.88 6511.34 Tibet 64.76 117.46 251.21
Guangdong 6519.14 9662.23 22366.54         
Guangxi 1869.62 2050.14 4075.75         
Hainan 389.53 518.48 894.57         
 Per capita GDP (yuan)  Per capita GDP  Per capita GDP 
Beijing 15044 22460 45444 Jilin 5163 6847 13348 Shaanxi 3313 5137 9899 
Shanghai 22275 34547 51474 Heilongjiang 6468 8562 14434 Sichuan 3763 4784 9060 
Tianjin 12270 17993 35783 Inner Mongolia 4259 5872 16331 Guizhou 2093 2662 5052 
Hebei 5345 7663 14782 Anhui 3881 4867 8675 Yunnan 3715 4637 7835 
Liaoning 7730 11226 18983 Jiangxi 3715 4581 9440 Gansu 2901 3838 7477 
Jiangsu 8447 11773 24560 Shanxi 4220 4549 12495 Qinghai 3748 5087 10045 
Zhejiang 9455 13461 27703 Henan 4032 5444 11346 Ningxia 3731 4839 10239 
Fujian 8136 11601 18646 Hubei 5122 7188 11431 Xinjiang 5167 7470 13108 
Shandong 6834 9555 20096 Hunan 4130 5639 10426 Tibet 2732 4559 9114 
Guangdong 9513 12885 24435         
Guangxi 4081 4319 8788         
Hainan 5500 6894 10871         
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
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The two largest cities of Beijing and Shanghai account for a large part of the variation in 
regional incomes. These two large metropoli, which enjoy a high level of 
industrialization and a large percent of their population living within 100km off the coast 
or on navigable waters, which enabled them to reap the full benefits of public 
infrastructure expansions, export promotion and substantial FDI inflows (Chandrasekhar 
and Ghosh, 2006). For example, the difference in per capita GDP between Shanghai and 
Guizhou increased from 7.3 times in 1990 to 12 times in 200016. Given that the coastal 
economy has largely expanded, the central government started to show concern for the 
development of interior regions in the 1990s. The plan of ‘the Great Development of the 
Western Area’, which has been promoted since 1999, may represent the government’s 
first real determination to develop its vast interior (Huang, et al., 2003). The recent 
strategies have involved funding new infrastructure projects and increasing fiscal 
transfers to these areas (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2006). It is hard to actually assess this 
strategic shift because the development of the western regions is ‘a systematic project and 
a long-term task, which may take the efforts of several generations’17. In addition, it must 
be recognized that almost all large economies exhibit substantial regional differences. 
This is not specially a Chinese phenomenon.   
 
Han (1998) has argued that the urban-rural inequality has been the biggest contributor to 
the whole problem of inequality in China. As mentioned, the increases in inequality are 
related to the economic growth process. In rural areas, the non-farming income 
opportunities, which significantly contribute to the inequality, are concentrated in a few 
                                                        
16 Data come from Shijie Ribao, January, 2000. 
17 Borrowing the words of Chinese leaders in Beijing Review, April, 2000. 
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areas, whilst rich urban areas, including for example urban municipalities, have grown 
more rapidly than others. This gap in urban areas is exacerbated by Chinese fiscal 
policies, which allow these richer areas to retain their higher revenues for local use and 
benefits. According to Sicular, et al. (2005), China’s urban-rural gap is not uniform 
regionally, it is higher in the western regions and comparatively lower in the central and 
eastern regions. For example, as argued by Benjamin et al. (2005), in the more dynamic 
coastal provinces, more rapid job growth in the non-state sector helped reduce urban-rural 
differentials by fostering more rapid rural income growth. The level of urban-rural 
inequality is significant in China, and the income gap between urban and rural areas rose 
steadily from 1979 to 1994. Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2006) argued that this inequality 
has largely accounted for the growing gap between wages in agriculture which is 
dominant in rural areas and wages in industry and services which predominate in urban 
areas. There was a short period of declining differences between 1995 and 1997, based on 
the increased price of agricultural products, introduced by the government in 1995 (Lu 
and Chen, 2006). Since 1997, inequality has increased once again as the price of 
agricultural products has fallen. Apart from these factors, restrictions on labour 
movement have been another important factor behind urban-rural inequality in China.  
 
The urban-rural income gap is often attributed to policies that inhibit labour mobility 
including, for example, discouraging relocation and employment of rural migrants in 
urban areas which is specifically restricted by the household registration system as 
mentioned before. Lu and Chen (2006) argued that the outflow of rural labourers 
increased the income of rural residents because migrant workers send money back to their 
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hometowns. From the 1980s onwards, some rural migrants have been granted temporary 
residence permits in urban regions. However, the larger part of the migrant population did 
not qualify for those permits, and had to remain in the informal sectors without access to 
the public utilities (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2006). Although recent social security 
system reform has shifted the responsibility from the SOEs and aimed to set up a unified 
system, it is clear there still exists a great variability in coverage of workers and the rural 
migrants are mostly left out of system. They are discriminated against in terms of 
education, housing, public service, pensions and health insurance18 compared to urban 
residents. Furthermore, to protect urban residents, many large and medium-size cities 
limited rural labour’s entry into good jobs by administrative means 19 (Lu and Chen, 
2006). These significant discriminations in social welfare significantly increased the 
urban-rural income differentials. Although the household registration system relaxed 
recently, huge challenges remain. For example, it is still noteworthy that richer rural 
inhabitants tend to have a higher possibility of obtaining urban household registrations 
than poorer inhabitants20.  
 
2.4.2. Inequality of Health Care 
 
China has experienced unprecedented economic growth, which has been accompanied by 
dramatic increases in income inequality as mentioned above. Relatively little discussion 
                                                        
18 On health insurance, Han (1998) argued that although some rural residents who work for 
country or township governments have employer-covered health insurance, the quality and 
availability in urban areas far exceeded that in rural areas.  
19 For example, according to Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2006), rural migrant workers in cities 
often face discrimination as a result of local regulations, being charged various ‘administration 
fees’.   
20 For detailed discussions see Lu and Chen, 2006. 
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is available on inequality in other dimensions of human development related to this 
income inequality, such as health care and education, which we are going to generally 
describe in this and the following section. Before the economic reforms, almost all urban 
residents of working age had guaranteed jobs in the SOEs and COEs. These jobs 
provided urban residents with benefits such as free or subsidized education, housing and 
health care. Two primary components of health insurance schemes operated in urban 
China in the pre-reform era. The Government Insurance Scheme21 (GIS), which covered 
government employees, retirees, disabled veterans, and university teachers, staff and 
students; and the Labour Insurance Scheme (LIS), which covered state enterprise 
employees, retirees and their dependents (Dong, 2001/2). The former was financed 
directly by government budgets, and the latter was financially supported by the welfare 
funds of enterprises. These two schemes provided comprehensive health care benefits and 
services based on a person’s place of employment.  
 
Health care and education attainment for rural residents were much worse compared to 
urban ones, due to the government’s urban-biased policy (Zhang and Kanbur, 2005). The 
Cooperative Medical System (CMS) was established primarily in rural areas, together 
with a three-tier (county, commune and production brigade) health delivery system, 
which guaranteed the majority of rural population access to essential health care 
regardless of their economic situation. By 1979 it is estimated that 80-90% of the rural 
population were covered by some form of CMEs (Zhu and Zhang, 1987). China’s health 
care system has undertaken great changes since the start of economic reforms for both 
urban and rural areas specifically after the 1980s, which has led to increasing inequality 
                                                        
21 In China, this plan is more often called ‘Free Medical Care’. 
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of health care coverage, cost and financing.  
 
China’s reforms have led to significant changes in health care coverage and costs with the 
collapse of the CMS in the rural areas and the erosion of the LIS in the urban areas (Wu, 
2003). Because the GIS is financed by each provincial government, the coverage of GIS 
in urban areas differs by province as well, with eastern provinces more capable of 
providing health insurance coverage to government employees than provincial 
governments in the western and central regions (Grogan, 1995). However, the major 
difference with respect to health insurance coverage is between urban and rural areas. In 
the urban areas, some urban programs have introduced cost-containment incentives to 
insurance programs, including co-payments and fixed monthly payments, which 
recipients can use for medical care or keep if they are not ill (Shi, 1993; Guo, 2003). 
However, according to Zhao (2006), in large and medium-sized cities, respondents 
having no health care coverage accounted for some 40 percent of the population in 2003, 
and in rural areas, proportions covered by the resurrected CMS or other health insurance 
schemes were generally small, and more than 80 percent had no health care coverage at 
all. An increasing number of people have to bear the full costs of medical care22, the 
majority of rural residents, whose income is on average less than half of the urban 
residents23 have to pay for health care out-of pocket, and those who can not afford to do 
so are denied access to care. Feng, et al. (1995) argued that ill health was one of the 
major contributors to the poverty of families in the poorer areas, and that almost half of 
those who needed medical care could not afford it. It is necessary to further mention that 
                                                        
22 According to Zhang and Kanbur (2005), the share of out-of-pocket expense in medical care for 
China as a whole increased from 16% in 1980 to 61% in 2001. 
23 For detailed discussions see Shi, 1993. 
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rural-to-urban migrants do typically earn more than the average rural residents, however 
it is unclear whether they actually have more health care purchasing power because as 
temporary migrant workers, they are not privileged to any urban health insurance 
programs (Grogan, 1995). 
 
Decentralization has been a central feature of fiscal reforms in the early 1980s. In this 
environment each province and lower levels of government are responsible for their own 
health care service, because of regional differences in prosperity, thus accentuating the 
already uneven distribution of health care services between rural and urban areas (Shi, 
1993). The proportion of the health care expenditure directly borne by government has 
declined sharply, and it has been specifically inadequate in less developed rural areas. In 
2000, the per capita rural health spending was merely 12 yuan, only 27.6% of the urban 
spending. Of the health expenses for China, 70% of the rural population accounted for 
only 33% of the country’s total24. It is still early to close the discussion on whether urban-
rural inequality in health care service leads to differential health outcomes, but it is clear 
that the urban population enjoys better health status than those who live in rural areas. 
For example, in 2000, urban residents have lower mortality rates than their counterparts 
in rural areas, and, further, people living in large and medium-sized cities live much 
longer than those in less developed rural areas (Zhao, 2006). It is clear that further 
reforms on health care system are still necessary. More effort needs to be made by the 
Chinese government based on a universal and compulsory health financing system, with 
regard to increasing health care coverage among the population and controlling spiraling 
increases in medical costs (Shi, 1993; Zhao, 2006).  
                                                        
24 Data come from the Red Flag Manuscripts Magazine, China, 2003.  
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2.4.3. Inequality of Education Attainment 
 
People in China have traditionally placed a high value on education, and the reason may 
be found not only in Confucian attitudes, but also in the potential benefits (Knight and 
Shi, 1996). Education is an important determinant of not only an individual’s income, but 
also his/her general well-being including factors such as improvements in health and 
nutrition. The system of education in China is divided into three categories: basic 
education, higher education, and adult education. Basic education includes primary 
education (normally six years) and regular secondary education. Secondary education is 
divided into academic secondary education (normally three years of lower and three years 
of upper middle school) and specialized/vocational/technical secondary education. Higher 
education at the undergraduate level includes two-and three-year junior colleges, four-
year colleges, and some universities offering programs in both academic and vocational 
subjects. Many colleges and universities also offer graduate programs leading to the 
master’s or Ph.D. degree25. Since the issuing of the Law of Compulsory Education in 
1986, governments at all levels have aimed to promote nine-year compulsory education 
(six years of primary education and three years of lower middle school) throughout China. 
After almost twenty years, this goal has not been totally accomplished in rural and some 
remote areas, however, it has made remarkable strides in the elimination of illiteracy. For 
example, the illiteracy rate in 1990 was approximately 21% of the total population, 
whereas in 2002 this figure was reduced to around 10%26. At the same time, higher 
education in China has experienced a massive expansion, especially over the last two 
                                                        
25 Education system in China, see China Education and Research Network, www.edu.cn. 
26 Data come from China Population Census, 1990; 2002. 
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decades, and the majority of high school graduates in China go on to attend college. 
According to the China Statistic Yearbook 2003, the proportion of upper middle school 
graduates entering into an institution of higher learning was 49.9% in 1996, and it has 
risen to 83.5%27 in 2002.  
 
According to Qian and Smyth (2005), on a larger scale, education plays an important role 
in contributing to social equity. Similar to health care, disparities exist in educational 
attainment, and specifically, gender inequality in education persists in China. Rong and 
Shi (2001) argued that the high level of female illiteracy and the underprivileged situation 
of girls with regards to their access to and retention in schools is one of the greatest 
challenges facing China. Table 2-2 shows the percentage of education attainment by 
educational level and gender in 1990 and 2000. It is clear that the percentage of illiteracy 
for women has substantially declined from 1990 to 2000, however, it was still 9% higher 
than for men in 2000. In addition, women accounted for 72.7% of the illiterate (and semi-
illiterate) population28, and this related to two points. Firstly, the high proportion of 
illiteracy for women is largely focused on the older population aged over 45. For people 
aged less than 45 (15-44), the percentage of illiteracy for women and men was 3.2% and 
1.1% respectively in 200029. Secondly, as shown in Figure 2-2, women (and men) in rural 
areas accounted for a large proportion of the illiterate population. This is consistent with 
the fact that girls (and even boys) in poor rural areas have less opportunity to attend 
                                                        
27 Data on the proportion of upper middle school graduates entering into institutions of higher 
learning refer to the ratio between new entrants into regular institutions of higher learning and 
graduates of upper middle schools (China Statistic Yearbook, 2003). 
28 These figures relate to the whole population, many of whom left school 20 or more years ago. 
Even if today the system is improving, it will still take decades to remove inequalities from the 
population as a whole. 
29 China Population Census, 2000. 
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school due to the impacts of a less developed economy and traditional conventions.  
 
Table 2-2 The Percentage of Education Attainment by Level and Gender 
 (Population Aged 15 and over)  
 
  1990 2000 
Level Female Male Female Male 
Percentage Distribution (%)     
Illiteracy 31.9  13.0  13.9  4.9  
Primary School 33.8  35.3  33.6  28.4  
Lower Middle School 24.3  36.0  36.0  44.6  
Upper and Specialized Middle School 8.8  13.1  12.8  16.4  
College and over 1.2  2.6  3.7  5.6  
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
     
Gender Distribution (%)     
Illiteracy 70.1  29.9  72.7  27.3  
Primary School 47.7  52.3  52.7  47.3  
Lower Middle School 39.0  61.0  43.2  56.8  
Upper and specialized Middle School 39.1  60.9  42.4  57.6  
College and over 30.3  69.7  38.3  61.7  
Total 48.8  51.2  49.0  51.0  
Numbers in Millions 398.6  419.0  469.1  489.0  
Source: China Population Census in 1990 and 2000. 
 
Figure 2-2 Illiteracy Rate by Urban/Rural Areas in 1990 and 2000 
(Population Aged 15 and over) 
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Source: China Population Census in 1990 and 2000. 
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Apart from the inequality between genders, inequality between the regions is mainly 
based on the quality of education provision and government expenditures, the contrasts of 
which stand out prominently in contemporary China. Data from the late 1990s and the 
year 2000 show that economically advantaged regions and urban areas enjoy substantial 
advantages in educational provision (Zhang and Kanbur, 2005). For example, from 1990 
to 1998 the pre-primary level in the rural areas witnessed no increase in the total number 
of teachers and school facilities in spite of the increased enrolment rate, however the 
urban areas saw an increase in both the number of school facilities and the number of 
teachers as well as in enrolments 30 . At the primary level, sixteen (mainly coastal) 
provinces had a 99.5% enrolment rate while a number of inland provinces (more heavily 
populated by minority groups) had markedly lower rates30. There is considerable 
administrative and fiscal decentralization in China. The structure of educational financing 
has undergone a fundamental change from a centralized system with a narrow revenue 
base to a decentralized system with a much more diversified revenue base since the early 
1980s (Qian and Smyth, 2005). Educational expenditures rose while the government’s 
share in educational expenditures dropped in the 1980s and 1990s (Tsang, 2000). 
Educational expenditures as a percentage of GDP have remained at a fairly low level (less 
than 2.4%) throughout the 1990s (Rong and Shi, 2001). According to Knight and Shi 
(1996), when education is publicly funded and funding is regionally decentralized, it is 
reasonable to expect that a prosperous region can afford to devote more resources to 
education, whereas a poor region can afford less. Thus the increasing emphasis on local 
self-reliance without cross-subsidization from richer to poorer regions, made regional 
inequality with respect to both the quantity and quality of educational provision and 
                                                        
30 See Basic Education, in United Nations in China, www.unchina.org. 
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attainment more significant.   
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter generally reviewed the economic reforms and the existing regional 
inequalities during China’s transition from a centrally-planned to a market economy. 
Even through the overall performance of China’s transition is very remarkable, the 
process is not complete yet. For example, as argued by Guo (2003), many SOEs after 
being transformed into shareholding forms continue to act and function in the same way 
as they did before, i.e., the old problems are still there, such as redundant employees, bad 
debts and all kinds of burdens and charges on enterprises. SOEs are owned by the state, 
but the control rights are divided between government and enterprise managers. 
Managers are not owners or pure shareholders, thus they can not make their decisions 
completely based on the enterprise’s economic performance, and recruit or dismiss 
employees on their abilities and productivity. As Opper (2001) concluded, the more 
diluted property rights are, the more enterprises are subject to political interventionism by 
the local and state administration, and the worse the structural performance will be.  
 
According to Lardy (2002), the absolute living standard has gone up enormously, 
although China has undergone a rapid increase in income inequality, and fairly rapid 
economic growth is important in making inequality more manageable. China is a member 
of the World Trade Origination (WTO), joining in December 2001. China’s entry into the 
WTO makes its door even more open to the world. It is necessary to continue with further 
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reforms and progress based on introducing greater competition, and these reforms and the 
accompanying globalization of the Chinese economy have to proceed at an appropriate 
speed to be consistent with a foreseen dramatic reduction in employment, specifically in 
the state sector. Some areas need to be given specific attention for further development, 
for example, the improvement of technology in agriculture, environmental protection and 
the social welfare systems, including unemployment insurance schemes and other social 
safety nets. Furthermore, as the Chinese economy becomes a more mature market 
economy and more integrated with the world economy, according to Lin (2004), it is 
crucial for the continuous growth of that economy to establish a transparent legal system 
that protects property rights so as to encourage innovations, technological changes, and 
domestic as well as foreign investments in these economies.  
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework and Empirical 
Background 
 
The importance of education in economic development has been emphasized in economic 
theory for many years. The concept of human capital is central to much of the research in 
the economics of education. Prior to this research, economic theories of capital and 
investment tended to concentrate on investment in physical capital, thus the development 
of human capital theory broadened the concept of capital and recognized that human 
skills were like any other physical capital in that they could be augmented through 
investment. Education is one of the most important aspects of investment in human 
capital, and specifically, we focus on education as a private investment decision. 
Following the introduction, this chapter discusses the theoretical and empirical issues 
relevant to educational returns corresponding to earnings, health and subjective 
well-being. We will begin with the human capital, focusing on education, and further 
expand to health capital and social capital. 
 
To estimate the impact of education in the following empirical chapters, it is necessary to 
start with how education is measured. Historically, education generally has been 
represented in the empirical studies by the number of years or grades that an individual 
has completed in the formal system. The term which is commonly used is ‘educational 
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attainment’ (Behrman, et al., 1997). Education is correlated with many outcomes, and 
most of these correlations used educational attainment to represent education. The reason 
for basing this on ‘formal education’ is, as argued by Behrman (1997), that it is a major 
form of education in most societies, and further it indicates that more information is 
gained than in most other forms of education. For example, training, as one form of 
education, is directly focused on the productivity effects of education rather than 
non-labour market benefits. 
 
There exists an argument in the literature based on the comparison of years of education 
completed and the highest level of education obtained. The idea is reflected in the 
so-called ‘sheepskin’ effect where qualifications have a discounted return that exceeds the 
return that could otherwise be gained from the number of years spent acquiring them so 
that there are discontinuities in the returns to education at points associated with 
acquiring qualifications (Chevalier, et al., 2004). For example, there might be a wage 
premium over the average return for fulfilling a particular year of education, such as the 
final year of college. Observing the non-linear wage returns to schooling years has been 
the basis of traditional tests for sheepskin effects (Gibson, 2000). However, the stronger 
test would be to compare the earnings of those who have a degree and those who do not, 
conditional on both groups having the same number of years of schooling (Park, 1999). It 
is clear that such a comparison is possible based on the available information of both 
years of education and qualifications received. In the thesis, we use the number of years 
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completed in formal system as a main indicator of education as this is consistent with 
much other research.  
 
As suggested by Behrman, et al. (1997), education might generate benefits in three ways: 
by changing individuals’ preference, by changing the constraints individuals face, or by 
augmenting the knowledge or information on which individuals base their behavior. As a 
result, the earnings of more educated people are almost always well above average; more 
educated people are more likely to have a healthy life style and thus less likely to be 
obese. However, these correlations do not necessarily imply causality. Correlation may be 
due in part to causal effects of education, but it also may reflect reverse causality or the 
fact that both education and outcomes respond to other determinants, such as innate 
ability, inherent health and family background, which make the causal explanation 
difficult. Therefore, together with introducing the theoretical foundations, this chapter 
pays particular attention to a number of the most important difficulties. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows: in the next section, we present the human capital 
framework: we start with the typical human capital theory developed by Becker (1964), 
followed by Mincer’s (1974) specification: the benchmark model for empirical estimation 
of the returns to education. Specifically, we also focus on the possible difficulties 
surrounding this form of analysis. Section 2 discusses health capital based on Grossman’s 
(1972) model, with the emphasis on the possible linkages between education and health. 
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In section 3, we introduce the dimensions and measurement of social capital and 
generally discuss the linkage between some social capital variables and subjective 
well-being. Finally we conclude this chapter. 
 
3.1. The Human Capital Framework  
 
3.1.1. Internal Rate of Return on Basic Theoretic Model of Educational 
Investment 
 
Human capital theory provides a framework for analyzing educational investment. The 
acquisition of education generates costs, and education is assumed to raise an individual’s 
productivity and consequently to pay off in terms of future earnings. According to the 
traditional method of calculating rates of return to investment in education, which is 
known as cost-benefit analysis, the analysis must commence with the calculation of all 
costs and benefits involved in this investment. It is suggested that although in theory it is 
straightforward, the actual measurement of costs, and especially benefits is difficult to 
obtain. Based on this, economists have tended to concentrate on the relatively hard 
evidence relating to benefits that exists in most countries, which is known as the 
age-earnings profile, that those people with higher levels of education on average receive 
higher incomes throughout their working lives than people with lower levels of education 
(Hough, 1994). In Becker’s (1994) words, education (schooling) would steepen the 
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age-earning profile. It has therefore seemed reasonable to look at the earnings-stream 
differentials to measure the benefits from received education.  
 
Two related concepts which are often used in this context are the net present value (NPV) 
and the internal rate of return (IRR). The NPV of an investment is the difference between 
discounted benefits and discounted costs based on a preselected discount rate, and the 
IRR is the discount rate which equalizes the discounted benefits and discounted costs. 
These two methods are based on the same principles and in many cases they give 
equivalent answers (Cohn and Geske, 1990).  
 
The following discussion draws heavily on Becker (1964)’s methodology by using costs 
of education and economic returns on education investment as inputs to derive an internal 
rate of return. Let Y be an activity providing a person, entering at a particular age, with a 
net earning stream of Y0, Y1, …, Yn, and X another activity providing a net earning stream 
of X0, X1, …, Xn. Based on the present value of V(Y) and V(X), the net present value of 
the gain from choosing Y would be given by: 
 
V(Y) - V(X) = ∑
= +
−n
j
j
jj
i
XY
0 )1(
       (3.1) 
 
Where i is the market discount rate, and assumed to be same in each period. The term 
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‘activity’ is used following Becker to indicate that any kind of investment in human 
capital is permitted, although we specifically focus on education. ‘Net’ earnings mean 
‘gross’ earnings during any period minus tuition costs during the same period. Those 
include the sum of both monetary and the monetary equivalent of non-monetary 
earnings31. Equation (3.1) can be reformulated to bring out the relation between costs and 
benefits. The cost of investing in human capital equals the net earnings foregone by 
choosing to invest rather than choosing an activity requiring no investment. Suppose Y 
requires an investment only in the initial period32 and X does not require any. The cost of 
choosing Y rather than X is simply the difference between their net earnings in the initial 
period, and the total benefit would be the present value of the differences between the net 
earnings in later periods (Becker, 1994). If C = X0 – Y0, kj = Yj – Xj, and R measures the 
total benefit, Thus: 
 
∑
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Individuals are assumed to choose their educational attainment in order to maximize the 
net present value of the stream of future incomes, and the optimal amount of education is 
                                                        
31 Becker (1994) argued that the term “investment in human capital” is not restricted to monetary 
costs and returns. It applies independently of the division of earnings into monetary and psychic 
components. For example, it applies to health which has a large psychic component. Later in this 
thesis we develop this analysis further. 
32 The investment in human capital is distributed over many periods, and this is to simply the 
analysis. For further discussions see Becker (1994).  
 48
obtained when the present value of returns equals the present value of costs in the same 
period (R = C). This relation between costs and benefits can be expressed by the internal 
rate of return, r, which is defined implicitly by the equation: 
 
C = ∑
= +
n
j
j
j
r
k
1 )1(
         (3.3) 
 
When the returns are the same in each period, kj = k, the equation (3.3) is considerably 
simplified and becomes: 
 
C = ])1(1[ nr
r
k −+−         (3.4) 
 
As people live longer, n tends to infinity, where nr −+ )1(  tends towards zero. Thus the 
equation (3.4) becomes:  
 
C = 
r
k          (3.5) 
 
The aforementioned discussion indicates that if investment in education is restricted to a 
single known period, the cost and rate of return are easily determined from information 
on net earnings. It is suggested in the literature that the sense of n in equation (3.3) can be 
implied by T and t: the time horizon T, which is fixed by the retirement age or death; the 
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choice variable t is the individuals to choose in how many years they invest in education. 
The returns are better if the educational investment is made earlier, which corresponds to 
the age-earnings profile. Since individuals invest early in their lives not only by means of 
education, but also by acquiring information about the labour market in their future career, 
thus later in their life they reap the returns in the form of higher earnings. Furthermore, 
foregone earnings are a major component of the costs of education, thus older people 
invest less in education since they are likely to have higher earnings. More detailed 
discussions by Harmon, et al. (2003) where kj = k = Ws – Ws-1, and C is expressed by 
adding the earnings of a graduate of school level Ws-1 to the direct cost of school level Cs, 
where C = Ws-1 + Cs, thus: 
 
           (3.6) 
 
The optimal investment decision would imply that individuals invest in the ths  year of 
schooling when rs > i. If Cs is sufficiently small, thus:  
  
          (3.7) 
 
which shows that the return to the ths of schooling is approximately the difference in log 
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wages between leaving at times s and at (s-1)33.  
 
The empirical approximation of the aforementioned theoretical framework is the familiar 
functional form of the earnings equation developed by Mincer (1974). Mincer has gone 
further in analyzing the effect of age on earnings in terms of the acquisition of experience. 
The Mincerian equation has been proved to be a powerful tool to explain what determines 
earnings and to compare the relative importance of education and other factors, such as 
gender, race, region, etc. in determining earnings. Since it is relatively quick and easy to 
compute, and does not include any specific reference to direct educational costs, although 
it does incorporate earnings forgone, it has become the benchmark model for the 
empirical estimation of the returns to education. 
 
3.1.2. The Mincer Specification 
 
The concept of an earnings function was used by Mincer (1974) to explain the pattern of 
individual earnings. The benchmark model for the development of empirical estimation 
of the returns to education is the key relationship which involves regressing the natural 
logarithm of earnings (Y) against educational attainment (edu) and working experience 
(exp). This is expressed as follows:  
                                                        
33  For detailed discussions see Harmon, et al. (2003): “The Returns to Education: 
Microeconomics”.   
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Ln(Yi) = β0 + β1edu + β2exp + β3exp²+ εi                         (3.8)            
 
where εi is a stochastic error term, often it is assumed that εi ~ N(0, σε2). This form of 
earnings equation is the simple one which assumes that earnings are determined only by 
two factors: years of schooling and work experience. In the absence of direct information 
on work experience, Mincer mentioned the use of ‘potential experience’: the number of 
years an individual of age A could have worked, assuming he started to school at age 6, 
finished E years of schooling in exactly E years, and began to work thereafter: potential 
experience = A – E – 6 (Card, 1999). Furthermore, it is also possible to estimate more 
complex earning functions that incorporate additional variables including age, gender, 
occupation, urban or rural location, and some mostly unobserved variables, such as 
personality, ability and motivation, etc. Thus the equation (3.8) can be often expressed 
by: 
 
Ln(Yi) = Xiβ + γedui + εi       (3.9) 
 
Where Yi is an earning measure for an individual i, and Xi is a set of conditioning 
variables mentioned above. edui is the number of years schooling, and the parameter γ 
indicates the estimated increase in earnings from one additional year of schooling. εi is 
the error term which captures all relevant factors in earnings determination that are not 
captured by observable variables. In order for this interpretation to be valid, we need to 
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impose certain conditions on the error term. We assume E(Xi εi) = 0 and E(edui εi) = 0, 
and make the standard hypothesis that E(εi) = 0. These assumptions allow us to interpret 
this equation as the conditional expectation of Ln(Yi) given Xi and edui. A large literature 
has grown up around the Mincerian model using a variety of variables. Two of the most 
comprehensive surveys are presented by Psacharopoulos (1985, 1994) covering the 
results of estimating the returns to human capital for over sixty countries. According to 
these results, educational returns for an additional year of schooling are positive and 
range from 5% in developed countries to as high as 29% in developing countries.   
 
3.1.3. Endogeneity of Education based on Ability Bias34 in the Mincer 
Model  
 
If it is not the case as mentioned above that E(edui εi) = 0, although we can still interpret 
the equation as the conditional expectation of Ln(Yi) given Xi and edui, it is not valid to 
interpret γ as the causal effect of an unbiased estimate of education on earnings since 
education is endogenous with respect to the causal effect γ. Broadly speaking, a regressor 
is endogenous when it is correlated with the error term. If any one regressor is 
                                                        
34 According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), leading examples of endogeneity, dealt with 
extensively in empirical model settings, include simultaneous equations bias, omitted variable 
bias, sample selection bias and measurement error bias. Endogeneity is quite likely to occur when 
cross-section observational data are used, and economists are very concerned with this 
complication. It had been suggested that there exist other possibilities apart from ability bias 
based on the endogeneity of education. For the purpose of this thesis the focus will be on the 
ability bias.  
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endogenous then in general the estimates of all regression parameters are inconsistent and 
this applies to both linear and non-linear models (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Human 
capital theory treats education as investment by individuals in themselves, and the 
coefficient of education (γ) in equation (3.9) is broadly interpreted as a measure of returns 
to human capital. It is clear that education is not randomly assigned; rather, it depends on 
the choices made by individuals, families, even communities. The regression (3.9) is then 
a regression of one endogenous variable, Y, on another, edu, and it does not measure in an 
unbiased manner the causal impact of an exogenous change in education. Thus the 
observed difference in earnings between individuals with different years of education 
may over-state or under-state the causal effect of education on earnings35. 
 
Education is indeed an endogenous choice variable in the underlying human capital 
theory. Specifically, in the Mincer specification the error term captures unobservable 
individual effects and these individual factors may also influence the education decision, 
and therefore induce a correlation between education and the error term in the earnings 
function. A common example is unobserved ability. There have been a number of 
approaches to deal with this problem. Firstly, measures of ability have been incorporated 
to proxy for unobserved effects. The use is documented in the literature to obtain a good 
measure/proxy approximating the impact of ability, such as intelligence quotient (IQ) 
                                                        
35 For example, if increasing ability (increasing μi in equation (3.10)) increases schooling but also 
independently increases earnings, then E(μiεi) > 0 and the standard OLS estimator will over- 
estimate γ as the causal effect of education as it will also pick up the effect of characteristics in 
the error term (such as ability) which makes individuals earn more.  
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scores, and include it as a direct measure of ability in the earning equation. This inclusion 
should reduce the estimated education coefficient if it acts as a proxy for ability, so that 
the coefficient on education then captures the effect of education alone. The usual finding 
is that the coefficient on education is not strongly affected by the inclusion of additional 
right-hand-side variables (Weiss, 1995).   
 
Secondly, there exists an approach dealing directly with the education-earnings 
relationship in a two-equation system by exploiting instrumental variables. To understand 
more clearly how this approach has been derived, it is helpful to posit the following 
equation together with equation (3.9): 
 
Edui = Xiλ + μi            (3.10) 
  
where Xi includes conditioning variables that directly influence both education and 
earnings, and μi is the error term. We assume E(edui εi) = 0 which is to say E((Xiλ + μi) εi) 
= 0, therefore, E(Xiλεi + μiεi) = 0, and therefore λE(Xiεi) + E(μiεi) = 0. Assuming that the 
error term εi is orthogonal to the X variables, this formal part λE(Xiεi) will be zero, for the 
expression to equal zero requires that E(μiεi) = 0. If we expect that factors affecting 
education will also affect earnings, this condition will not hold. To put this differently, 
estimation of equation (3.9) yields inconsistent estimate of γ when the pair of residuals εi 
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and μi are correlated (e.g., in this case the unmeasured ability is a confounding variable36). 
Since most observational data sets lack measures of individual ability, the regression of 
earning on education has error which includes unobserved ability and hence is correlated 
with the regressor of education.  
 
Based on this, presumed we can find κi variables that influence education directly, but on 
earnings indirectly only through the impact on education. We can then rule out this 
confounding variables bias. The κi variables are called instruments or instrumental 
variables, and this method is known as the instrumental variables method (IV method) 
which is a general approach to control for endogeneity. Several instruments have been 
used in the literature, for example, distance to educational institutions or family 
background variables. In particular, parental education is documented as one of the most 
commonly involved variable in this context. It is necessary to note that parental education 
could be used either as an instrument for education or as a proxy for the unobserved 
ability. Existing studies use it in both ways. For instance, when it is used as an instrument 
(see e.g., Ashenfelter and Zimmerman, 1997), it is assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
ability of their children but correlated with their education. Furthermore, economists have 
also tried to use a variety of ‘nature experiment’ to estimate the causal effect of education 
as it is not possible to set up an actual experiment as it is, for example, in the medical 
                                                        
36 According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), when variables are omitted from a regression, and 
when omitted factors are correlated with the included variables, a confounding bias results. 
Possibly confounding variables include not only ability, but also other variables such as family 
background characteristics (Maluccio, 1998). 
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literature. Such instruments constructed from the ‘nature experiment’ including, for 
example, individual’s quarter of birth, which is uncorrelated with earnings except through 
their effect on education via school-start age policy and compulsory school attendance 
law (e.g. Angrist and Krueger, 1991).  
 
However, the IV method can not always be applied to the empirical work as either 
necessary instruments may not be available, or they suffer from weak instruments bias. 
We thus need to be very cautious with respect to the validity and relevance of these 
instruments as applied in the empirical analysis. Instruments are valid provided they are 
orthogonal to the error term (E(κiεi) = 0). In the traditional simultaneous equations 
approach, this occurs if they are excluded from the equation of interest. Recently, the 
relevance of the instruments has received increased attention by researchers. It has been 
suggested that many applications of the IV regressions suffer from ‘weak instruments’ or 
‘weak identification’, which is that the instruments are only weakly correlated with the 
included endogenous variables (Stock, et al., 2002). If the instrument is extremely weak, 
it may provide little or no useful information (Imbens and Rosenbaum, 2005). The 
problem of weak instruments is quite prevalent in recent IV studies, and researchers have 
pointed out that some IV studies have been undermined by a lack of precision in their 
first stage estimates. Bound, et al. (1995) pointed out that even a weak correlation 
between the instrument and the error term in the earning equation can result in a large 
bias in the IV estimates even in large samples, and this problem is compounded if the 
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instrument is weak. They argued that instrumental relevance is ensured only if there is a 
strong correlation between the instruments and the endogenous regressor. If this is not the 
case, IV estimates are asymptotically centered on least squares (Han and Schmidt, 2001).  
 
According to Card (1994), an alternative to the use of instruments for education 
attainment is to assume that the pair of residuals εi and μi in equation (3.9) and (3.10) 
have a restrictive covariance structure, and then use either repeated observations over 
time for the same individual or observations for different individuals from the same 
family to ‘difference out’ the correlation between εi and μi. Estimates based on the twins 
fixed effects are mostly applied in this context, presumably that specifically monozygotic 
twins are genetically identical and have a similar family background, thus the effects of 
unobserved ability or family background should be similar for both twins (Li, et al., 
2005). They further argued that provided that at least some pairs of twins have different 
levels of education, a within-twin-pair estimator analogous to the standard fixed effects 
estimator removes the possible bias that is caused by the omitted ability and family 
background variables (e.g. Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994). Nonetheless this still raises 
the question as to why, e.g., one twin goes to the university and the other does not. Is this 
distinction completely random or are they unobserved causal factors? If the latter, how do 
they affect the estimates?     
 
The aforementioned arguments are focused on the possible solutions for ability bias. The 
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main debate is whether the impact of education on earnings isolated the effects that are 
caused by education from the consequences of unmeasured, for instance, ability. In other 
words, whether the coefficient of education is biased in the sense that it is picking up both 
the impact of education and ability. We will return to this in detail in chapter 4. 
 
3.1.4. Signaling/Screening37 
 
The positive correlation between education and earnings has been explored with a variety 
of data sources and analytic techniques by a large amount of researchers in the literature. 
Economists offer two major theories explaining this correlation: human capital theory 
which we have discussed and signaling/screening hypothesis. Both of them assume that 
an individual obtains education up to the point where the marginal benefit given by the 
earnings function just equals the marginal cost of education. The theories differ in the 
reason that employers pay a premium for education (Kroch and Sjoblom, 1994). 
According to human capital theory, education is assumed to raise individual’s 
productivity and subsequently future earnings. In this sense, the coefficient on education 
in the log earnings regression has been interpreted as an estimate of the 
productivity-enhancing effects of education. However, do workers’ earnings differentials 
accurately reflect their different marginal productivities? There has developed the 
                                                        
37 According to Weiss (1995), both signaling and screening serve to ‘sort’ workers according to 
their unobserved abilities based on information asymmetry. For example, students will choose a 
length of schooling to ‘signal’ their ability to employers, and the employers will demand a 
minimum level of schooling from applicants in order to ‘screen’ their workers.  
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signaling/screening hypothesis by Arrow (1973) and Spence (1973, 1974) that employers 
use educational attainment to identify individuals with certain valuable innate traits that 
cannot be observed directly: education is not fundamentally productive; nevertheless in 
equilibrium wages increase with education, since individuals of greater productivity 
experience less disutility from schooling and obtain more of it, thus signaling to 
employers their greater worth 38 . Simply speaking, education acts as a signal of 
individuals’ innate traits which enable employers to identify workers. In the literature, 
Groot and Oosterbeek (1994) have tested these two competing theories by separating the 
number of actual years of education into five components: effective years, repeated years, 
skipped years, inefficient routing years and dropout years. Their results provide strong 
support for the human capital theory and refute the screening hypothesis. In addition, 
Kroch and Sjoblom (1994) used a similar method and obtained the same results.  
 
It has been suggested in the literature that signaling/screening models extend human 
capital theory models by allowing for some productivity differences that firms do not 
observe to be correlated with the costs or benefits of education39 (Weiss, 1995). Hence, 
                                                        
38 For detailed discussions see Kroch and Sjoblom (1994). Game theoretic refinements for this 
have been suggested by Riley (1975), Mailath (1987) and Cho and Kreps (1987).  
39 Weiss (1995) argued that if the signaling/screening extensions of human capital theory are 
important, the marginal benefits from education for an individual could greatly exceed the 
expected value of the effects of those activities on productivity. For example, an accurate measure 
of the change in earnings for an individual who goes to school for 12 years instead of 11 would 
not measure the effect of that year of education on his productivity, but rather the combined effect 
of one additional year of learning and the effect of being identified as the type of person who has 
12 rather than 11years of education.    
 60
the strong screening hypothesis (SSH) and the weak screening hypothesis (WSH) have 
been separately identified. The SSH presumes that education is being used exclusively as 
a signal immutable to productivity (Psacharopoulos, 1979). The WSH presumes that the 
primary role of education is to signal, but it may also augment inherent productivity 
(Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 1975). For example, Brown and Sessions (1998) 
found evidence in support of weak, but not strong, screening which indicates that 
education both signals and augments individual productivity. Psacharopoulos (1994) 
concluded, regardless of whether schooling signals or arguments productivity, it certainly 
enhances lifetime earnings and, as such, may represent a good investment for individuals.     
 
The standard procedure to finessing this problem is to distinguish those situations where 
individuals would benefit from signaling ability from those situations where one would 
not expect such a benefit, and then to compare the rates of return to education of the two 
groupings (Kroch and Sjoblom, 1994). It has been documented in the literature that the 
possibly comparative groups include employees vs. the self-employed or public vs. 
private sector employees. Thus the difference between the returns to education for 
employees vs. the self-employed or between public vs. private sector employees is the 
value of education as a signal (Harmon, et al., 2003). In addition, the direct approach to 
distinguishing between ability and productivity is to include ability measures. It is 
noticeable that instead of the IQ scores as a proxy of ability as mentioned before, these 
ability measures need to specifically indicate the ability of making money, and they 
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further need to be uncontaminated by the effects of education or they will pick up the 
productivity enhancing effects of education (Harmon, et al., 2003). It seems clear that 
these measures cannot be easily observed. 
 
3.1.5. Experience40 and the Schooling Vintage 
 
According to Neuman and Weiss (1995), there are two types of human capital 
depreciation: internal depreciation and external depreciation. Internal depreciation which 
is assumed in most studies is the depreciation attributable to the worker including the loss 
of physical ability as well as any loss of mental capacity. External depreciation is caused 
by external forces, i.e., it is the lowering of the value of an individual in the market due to 
changes in the job or work environment. Analogously, De Grip and Van Loo (2002) 
considered that, from an economic point of view, two types of depreciation may be 
distinguished, technical skills depreciation that refers to a worker’s loss of human capital, 
and economic skills depreciation that refers to the loss of market value of a worker’s 
qualifications. Among the first type, they include the depreciation directly attributable to 
the worker’s physical deterioration (wear of skills) and that due to atrophy of skills due to 
the lack of insufficient use of skills. As for the economic depreciation they further 
distinguish three causes, job specific skills obsolescence due to technological or 
                                                        
40 Here we focus on schooling vintage on Mincer’s (1974) experience-earning profiles. For 
detailed discussions see Neuman and Weiss (1995). 
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organizational developments, obsolescence related to shifts in the sector structure of 
employment and firm-specific skills obsolescence.  
 
In particular, one element of these external/economic forces is the gradual obsolescence 
over time of the stock of knowledge obtained during the schooling process. This is due to 
the so-called ‘vintage effects’, which are closely associated with the pace of technological 
change (Ramirez, 2002). Simply speaking, the ‘human capital vintage effect’ means that 
the skills individuals have learned when they were young can become outdated and no 
longer productivity-enhancing as people become older (Skirbekk, 2002). Mincer (1974) 
changed the emphasis from age to labour market experience, although the depreciation 
rate was not identified in his typical model. Even so, researchers have attempted to 
estimate the depreciation of human capital under certain identification assumptions. Most 
studies which have dealt with it empirically have focused on how schooling vintage can 
affect Mincer’s experience-earning profile. A simple example would be if there is no 
vintage effect of education, returns from an extra year of recent schooling and an extra 
year of schooling in the distant past are the same. In addition, Neuman and Weiss (1995) 
argued that it seems unreasonable to assume that an elementary school graduate’s human 
capital suffers the same degree of obsolescence as a university graduate of electrical 
engineering. It is clear that the material taught in elementary schools has not changed 
much over time. However, an electrical engineer who was trained 20 years ago learned a 
lot of different material than one who just left the university. They introduced interacted 
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variables41 of schooling and experience with high-tech/low-tech dummies in the earnings 
equation and concluded that the rate of return to education slacks over time and also there 
is greater depreciation in the return to experience for the better educated. Thus the higher 
level of education, the more quickly the human capital becomes obsolete. Further more, 
this depreciation, driven by technical change, is more significant in industries strongly 
affected by technology growth (high-tech), such as the information technology (IT) and 
the electronics industries, although it could be argued that IT now impacts on most 
industries.  
 
3.2. Health Capital 
 
3.2.1. Grossman’s Model (Grossman, 1972) 
 
Investment in education is not the only form of human capital investment that individuals 
undertake. Health can be viewed as one form of human capital, and health capital differs 
from other forms of human capital. An individual’s stock of knowledge affects his/her 
market and non-market productivity, while his/her stock of health determines the total 
amount of time he/she can spend producing earnings and commodities (Grossman, 1972). 
                                                        
41 Instead of using interacted variables, an alternative way to take into account this possible 
vintage effect is to estimate the earnings equation for different groups classified by years of work 
experience to obtain the different rate of return to education over time. For example, Liu (1998) 
has implemented this approach and argued that the rate of return to education diminishes for more 
experienced individuals which indicated a higher return for more recently obtained education.  
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It is necessary to notice the distinction between ‘commodities’ and ‘market goods’. 
Consumers produce commodities with inputs of market goods and their own time. In 
other words, consumers do not purchase health from the market but produce it, spending 
time upon health improving behavior or otherwise as well as purchasing medical inputs. 
The demand for medical care is a derived demand for an input to produce health.  
 
Following the standard model of Grossman (1972, 2000), we assume that the utility 
function for a representative consumer is as follows: 
 
),,( ttt ZHUU φ=  t = 0, 1, ..., n          (3.11) 
 
Where Ht is the stock of health at age t or in time period t, tφ  is benefit produced by one 
unit of health capital, ht = tt Hφ is the total health ‘consumed’ at age t, and tZ is 
consumption of another commodity.  
 
The initial stock of health capital H0 is exogenous. Ht at any other age and the length of 
life n are endogenous. Length of life is determined by the quantities of health capital that 
maximize utility subject to production and resource constraints. The following equation 
describes the change of health capital: 
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      (3.12) 
 
where It is the gross investment in health and tδ  is the rate of depreciation during the tth 
period. The rate of depreciation is exogenous but may depend on age. Consumers 
produce gross investment in health and the other commodities in the utility function 
according to a set of household production functions: 
 
);,( ETHMII tttt =                   (3.13) 
);,( ETXZZ ttt =                   (3.14) 
 
In these equations Mt is a vector of goods purchased in the market, such as health care 
service, which is used to contribute to It. Xt is a similar vector of goods inputs that 
contribute to Zt42. THt and Tt are time inputs, i.e. the amount of time devoted to the 
respective activities, and E is assumed to be other exogenous components of human 
capital exclusive of heath capital, such as education43.  
 
Furthermore, the consumer faces the following budget constraint: 
 
                                                        
42 Hence we exclude the possibility that consumption of Xt can impact on health, as may be the 
case with excessive eating or drinking, or goods such as holidays which reduce stress.  
43 Grossman (2000) explained that the semicolon before E highlights the difference between this 
variable and the endogenous goods and time inputs. In addition, he assumed that E in equation 
(3.13) and (3.14) does not vary over the life cycle. 
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where tP  and tQ are the prices of tM and tX , tW is the hourly wage rate, tTW  is 
hours of work, A0 is initial assets, and r is the market rate of interest. The time constraint 
requires that Ω, the total amount of time available in any period, must be exhausted by all 
possible uses is: 
 
Ω=+++ tttt TLTTHTW               (3.16) 
 
where tTL is time lost from market and nonmarket activities due to illness and injury
44. 
To sum up, equations (3.11) to (3.16) constitute the basic Grossman model and they 
jointly determine the demand for health.  
 
Individuals inherit an initial stock of health that depreciates with age and can be increased 
by investment. This approach developed an important link between the household 
production theory of consumer behavior and the theory of investment in human capital: 
health is a choice variable because it is a source of utility (satisfaction) and also because 
it determines income or wealth levels45 (Grossman, 2000). Gross investment in health 
                                                        
44 Although we note in passing that this too could be argued to be dependent on other activities, 
both health and non-health related. 
45 Equations (3.11) to (3.16) do not include the ‘full wealth’ constraint. For detailed discussions 
see Grossman (2000). 
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capital is produced by household production functions. Hence the output of health is 
impacted upon by health-related choices including diet, exercise, smoking, etc. In 
addition, it is also affected by the factors which influence the efficiency of the production 
process for a given consumer as reflected by his or her personal characteristics, including 
factors such as age, gender, and possibly the level of education.  
 
Health is both produced and demanded by consumers. Health is both an investment and a 
consumption good, and it relates to both a pure investment model and a pure consumption 
model in Grossman’s monograph on the human capital model. In the former model the 
psychic rate of return is assumed to be zero, while in the latter the monetary rate of return 
is assumed to be zero. Empirical work mostly focuses on the estimation of the investment 
model based on its powerful predictions from simple analysis and a more adequate 
representation of people’s behavior (Grossman, 2000). The stock of health and gross 
investment respond to variations in a number of exogenous variables46. Grossman 
examined two types of variations: evolutionary (differences across time for the same 
individual) and parametric (differences across consumers of the same age). Based on this, 
the wage rate, the price of medical care, the stock of human capital (mostly years of 
formal education completed) and age, and the unobserved depreciation rate in the initial 
period are included in the estimating equation. The investment model predicts that the 
coefficients of the wage rate and the stock of human capital are positive, while the 
                                                        
46 For example, education is assumed to be exogenous here (see Grossman, 1972). 
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coefficients of the price of medical care and depreciation rate are negative47. In the 
empirical analysis, the stock of health is mostly measured by individuals’ self-reported 
health, and the estimated equation mostly involves education level, age, the wage rate, etc. 
restricted by the data availability.  
 
3.2.2. The Causality between Education and Health 
 
An extensive review of literature conducted by Grossman and Kaestner (1997) suggested 
that years of formal education completed is the most important correlate of good health, 
whether health levels are measured by self-evaluation of health status, mortality rates or 
physiological indicators of health. In a broad sense, the observed correlation between 
education and health may be explained in one of three ways according to Grossman 
(2000): firstly, there is a causal relationship that runs from increases in education to 
increases in health; secondly, the direction of causality runs from better health to more 
education; thirdly, there is no causal linkage between education and health, instead, 
differences in one or more ‘third variables’ affect both education and health in the same 
direction. These explanations suggest that education clearly is an endogenous variable48. 
                                                        
47 For detailed discussions see Grossman (2000). 
48 Note that income is another endogenous variable in this context and the main direction of 
causality between income and health is also open to debate. Similarly, there are two main issues 
that need to be tackled in order to establish causality. These relate to: i) there are likely to be 
unobserved individual characteristics, which jointly determine both income and adult health; and 
ii) there exists the issue of reverse-causality, in which case people in good health are more likely 
to be economically productive and have higher incomes (Frijters, et al., 2005). We will review 
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We will start with the first one. More education leads to better health when more educated 
individuals are more efficient producers of health. This efficiency effect can take two 
forms: productive efficiency pertains to a situation in which the more educated obtain a 
larger health output from given amounts of inputs; allocative efficiency pertains to a 
situation in which education increases information about the true effects of the inputs on 
health (Grossman, 2000). For example, the more educated may have more knowledge 
about the harmful effects of cigarette smoking. In addition, education is also linked to 
income and occupation, two other components of socioeconomic status, and the gross 
effect of education on health may partly include these effects too49.  
 
It is clear that the second and third explanations challenged the causal relationship 
between education and health. According to Grossman (2000), the direction of causality 
may run from better health to more education because healthier students may be more 
efficient producers of additions to the stock of knowledge through formal schooling. 
Furthermore, this causal path may have long-lasting effects if past health feeds into 
current health status. Thus a positive relationship between health and education may 
reflect reverse causality in the absence of controls for past health, or more broadly, health 
endowments shaped prior to educational attainment. For example, Case, et al. (2003) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
these issues in detail in chapter 5.  
49 However, as argued by Grossman and Kaestner (1997), the significant portion of the gross 
education effect on health can not be traced to the relationship between education and income or 
occupation.  
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confirmed that children who have experienced poorer health in childhood have 
significantly lower educational attainment and poorer health as adults. This reverse effect 
would create a positive simultaneity bias in measuring the effect of education on health 
(Groot and Maassen van de Brink, 2006).   
 
The ‘third variable’ explanation is particular relevant if there exists a large unexplained 
variation in health after controlling for education and other determinants. This hypothesis 
has received a great deal of attention in the literature because it is related to the 
hypothesis that the positive effect of schooling on earnings is biased by the omission of 
ability. Fuchs (1982) identifies time preference as the third variable. Individuals’ 
preferences for the future affect the likelihood of both educational attainment and good 
health behavior. Fuchs argued that persons who are more future-oriented attend school 
for longer periods of time and make a larger investment in their health50. Fuchs (1996) 
further argues that education is correlated with time preference, and that it is time 
preference that affects health rather than education. This hypothesis is tested by Sander 
(1995), who found the support for both the argument that education affects health and for 
the hypothesis that time preference matters. In addition, another important aspect that 
should be noted is the role of intermediate variables in the relation between education and 
health, such as parental education (Groot and Maassen van de Brink, 2006). Parental 
                                                        
50  Fuchs also mentioned the possibility that schooling has an effect on time preference 
(preferences are endogenous), but he could not distinguish the direction of the causality.  
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education has an effect on health through its effect on educational achievements51. 
Grossman (2000) concluded that both the reverse causality explanation and the ‘third 
variable’ explanation indicate that the observed relationship between current health and 
education reflects an omitted variable which challenges the causal relationship between 
education and health. In econometric terminology, both explanations fall under the 
general rubric of biases due to unobserved heterogeneity among individuals (Grossman, 
2000). 
 
Several approaches can be employed to correct for these biases. Firstly, one can include 
past health measures in regressions that relate adult health to own schooling. The problem 
of this procedure, as argued by Grossman (2006), is that measures of past health may not 
be available or may be measured imprecisely. Secondly, unmeasured third variables can 
be controlled by examining differences in outcomes due to differences in education 
between siblings or twins. This approach is clearly restricted by the data availability. In 
addition, differencing between twins exacerbates biases due to measurement error 
(Neumark, 1999). Finally, one can employ the IV approach, which is the most commonly 
used procedure in the literature. As argued before, the IVs need to be correlated with 
education, but not be correlated with such omitted variables as ability, other inherited 
genetic traits, and time preference to obtain consistent estimates.  
 
                                                        
51 For detailed discussions see Groot and Maassen van de Brink (2006). 
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3.2.3. Body Mass Index 
 
The BMI is a practical measure used to determine overweight, developed by a Belgian 
statistician and anthropometrist, Quetelet in 1996. It is highly correlated with body fat, 
and, subsequently, health risk, specifically type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular disease, 
which are rapidly becoming major causes of death in adults in all populations (WHO 
Expert Consultation, 2004). The BMI is generally calculated as weight in kilograms over 
height in meters squared (weight(kg)/height(m)²). The WHO has devised a classification 
where by persons with BMIs below the range 19-25 are considered underweight, those 
with BMIs above this range are considered overweight or ‘at risk’ and those with BMIs 
greater than or equal to 30 are considered obese. These WHO BMI classifications of 
overweight and obesity are intended for international use.  
 
Recently, a growing body of literature in anthropometry indicates that these cut-off points 
are likely to be lower among Asian populations because the greater prevalence of 
cardiovascular disease risk factors is at lower BMIs in Asian populations than in Western 
populations (see, e.g. Moon, et al., 2002). There is no clear single cut-off point for all 
Asians for high risk, and individual countries should set their own cut-off for high risk on 
the basis of their morbidity and mortality data (Choo, 2002). For instance, the overweight 
status among Chinese is defined as a BMI≧24 (Wildman, et al., 2004). In addition, it has 
also been suggested that the BMI is age and gender dependent when used as an indicator 
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of body fatness (see, e.g., Gallagher, et al., 1996; Burkhauser and Cawley; 2008). Thus 
the BMI, used indiscriminately for all people of all ages might provide misleading 
information. For example, when people are getting old, their body fat increases and 
muscle diminishes, while the BMI stays stable during these changes (Prentice and Jebb, 
2001). However, there are no clear cut-off points after adjusting age and gender to be 
found in the literature. 
 
3.3. Social Capital 
 
3.3.1. The Dimensions and Measurement of Social Capital 
 
Social capital, in short, refers to social connections and the attendant norms and trust 
(Putnam, 1995). The working definition of social capital that is emerging in an 
increasingly interdisciplinary literature refers to the networks, norms and understandings 
that facilitate cooperative activities within and among groups of individuals (Helliwell, 
2001). Similarly, Halpern (2005) argued that most forms of social capital consist of a 
network, a cluster of norms, values, and expectancies that are shared by group members; 
and sanctions that help to maintain the norms and network. Accepting that there is no 
single form of social capital, as argued by Putnam (2001), we need to think about the 
multiple dimensions of social capital. Some forms of social capital are highly formal, like 
a labour union, or a national organization of any sort, formally organized with a chairman 
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and a president, and membership dues and so on. However, some forms of social capital, 
such as a group of people who gather at bar, are highly informal. Both of these constitute 
networks in which there can easily be developed reciprocity, and in which there can be 
gains to the individuals in the networks (Putnam, 2001). Alternatively, some forms of 
social capital are very dense and interconnected, while some forms are very thin and 
almost invisible, although still providing networks and associated norms of reciprocity52. 
A particularly common and important distinction is between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ 
social capital (Gittell and Vidal, 1998). The former focuses on ties within a group, 
sometimes in ways that increase distance and tension between groups; and the latter 
typically has a wider and more inclusive radius. According to Helliwell (2001), many 
actual situations are characterized by social capital that mixes these two types in different 
proportions. 
 
The most compelling empirical evidence in support of the importance of social capital 
comes from the household- and community-level, and the best way to think of 
community-level social capital is as the set of social resources of a community that 
increases the welfare of that community, or in the language of economists, utility (Glaeser, 
2001). There is an older definition of social capital that is individual-based. Following 
James (1904), it would be possible to define individual social capital as the set of social 
                                                        
52 Putnam (2001) argued that if you nod to people in the hall, they are more likely to come to 
your aid if you should have a fit or have a heart attack.  
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attributes possessed by an individual – including charisma, contacts and linguistic skill – 
that increase the returns to that individual in his dealings with others. Researchers have 
believed that thinking about individual social capital is a prerequisite for thinking about 
the formation of community social capital, and that decisions to invest in social capital 
are made by individuals, not communities (Glaeser, 2001). Since individual social capital 
is very close to human capital, much of the theory on investment in human capital can be 
applied to social capital.  
 
The theoretical discussion has outlined a number of different dimensions of social capital, 
and it is rather difficult to ideally measure them as is, for example, years of education for 
human capital. However, the social capital literature has primarily focused on two 
questions. First, there is a set of questions about types of non-professional organizations 
that an individual belongs to. Generally, organizational membership is aggregated up to a 
variable that captures the number of different types of organizations to which an 
individual belongs. Glaeser (2001) argued that it is probably the best measure of social 
capital investment on the individual level. Second, there is a survey question on trust that 
typically asks: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or 
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” In some work, a measure of 
generalized trust in others is part of what we meant by social capital, while other 
researchers prefer to treat social trust, or interpersonal trust, as something that is 
generated and supported by the more variable sorts of social capital (Helliwell, 2001). 
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Furthermore, the concept of social capital is a central feature of civil society and trust as a 
key ingredient of civil society is vital for sustaining economic wellbeing (Putnam, et al., 
1995). Inability to commit oneself to or believe in anything that transcends one’s own 
private interests leads to the weakening of commitment in family and community, and in 
these associations, people build relationships of trust and mutual aid (Persell, et al., 
2001).  
 
The education-social connection relationship should probably be seen as the most 
important fact about the formation of social capital (Glaeser, 2001). In all studies of 
differences among individuals as to the extent of their connectedness and trust, education 
levels are uniformly the strongest and most consistent explanatory factors. There are 
many possible interpretations of this relationship. Firstly, if education reflected a greater 
orientation towards the future (i.e. lower time discount factor), then we should not be 
surprised that people with more human capital also invest more in social capital. 
Secondly, social capital may be reflecting relative prestige and it is very likely that 
interacting socially may be more pleasant for more prestigious individuals. Finally, 
according to Glaeser (2001), a significant part of education is in learning social skills. A 
great deal of time is spent in schools learning how to deal with peers in an educational 
setting: in younger grades, learning cooperation exists as a major part of education 
process; and in college, a great deal more time is spent on constructive social activies.  
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3.3.2. Social Capital and Well-being 
 
There are measurable consequences to social capital. To get a full picture of the 
consequences of social capital for well-being, we need look at different levels of 
individuals, communities and nations and different measures of well-being. Putnam 
(2000) reviewed a large number of empirical studies which report a positive linkage 
between social capital and child welfare, crime, neighbourhood vitality, health and 
happiness. One of the most convincing pieces of evidence of the positive impact of social 
capital lies in the area of personal health based on the individual level. With respect to our 
empirical work in this context, we will focus on those effects of social capital that flow 
through health outcomes to well-being, and further extend to the direct impact of some 
social capital variables on subjective well-being. 
 
Like human capital, social capital provides important benefits to individuals and societies. 
Social capital in various forms is hypothesized to affect an individual’s health, and good 
health is included in various ways in all broader measures of well-being. One of the 
earliest papers, according to Helliwell (2001), and still one of the most convincing, is a 
mortality study by Berkman and Syme (1979) of almost 5,000 residents of Alameda 
County, California, selected randomly in 1965 and followed thereafter for nine years. 
Four types of social contact were assessed: marriage, contacts with close friends and 
relatives, church membership, and informal and formal group associations. For each of 
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the four types, individuals who had greater ties had lower mortality rates over the 
nine-year period53. In addition, the results of numerous studies indicate that there exists a 
link between social connectedness on the one hand, and health and personal well-being 
on the other (after controlling for social, racial and demographic characteristics of 
individuals) (OECD, 2001). Putnam (2000) suggested two possible reasons for these links: 
i) social networks furnish tangible assistance and care which reduce psychic and physical 
stress, and ii) social capital might trigger a physiological mechanism stimulating 
individuals’ immune systems to fight disease and buffer stress.  
 
Halpern (2005) argued that the factors affecting positive, subjective well-being are 
largely a mirror image of those driving everyday psychopathology. In this respect it is no 
surprise to find that happiness or life satisfaction is strongly affected by personal 
relationships. The married are very substantially happier than the unmarried, and those 
living together are happier than those living alone. Thus marriage serves as a buffer 
against the hardships of life and it provides emotional support which produces positive 
states of well-being (Eddington and Shuman, 2005). In addition, measures of social 
connection also have significant effects on happiness, like being a member of some 
voluntary associations (Argyle, 1987; Helliwell, 2003). As mentioned before, these 
associations constitute networks in which there can easily be developed reciprocity. 
                                                        
53 It is necessary to note that these relationships are not all large and robust, and they could be 
subject to alternative interpretations, such as confounding factors. For detailed discussions see 
Halpern (2005): Social capital, page 75. 
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Specifically, failure to trust people means an inability to make use of potential help which 
affects the efficiency of the individuals’ welfare maximization problem. However, it is 
important to note that these are not free of the risk of reverse causation or of the 
possibility that both social engagement, trust and well-being are the results of other, 
unmeasured, interpersonal differences (Helliwell, 2003). For example, the married are 
happier, or are happy people more likely to marry and stay married than others? In 
addition, it is very likely that people with optimistic personalities are likely to report 
higher levels of well-being and a more positive view of social interaction; hence they are 
more likely to engage in social interactions and to derive pleasure from them. More 
optimistic people also tend to be more trusting and satisfied with their lives. Theoretically, 
the approaches dealing with this possible bias between social capital variables and 
happiness would be similar to the ones we have discussed in the previous sections on 
education and earnings or health. Practically, it is very difficult to either find a suitable 
proxy to measure personality, or obtain suitably strong instruments.  
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter introduced the theoretical frameworks and empirical foundations related to 
our empirical analysis in the following three chapters. We started with the theory and the 
model of human capital, and further expanded this to cover both health capital and social 
capital. The main areas of concern lies with the impacts of education on earnings, health, 
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and some social capital variables and thence on subjective well-being. Note that there 
have not yet been clear measurements of social capital as, e.g. years of education serves 
for human capital. We focus mainly on the possible difficulties why these associations are 
difficult to test causally. 
 
There are two main issues that need to be tackled in order to establish causality. These 
relate to: i) there are likely to be unobserved individual characteristics, which jointly 
determine both regressors and outcomes; and ii) there exists the issue of reverse-causality. 
Broadly speaking, both explanations indicate that the observed relationship between 
regressors and outcomes reflects an omitted variable. In the earnings equation, we mainly 
focused on the unobserved individuals’ ability; in the health equation, we discussed the 
omitted individuals’ inherent health and time preference; and for subjective well-being, it 
is very likely that certain types of personality influences both social capital variables and 
subjective well-being. The most common way to deal with this is applying the 
instrumental variable approach, although in many applications it is difficult to find 
suitably strong instruments and empirical work relating to education has in particular 
been the subject of substantial criticism in terms of its reliance on weak instruments. Data 
availability problems relating to the issue of finding suitable instruments are further 
compounded for transitional economies, such as China. Therefore, there is a need to 
supplement the traditional research in these areas with that based on alternative 
approaches to dealing with endogeneity. Throughout the thesis, we suggest alternative 
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approaches, each specific to the context in which it is used. Their value lies more in that 
they present extra evidence on the impact of education, rather than they unambiguously 
provide a solution to the endogeneity problem. Neither approaches may be beyond 
criticism, but if different approaches lead to similar conclusions the value of those 
conclusions are strengthened. We will discuss these issues in detail in the following 
chapters. 
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Chapter 4 Private Returns to Education in Urban 
China 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The private return to education is a topic to which economists have paid a great deal of 
attention since Schultz (1961), Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974) laid down the 
theoretical foundations. The benchmark model for the returns to education is the key 
relationship derived by Mincer (1974), which involves regression of the natural logarithm 
of earnings against educational attainment and working experience. A great deal of work 
based on this model has been done for many countries. A large number of studies from all 
parts of the world show that educational returns for an additional year of schooling are 
positive and range from 5% in developed countries to as high as 29% in developing 
countries (Psacharopoulos, 1994). An early study on this topic for China is by Byron and 
Manaloto (1990). Using a sample of eight hundred adult workers from the city of Nanjing 
in 1986, they reported the rate of return to education to be less than 3.7%. Yu and 
Hannum (1996) used the national sample of 1988 and concluded the rate of return to 
education is 2.9% for males and 5.0% for females. It therefore seems that the return rate 
in China is, or was, relatively low. This result is probably because either China’s long 
term planned allocation of labour resulted in a relatively equal distribution of income, or 
the combination of a small sample size and inadequate variation in the data used (Liu, 
1998). 
 83
China’s transition from a planned to a market economy began at the end of 1978. By 
October 1992 when the 14th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party formally 
authorized the concept of the “socialist market economy”, the Chinese economy in terms 
of its structure and institutional condition had changed almost beyond recognition (Lin, et 
al., 1996). Economic reforms have brought significant changes to China’s labour market, 
including market determined wage rates, which may have new implications for the 
returns to education. The main aim of this chapter is to examine to what extent this is so, 
and in particular to what extent returns to education have been increasing during the 
1990s and to what extent such returns depend upon factors such as gender, sector and 
region.  
 
According to human capital theory, education is assumed to raise individual’s 
productivity and subsequently future earnings. However, there has developed the 
signaling/screening hypothesis by Arrow (1973) and Spence (1973, 1974) that employers 
use educational attainment to identify individuals with certain valuable innate traits that 
cannot be observed directly. Thus whether workers’ earnings differentials accurately 
reflect their different marginal productivities is open to more debate. More precisely, it is 
difficult to determine whether the primary role of education is to raise productivity or to 
signal. Indirectly it is one of the objectives of this chapter to shed light on these issues. In 
this chapter, we use the panel data of the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) for 
the years of 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2000, covering more than a decade of Chinese 
economic reform, to estimate the returns to education. Such estimates of the rate of return 
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to education, according to Duraisamy (2000), are a useful guide for private and even 
public investment in education.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature based on different 
data sources and analytic techniques on returns to education as mentioned in chapter 3. In 
section 3, we outline our econometric framework. In section 4, we describe the dataset 
and model specification. Specifically, Mincer’s model is slightly extended to include 
education depreciation, and our hypothesis is discussed. Section 5 presents the empirical 
results and finally we conclude this chapter.   
 
4.2. Literature Review  
 
Education plays an important role in the modern labour market. In human capital theory, 
education is an investment of current resources in exchange for future returns. Private 
investment in education theoretically provides an individual with the higher lifetime 
income level, social status and personal freedom (Filer, et al., 1996). A large amount of 
literature in many different countries and time periods have confirmed that 
better-educated individuals earn higher wages, experience less unemployment, and work 
in more prestigious occupations than their less-educated counterparts (Card, 1999). The 
benchmark model for the development of empirical estimation of the returns to education 
is the key relationship derived by Mincer (1974). Empirically, this involves regressing the 
natural logarithm of earnings (Y) against educational attainment (edu) and working 
experience (exp). This is expressed as follows:  
 85
Ln(Y) = β0+β1edu+ β2exp+ β3exp²+ε                                       (4.1) 
 
A large literature has grown up around the Mincer model. Two of the most 
comprehensive surveys are presented by Psacharopoulos (1985, 1994). They cover the 
results of estimating the returns to human capital for over 60 countries. Psacharopoulos 
and Patrinos (2002) further updated the results based on estimates of returns to education 
for 98 countries. This study confirmed the results that the highest returns are recoded for 
low and middle-income countries. Returns to education for Asia are at about the world 
average: 10%. As suggested by the Mincer model, the explanatory variables are normally 
the years or the level of schooling, experience and experience squared. Given perfectly 
competitive markets, this should represent a full model. Partially to allow for market 
imperfections a number of other variables, primarily dummy variables, tend to be 
included relating to gender, sector and region, etc.  
 
The estimates are generally derived using standard least squares regression with the 
explanatory observed variables that are deemed relevant by the researcher in addition to 
education attainment and experience. This interpretation is accurate as long as there is no 
linkage between education and the error term in the earnings equation. Education is an 
endogenous choice variable in the underlying human capital theory as it depends on the 
choices of educational investment made by individuals. Thus ordinary least squares 
estimates of its impact on earnings do not necessarily measure the causal impact of an 
exogenous change in education. As already discussed in chapter 3, estimates of returns to 
education based on the analysis of using IV measures are mostly applied in the literature. 
 86
However, many applications of the IV regressions in the literature suffer from weak 
instrumental variable bias (Bound, et al., 1995).  
 
4.2.1. Estimates Using Standard Least Squares Regression  
 
In this section we selectively review the research which has been done for some 
transitional economies by standard least squares regression. It has been suggested that 
data availability makes the issue of finding suitable instruments rather severe for 
transition economies. The first transition to market economy conditions emerged in rural 
China around 1978, and the focus of the reforms has gradually shifted to urban areas 
since 1984. Up to the end of the 1980s, the economic, political and social changes in the 
former communist and socialist countries of Europe and Soviet Union were even more 
dramatic (Verhoeven, et al., 2005). There are at least two competing hypotheses about the 
returns to education during transition from centrally planned to market economy: one 
hypothesis is that labour market reforms at the onset would entail immediate increases in 
returns; the other is that the skills hitherto acquired can not be easily transferred to a 
changed economic situation, thus one would expect to see a temporary decline in returns 
during transition. In addition, the gender difference of the returns to education has also 
been the subject of the analysis. Women generally receive higher returns to their 
schooling investments (Psacharopoulos, 1994). Flanagan (1998) studied the Czech labour 
market and reported that returns to a year of schooling increased from 4.3 percent in 1988 
to 5.7 percent in 1996. For males, the change in returns to schooling was from 3.7 percent 
to 4.5 percent, while for females this change was from 5.1 percent to 7 percent. Chase 
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(1998) found that the returns to one year’s of schooling for men increased from 2.4 
percent in 1984 to 5.8 percent in 1993 in the Czech Republic. For Czech women, he finds 
that the returns are higher than for men and increased from 4.2% in 1984 to 7% in 1993.  
Campos and Jolliffe (2002) used the data for about 2.9 million wage earners from 1986 to 
1998 in Hungary and concluded that returns to schooling increased from 6.4% in 1986 to 
11.2% in 1998. The evidence for the Russia Federation is somewhat different. 
Cheidvasser and Benitez-Silva (2000) found that the returns to education in the Russia 
Federation are quite low, less than 5%, and there is almost no improvement in returns to 
education in the post-reform period of 1992-99. In contrast, some studies found evidence 
of reduced returns to education in the former Republic of East Germany between 1988 
and 1991 (see e.g., Krueger and Pischke, 1995). 
 
There is some work which specifically relates to China. The most widely used datasets in 
estimating returns to education in China are the two waves of the Chinese Household 
Income Project (CHIP), which collected household survey data in 1988 and 1995. 
Maurer-Fazio (1999) used the urban sample of the 1988 CHIP and the Chinese Labour 
Market Research Project (CLMRP) data and concluded that the overall returns to 
education were estimated to be 2.9% and 4.5% for male and female workers respectively. 
Similarly, Liu (1998) used the CHIP 1988 data and found the rate of return to education 
to be 3.6%. He also considered differences in the returns to education across the 
provinces and found that Guangdong province54 had the highest returns among the 
provinces. With respect to changes in the labour market, Li (2003) using the CHIP 1995 
                                                          
54 Other provinces include Liaoning, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Gansu and Yunnan. 
Guangdong is one of the five southeast coastal provinces where economic reforms started early. 
The others are: Jiangsu, Shandong, Zhejiang and Fujian.  
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reported the overall rate of return to be 4.3% for men and 6.9% for women, which is 
higher than the CHIP 1988 results (for example, compared to 2.9% and 4.5% respectively 
by Maurer-Fazio (1999)). He classified workers into three cohorts depending on when 
they started working prior to economic reform, up to 1979, in the early stage of urban 
reforms, 1980 to 1987, or during the advanced stage of urban reform, 1988 to 1995. The 
average annual rates of return to college education were 7.7% for the pre-1979 cohort, 
14.1% for the 1980-1987 cohort, and 14.8% for the 1988-1995 cohort. In contrast to Liu 
(1998)’s results on regional differences, he found that the rates of return were higher in a 
less-developed province, Gansu, than in a higher-income province, Guangdong. In 
addition, Wu and Xie (2002), based on the survey of “Life Histories and Social Change in 
Contemporary China”, examined earnings inequality and earnings returns to education in 
China among four types of workers (stayers, later entrants, market losers and early birds 
as characterized by their labour market history). Compared to workers staying in the state 
sector, early market entrants no longer enjoy advantages. The commonly observed higher 
earning returns to education in the market sector are only limited to recent market 
entrants. 
 
Researchers have also searched for evidence of increasing returns to education over time. 
Zhao and Zhou (2002) used a sample of urban residents drawn from 20 cities through a 
stratified sample in 1993 and 1994. They found significant and substantial increases in 
returns to education over time and especially in the non-state sector where market 
mechanisms prevail. Knight and Song (2003) also found that returns to college education 
rose from 4.9% in 1988 to 15.0% in 1995. This is consistent with the gradual 
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development of both labour market reforms and economic reforms. In addition, a more 
recent study is by Zhang, et al. (2005), who used the data from fourteen consecutive 
years of Urban Household Surveys (1988-2001), and concluded that there had been a 
dramatic and consistent increase in returns to education in urban China. In 1988, the rate 
of return to education was only 4.0%, by 1999, it had risen to 10.2%. Similarly, returns to 
education are consistently higher for females than for males. In addition, they also found 
that the returns to schooling were lower in richer provinces, i.e., Guangdong, Zhejiang 
and Liaoning, which is consistent with Li’s (2003) results, although this difference has 
declined over time. We summarize this in Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1 Summary of the Selected Literature for Returns to Education in China 
 
Authors Samples Returns to Education 
Maurer-Fazio  
(1999) CHIP 1988 
Rates of return were 2.9% for men and 4.5% for 
women. 
Liu (1998) CHIP 1988 The developed province, Guangdong, had the highest returns among the provinces. 
Li (2003) CHIP 1995 
Rates of return were 4.3% for men and 6.9% for 
women; 
Rates of return were higher in a less-developed 
province, Gansu, than in a higher-income 
province, Guangdong. 
Knight and 
Song (2003) CHIP 1988 and 1995 
There is a substantial increase in all the 
education coefficients between 1988 and 1995; 
Rates of return were lower for profit-making 
than for loss-making enterprises. 
Zhao and Zhou 
(2002) 
A stratified sample from 
20 cities in 1993 and 
1994 
Rates of return increase over time; 
Rates of return are higher in non-state sectors. 
Wu and Xie  
(2002) 
Life Histories and Social 
Change in Contemporary 
China (1996) 
Higher earning returns to education in the 
market sector are only limited to recent market 
entrants. 
Zhang, et al. 
(2005) 
Urban Household 
Surveys (1988-2001)  
Rates of return increase from 1988 to 1999; 
Consistently higher for females than for males; 
Rates of return were lower in richer provinces. 
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Although the research suggests that the rate of return to education varies widely overtime 
and between countries, most studies find evidence of increasing returns to education 
during the transitional process. This further suggests that such returns depend on supply 
and demand for different amounts or types of labour, and perhaps that in many cases the 
market is not in equilibrium and indeed also there is the possibility of market 
imperfections. With respect to China the results suggest an increasing rate of return to 
education over time and higher returns for women than men. 
 
4.2.2. Review of the ‘Vintage’ Effect 
 
De Grip and Van Loo (2002) have reviewed the economic literature on the various causes 
of skills obsolescence and the ways in which skills obsolescence has been estimated. One 
element of skills obsolescence is the gradual obsolescence over time of the stock of 
knowledge obtained during the schooling process. This is due to the so-called ‘vintage’ 
effect as mentioned in chapter 3. Early human capital theory dealt with skills 
obsolescence due to technological change55. For example, Su (1973) simply defined skills 
obsolescence as the gap between what a worker already knows and what he needs to 
know for working with the new technology. Su (1973) further gave the condition for the 
optimal point in time at which a firm terminates the retraining of existing workers and 
starts hiring new workers. However, Holtmann (1972) made the assumption that the gap 
is smaller for workers with a higher quality of initial education, since a higher quality of 
initial education reduces the training costs later in a worker’s career. Rosen (1975) 
                                                          
55 Other causes of skills obsolescence see De Grip and Van Loo (2002). 
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considered the obsolescence of skills due to technological development to be a ‘vintage’ 
effect: Obsolescence occurs because stocks of knowledge available to society change 
from time to time... Sometimes new knowledge proves received knowledge to be incorrect 
or at least less general than was supposed at an early time. Similarly, production 
innovations often render useless skills associated with prior methods. In both cases, 
capital losses are imposed on those embodying the earlier knowledge and skills. Van 
Imhoff (1988) further modelled the negative effect of a greying labour force on economic 
growth by means of a vintage model which takes account of skills obsolescence due to 
technological developments.  
 
An extensive empirical literature on Mincer’s earnings equations has evolved on the 
returns from investments in human capital, and empirical evidence is consistent with the 
existence of a process of human capital depreciation. Carliner (1982) used the Mincerian 
equation to look at the human capital depreciation process when studying the evolution of 
the salaries of U.S. males close to retirement with the concentration on worker’s physical 
deterioration. Neuman and Weiss (1995) analysed the depreciation of human capital for 
the Israeli case. They tried to identify depreciation due to the economic depreciation 
caused by external forces, i.e., technological or organizational changes, which affects the 
value of the worker in the market. They extended the Mincerian model to include 
depreciation specifically linked to education or the ‘vintage’ effect. Since the ‘vintage’ 
effect is not the same in all sectors, while technical depreciation is, it is possible to 
identify both of them by comparing data from high- and low-tech sectors. Based on this, 
Ramirez (2002) carried out a similar study for Switzerland. A somewhat different result 
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was obtained by Arrazola, et al. (2005), who concluded that for Spain, the depreciation 
rate does not vary according to the level of education, however, it does so depending on 
employment spells endured by the workers in recent years and on whether they have 
undertaken training courses.  
 
4.2.3. Returns to Educational Signals 
 
Accepting the positive relationship between education and future earnings, economists 
offer two major theories explaining this correlation: human capital theory and 
signaling/screening hypothesis. Both of them have been discussed in chapter three. 
Signaling and screening theories appear in the economics literature in the early 1970s as 
economists started to explore the consequences of imperfect information (Arrow, 1973; 
Spence, 1973). For example, when employers have imperfect information about the 
productivity of potential employees, one readily available piece of information is years of 
educational attainment. Therefore, in the absence of perfect (better) information, 
employers use these educational signals to predict the true productivity of workers in the 
hiring process. Because both of the theories explained the positive relationship between 
education and earnings as resulting from a positive relationship between education and 
productive ability, it is very difficult to empirically separate these two hypotheses. There 
have been a great many studies attempting to do so, using a wide variety of approaches. 
For the relevance of this chapter, we review a limited number of papers focused on the 
time path of the returns to educational signals to test for the existence of signaling.  
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Researchers have contested whether or not returns to education signals should decline as 
workers gain increased labour market experience. If employers learn about the true 
productivity of their employees over time, therefore causing the educational signal itself 
to be of less value, returns of education signals decline overtime. For example, Layard 
and Psacharopoulos (1974) argued that returns to educational signals will fall with 
experience as employers come to have better information about their employees’ real 
productivity. Their examination of relevant studies of time showed no such decline, 
thereby proving evidence against the signaling hypothesis. However, Riley (1979) 
pointed out that a basic condition for a signaling equilibrium is that employers find out 
that their predictions based on the education signals are correct on average: some 
members of a particular educational signaling group will earn a higher wage and some 
will earn a lower wage, the return to an educational signal is constant over time. He uses 
this argument to dispute the hypothesis that returns to educational signals decline over 
time. Farber and Gibbons (1996) presented a model to incorporate Riley’s point. They 
argued that as long as the new information acquired with work experience is orthogonal 
to the educational signals, the observed return to those signals will not decline. Belman 
and Heywood (1997) argued that the productivity of a worker in a particular job depends 
on the quality of the match between the requirements of the job and the abilities of the 
worker. In this sense, the worker’s productivity is constrained by the quality of the job 
match. Employers can not immediately observe the true productivity of workers. The 
authors assumed that the matching process results in non-optimal matches in the first 
period, but the true productivity of the new employees is revealed in the second (and last) 
period. They calculated the return to an educational signal in each period to demonstrate 
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that as workers gain experience the returns to such signals do attenuate over time. 
Furthermore, a recent paper by Habermalz (2003), who assumed that information is 
imperfect but symmetric in the first period, from period two onward workers become 
privately aware of their true productivity and the employer is still excluded from the 
knowledge of the true productivity of their workforce, offered a different explanation 
related to employer-learning from Belman and Heywood’s (1997). His results indicated 
that for above median ability workers returns to educational signals first increase and then 
decrease, and empirically the return to an educational signal increases for a large portion 
of an individual’s work life.  
 
4.2.4. Estimates Using IV Measures and Weak Instrumental Variable 
Bias 
 
Over the years there has been considerable interest focusing on the causality debate 
between education and earnings. A comprehensive survey is presented by Card (1999), 
which covers different techniques used in the estimation of the returns to education with 
the focus on a possible endogeneity bias in standard least squares estimates. The 
disturbance term ε in equation (4.1) captures unobservable individual effects and these 
individual factors may also influence the education decision. A common example is 
unobserved ability. More broadly, if there is a correlation between schooling and the error 
term in the Mincerian specification, schooling is endogenous and the estimated rate of 
return by standard least squares method will yield biased results. There have been a 
number of approaches dealing with this problem in the literature. The most commonly 
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used method is the instrumental variables approach, which typically looks to the 
educational attainment literature for appropriate instruments or exploits some ‘natural 
experiment’ (Maluccio, 1998). Researchers assume the existence of instrumental 
variables uncorrelated with the structural error but correlated with the endogenous 
regressor. According to Imbens and Rosenbaum (2005), even in the best of situations, the 
assumptions that are required for an instrument are plausible, not certain. Specifically, if 
the instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressor then the IV 
estimates are potentially as biased as the standard least squares estimates.  
 
One important example of the use of IV methods to make a causal inference is the paper 
by Angrist and Krueger (1991), which used quarters-of-birth as an instrument to 
circumvent bias in estimating the returns to education. They argued that quarters-of-birth 
are exogenous sources of variation in educational attainment due to existing compulsory 
schooling laws. Two findings support this association between quarter-of-birth and both 
age at school entry and educational attainment (Cruz and Moreira, 2005): First, the effect 
of birth on school attainment varies across states, depending on the legal drop-out age. 
The drop-out rate is considerably higher in states with an age-16 requirement compared 
with states with a longer requirement. Second, the relationship is weaker for more recent 
cohorts. Since the average level of education has increased over time, the laws are less 
likely to influence more recent cohorts. To estimate returns to education using 
quarters-of-birth as instruments, Angrist and Krueger (1991) used data from the public 
use data files, describing samples of individuals, from US censuses of 1960, 1970 and 
1980, with sample sizes that were greater than 200, 000 for men born between 1920 and 
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1929, greater than 300, 000 for men born between 1930 and 1939 and greater than 400, 
000 for men born between 1940 and 1949. However, the relevant sample size varies 
somewhat depending on the details of the different analyses that they performed (Imbens 
and Rosenbaum, 2005). They estimated earning equations considering specifications that 
combine different sets of instruments (quarter-of-birth possibly interacting with 
year-of-birth and region-of-birth) and different sets of covariates (race, metropolitan area, 
marital status, age and age squared). Their estimates for returns to education are sensitive 
to the different specifications but with remarkably small standard errors. For example, 
using the 1980 US census, the two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimates range from 6.0 
percent to 9.9 percent for the 1930-1939 cohort with a standard error around 2 percent.  
 
Bound, et al. (1995) replicated Angrist and Krueger’s results for 1930-1939 cohort and 
questioned the reliability of quarter-of-birth as an instrument. Their criticism is two-fold. 
First, quarter-of-birth can be correlated with unobserved characteristics of the individual. 
Therefore, these instruments are not truly exogenous, being correlated with earnings after 
controlling for education. The second criticism is that quarter-of-birth is only weakly 
correlated with educational attainment in some specifications. Specifically, using exactly 
the same data, they replaced the quarter-of-birth information by entirely irrelevant 
random numbers, which should be useless for estimating the return to education, 
repeating this process 500 times, applying TSLS each time, obtaining a mean estimated 
return of a 6 percent increase in weekly wages for a year of additional education, with an 
estimated standard error around 2 percent as well. Moreover, by varying the instruments, 
they found greater apparent precision with more instruments than with fewer instruments, 
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even though the instruments are all just irrelevant random noise (Imbens and Rosenbaum, 
2005). Clearly, if the instruments are only weakly correlated with the explanatory 
variable, standard asymptotic theory can not be employed to developed reliable inference 
methods (Cruz and Moreira, 2005). The problem of weak instruments is quite prevalent 
in recent IV studies, and in most of the studies surveyed in Card (2000) the IV estimates 
suffer from imprecision and are not significantly different from the standard least squares 
regression.  
 
4.3. The Data and Model Specification  
 
4.3.1. Data Descriptions 
 
The panel data we use comes from the Household Survey in China Health and Nutrition 
Survey, which is collected mainly by the Carolina Population Centre. It covers the four 
years of 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2000, and thus covers much of the period of China’s 
economic reform process. This dataset is designed to examine the impact of the health, 
nutrition, and family planning policies and programs implemented by national and local 
governments. It contains information on wages, education, and other demographic 
information, so it is suitable to estimate the returns to education in China. We choose the 
urban area only, because of a large number of education missing values or no education 
attained in some/most rural areas. We restrict our sample to wage employees, currently 
working with only one primary job. The analysis was also restricted to those between 15 
and 65. After also excluding observations with less than full information, this provided 
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5589 data points in the four years altogether. All the variables are defined in Table 4-2 
and Table 4-3 shows summary information.  
 
Table 4-2 Data Description of the Main Variables 
 
Variables Data Description 
Ln(Y) The natural logarithm of average monthly wages (inflation adjusted) which consist of basic wages, subsidies and bonuses. 
Education (edu) Formal education years (0-18) 
Potential Experience 
(exp) Experience=age–education–6 
Gender Male=1  Female=0 
Sectors  
Public: governmental units and state-owned enterprises/institutes; 
Private: individual/private enterprises and three-capital enterprises 
(owned by foreigners, overseas Chinese and joint ventures), and the 
remaining sector includes collectives and others. 
Regions   1. Provinces Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou  
2. Distance Distance between the capital of upper nine provinces to Beijing and 
Shanghai respectively. 
 
Almost 60 percent of all workers are employed in the state sector. This ratio increased 
from 1989 to 1993, and declined thereafter. This shrinkage of state sector employment 
coincided with the restructuring and privatization of SOEs. Compared to the state sector, 
the percentage of workers in the private sector increased significantly from 6.55% in 
1993 to 17.03% in 2000, after Deng Xiaoping’s tour to the South in 1992 promoting 
openness and reform. The private sector here includes individual/private enterprises and 
three-capital enterprises (owned by foreigners, overseas Chinese and joint ventures). The 
selection of these two sectors is mainly based on the rationale of the aggressive 
competition within the state sector and the emergence and development of the private 
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sector as a prominent player in China’s labour market since the early 1990s. People not in 
either the state or private sectors include, e.g., those in collectives.  
 
Figure 4-1 Survey Regions 
 
 
 
Source: China Health and Nutrition Survey. The emphasised (green) parts are the survey regions.  
 
The survey covers nine provinces shown in Figure 4-1 that vary substantially in 
geography and economic development. These are Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, 
Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou. Jiangsu and Shandong belong to 
coastal provinces, where economic reform started early; Liaoning and Heilongjiang 
belong to north-eastern provinces, and have many similarities in economic structure as 
China’s major bases of heavy industry. Henan, Hubei and Hunan are middle provinces 
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and Guangxi and Guizhou are western provinces where economic development is 
relatively slow. In 1989 and 1993, the survey includes eight provinces: Liaoning Jiangsu, 
Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou. In 1997, Liaoning is substituted 
for Heilongjiang, and in 2000, the survey covers all nine provinces. In the regression 
results, there is one regional dummy variable for each region respectively. In addition, 
two metropolises have been chosen. One is Beijing, the capital of China, the other is 
Shanghai, the biggest commercial centre in China. The distance from the capital of the 
nine provinces to these two metropolises is included as well for reasons discussed later. 
 
The dependent variable in our analysis is the natural logarithm of average monthly 
wages56 which consist of basic wages, subsidies and bonuses. Subsidies in 1989 included 
those for food (grocery/meat), one-child, health, bathing/haircut and books/newspapers. 
In 1993, 1997 and 2000, the one-child subsidy was replaced by an accommodation 
subsidy. The others remained the same. Recall from the chapter 2, basic wages (or fixed 
income) in China are largely determined by the administrative system and reflect the 
principles of human resource allocation and rewards on a more or less rational basis 
(those with more seniority and education earn more) (Dickson and Rublee, 2000; Zhao 
and Zhou, 2002). In contrast, bonuses and subsidies, which constitute an increasingly 
large proportion of individuals’ total income, are distributed less systematically. To some 
extent, bonuses and subsidies are dependent on the profitability of the enterprise itself. In 
the conventional context, the inclusion of bonuses and subsidies may be less closely 
                                                          
56 In labour economics, the wage rate or weekly wage is often used because these wage rates 
measure more precisely productivity-related rewards. In the Chinese context, since most urban 
employees are full-time workers, the monthly wage serve the same purpose well (Zhao and Zhou, 
2002).  
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associated with education, however, these employer-provided subsidies are more 
important in relatively high wage jobs, and their exclusion may affect the estimated 
returns to education, specifically for developing countries (see, e.g. Gibson and Fatai, 
2006). In addition, we note that non-wage benefits such as a company car may also have 
an impact in developed countries. We use the consumer price indices from the World 
Development Indicators (2003) to deflate wage income in different years. 
 
From the Table 4-3, we can see that the wages increased significantly from 1989 to 2000, 
and the substantial improvement is from 1997 to 2000. Table 4-4 and Table 4-5 show the 
specific distribution of wages across genders, sectors and different regions. Within the 
sample, there is a slight decline in the percentage of females in the dataset, from 45.32% 
in 1993 to 42.52% in 2000, and females earn less than males in all four years. In addition, 
individuals in state sectors earn less than those in private sectors except for 2000. It is 
necessary to mention that the sample size of the private sector in 1989 and 1993 is 
comparatively small. The state sector in the survey includes governmental units and 
state-owned enterprises/institutes. Regional inequality has always been an issue for China 
as argued in Chapter 2. Table 4-4 shows that individuals in coastal and middle provinces 
almost always have higher wages in all four years. People in Heilongjiang earn 
comparatively more as well, however, the selected sample in Heilongjiang includes only 
two recent years of 1997 and 2000. In addition, the distance between the capital of 
Jiangsu/Shandong and Shanghai/Beijing is the shortest of the nine provinces. 
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Table 4-3 Sample Size and Distribution 
 
Variables 1989 1993 1997 2000 Full Sample
Female (%) 44.98 45.32 43.63 42.52 44.32 
Average Age 37.79 39.00 37.63 39.05 38.32 
Average Experience 23.77 23.86 21.84 22.62 23.17 
Average Formal Education Years 8.02 9.14 9.79 10.45 9.16 
Average Wages (RMB),  
Inflation Adjusted 312.09 405.29 544.04 841.20 486.56 
State (%) 57.94 63.77 56.88 52.87 58.31 
Private (%) 8.53 6.55 11.04 17.03 10.04 
Married† (%) 76.03 70.46 79.50 70.13 74.17 
Per cent Working† 65.95 66.46 57.63 55.51 61.98 
Average Number of  
Household Members†  4.40 4.14 4.04 3.90 4.15 
Liaoning (%) 16.79 19.12 - 8.28 12.26 
Heilongjiang (%) - - 10.10 11.10 4.24 
Shandong (%) 11.83 9.56 9.93 7.90 10.07 
Jiangsu (%) 13.39 13.64 23.26 22.01 17.18 
Henan (%) 13.55 10.76 12.65 11.38 12.20 
Hubei (%) 11.23 12.83 14.52 11.67 12.44 
Hunan (%) 12.04 13.24 13.58 12.61 12.79 
Guangxi (%) 11.83 10.16 8.23 7.43 9.78 
Guizhou (%) 9.34 10.70 7.72 7.62 9.04 
No. of the observations 1852 1496 1178 1063 5589 
Source: China health and Nutrition Survey, various years. 
Notes: † No. of the observations for these three variables are slightly less than others due to missing values. 
They are only used for the test of possible selection bias in the empirical section.
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Table 4-4 Sample Size and Distribution by Regions. 
 
 1989 1993 1997 2000 
Province Average Formal  Average Average Formal Average Average Formal Average Average Formal Average 
 Education Years Wages† (RMB) Education Years Wages (RMB) Education Years Wages (RMB) Education Years Wages (RMB) 
Liaoning 10.13 254.06 10.94 331.22 - - 12.03 663.76 
Heilongjiang - - - - 11.15 601.82 12.13 1058.64 
Jiangsu 6.78 262.84 7.42 482.62 8.80 606.03 9.53 822.01 
Shandong 6.95 405.85 8.46 589.38 9.34 449.99 10.20 1058.70 
Henan 8.52 366.06 10.14 303.16 11.27 513.09 11.18 1025.99 
Hubei 8.01 242.86 9.06 416.26 9.52 513.15 10.16 680.42 
Hunan 8.64 370.58 9.51 473.07 10.43 672.26 10.53 868.67 
Guangxi 6.63 364.64 7.84 372.81 9.08 455.56 8.77 519.80 
Guizhou 7.66 231.35 8.59 311.18 9.27 380.37 10.11 785.22 
 
 
Full Sample Distance to Distance to No. of  the    
 Average Formal Average Beijing‡  Shanghai Obs.    
 Education Years Wages (RMB) (miles) (miles)     
Liaoning 10.71 338.91 390 747 685    
Heilongjiang 11.64 829.27 656 1051 237    
Jiangsu 8.16 543.79 560 166 960    
Shandong 8.32 559.05 228 459 563    
Henan 9.97 500.42 395 517 682    
Hubei 9.06 435.33 657 423 695    
Hunan 9.63 559.82 834 543 715    
Guangxi 7.71 405.44 1273 986 547    
Guizhou 8.64 372.34 1000 939 505    
Source: China Health and Nutrition Survey. 
Notes: † Inflation adjusted; ‡ Calculations are based on the Meridian World Data system (http://www.meridianworlddata.com).  
 104
 
Table 4-5 Sample Size and Distribution by Sectors and Genders. 
 
 1989 1993 1997 2000 Full Sample 
 
 
Average 
Formal 
Education 
Years 
Average  
Wages† 
(RMB) 
Average 
Formal 
Education 
Years 
Average 
Wages 
(RMB)
Average 
Formal 
Education 
Years 
Average 
Wages 
(RMB)
Average 
Formal 
Education 
Years 
Average 
Wages 
(RMB)
Average 
Formal 
Education 
Years 
Average 
Wages 
(RMB)
No. of 
the 
Obs. 
State 8.85 338.53 9.91 367.55 10.7 543.52 11.57 904.47 10.01 486.76 3259 
Private 6.66 353.38 8.26 870.93 9.15 775.48 9.47 805.6 8.41 683.97 567 
            
Female 7.63 278.1 8.8 359.54 9.58 462.75 10.27 752.7 8.84 425.31 2477 
Male 8.35 339.88 9.42 443.22 9.95 606.97 10.59 906.67 9.41 535.31 3112 
Source: China Health and Nutrition Survey. 
Notes: † Inflation adjusted.  
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The independent variables include the number of years in formal education (edu), 
potential experience (exp) and experience squared. In the survey, completed years of 
formal education were measured by primary school (1-6 years), lower middle school (1-3 
years), upper middle school (1-3 years), middle technical or vocational school (1-2 years) 
and college/university (1-6 years or more). For comparative purpose, we aggregate these 
discrete values based on China’s education system to obtain continuous values of the 
formal education years57. From Table 4-3, we can see that average formal education years 
increased steadily from 8.02 in 1989 to 10.45 in 2000. More specifically as shown in 
Table 4-5, females have less formal years of education than males, although the values 
are very close in 1997 and 2000. Individuals in state sectors have substantially more years 
of education than those in private sectors in all four years. Potential experience is defined 
as: age-education-6, where 6 is the normal starting school age. It reflects the maximum 
number of years spent in work. Other explanatory variables in the earnings equation 
include gender, sectors, regional variables, and some interactive variables: gender*edu 
and sector*edu. 
 
4.3.2. The Connection between Education and Earnings 
 
As our baseline model, we begin by estimating returns to education with respect to wages 
income (Y) as follows: 
                                                          
57  In China, basic formal education includes primary education (normally six years) and 
secondary education. Secondary education is divided into academic secondary education 
(normally three years of lower and three years of upper middle school) and specialized/ 
vocational/technical secondary education, i.e., after graduated from the lower middle school, one 
can apply for upper middle school or middle technical/vocational school.  
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Ln(Y) = β0+β1edu+β2exp+β3exp²+β4gender+β5region+ε     (4.2) 
 
Where Y is average monthly wages including basic wages, subsidies and bonuses. The 
inclusion of education, experience and experience squared is consistent with the standard 
human capital model – Mincer’s earnings function. Coefficients β0 to β3 relate to this 
basic model. ε is a random error term. β4 represents the basic earning differences between 
males and females. To an extent, as we have already suggested, these other variables are 
included to reflect labour and product market imperfections. For example, given perfect 
labour mobility the regional variables should not be significant. We use β5 to capture the 
regional differences, and the variable region takes two forms: firstly a vector of regional 
dummy variables to represent the nine provinces; and the second form is two variables 
reflecting distance from Beijing and Shanghai respectively. We expand on the rationale 
for these later.  
 
To further estimate returns to education, we then extend the equation (4.2) to incorporate 
information on sectors. It is necessary to include the sectoral differences in the Chinese 
context for reasons we have described in chapter 2. We also include two interaction terms: 
gender*education (genedu) and sector*education. We use the former to capture 
differences in the returns to education between genders, and the latter to identify and 
assess the specific channels that are effective in determining returns to education.  
 
A major preoccupation in this context has been the potential for the unobserved 
determinants of education to be correlated with earnings. As mentioned in chapter 3, a 
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large literature has developed looking at the causal impact of education on earnings. The 
main debate is whether the estimated impact of education on earnings has isolated the 
effects that are caused by education from the consequences of unmeasured, for instance, 
ability. The IV method is mostly applied in the empirical work to correct this bias 
presuming the valid and relevant instruments can be obtained. If this is not the case, for 
example, the instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressor, then 
the IV estimates are potentially as biased as the standard least squares estimates. Thus 
this approach is handicapped by the lack of suitably strong instrumental variables. This 
applies equally to other peoples’ research and the database we are using. Instead we 
approach the problem of endogeneity from a slightly different perspective.  
 
When labour economists estimate earnings equations, they almost universally find a 
significant positive partial correlation between years of education and earnings, and this 
finding is consistent with both the human capital and the signalling theories (Kroch and 
Sjoblom, 1994). We assume that the impact of education itself on wages may be because 
education either (i) enhances ability and productivity58 or (ii) because it reflects ability. 
The former is based on the typical human capital theory that education adds directly to a 
person’s productivity and that innate ability is merely a foundation to build on. The latter 
may be the case if education serves as a signal of innate productivity to alleviate the 
informational asymmetry between the employer and the employee about the true 
productivity of a worker (Habermalz, 2003). Therefore, the amount of education an 
                                                          
58 There exists the possibility that education both augments and signals individual productivity 
based on weak screening hypothesis as mentioned in chapter 3 (see e.g., Brown and Sessions, 
1998). Thus our hypothesis (i) indicates the primary role of education is to augment marginal 
productivity.  
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individual acquires signals the individual’s innate ability. Considering cross-sectional 
data, we can summarize this within the context of the model by first arguing that the basic 
theory underlying the earnings equation is that wages are a function of ability59 (Ai):  
 
Yi = f(Ai)                           (4.3) 
 
Ability itself is a function of basic or innate ability (Ai*) and education augmented 
ability: 
 
Ai = Ai* + h(Ei)                         (4.4) 
 
Included in E could be experience, although we will assume for simplicity that this is not 
so and restrict it to education. We also assume for simplicity linearity and separability. 
Finally education is a function of basic ability 
 
Ei = g(Ai*)                          (4.5) 
 
We cannot observe innate ability directly, although conceptually it is possibly to think 
that it could perhaps be measured. Hence when we estimate wages as a function of 
education we get: 
 
                                                          
59  Human capital models do not naturally generate a positive correlation between ability 
differences and education (Weiss, 1971), however, the available evidence suggests that the 
benefit to schooling is greater for more able individuals (Weiss, 1995). We would expect this has 
the same implication for experience as well. 
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Yi = f(g-1(Ei) + h(Ei))                                    (4.6) 
 
That is when we have no direct measure of innate ability and simply include education on 
the right hand side it is picking up the influence of both innate ability (g-1(.)) and the 
impact of education in enhancing ability (h(.)). Unless one can find a suitable proxy for 
A* it is difficult if not impossible to separate out these two effects. Researchers have used 
the IV method or twin studies to isolate the causal effect of education on earnings. In 
reality this has not been totally satisfactory as argued before. However there are different 
implications in the model with respect to whether or not the impact of education declines 
with the period since the individual left formal education. If we assume potentially the 
only impact of education is to proxy innate ability (g-1(Ei)) and if this is stable and 
unchanging over time, then the impact of education will not change as the individual 
ages60. If, however, education enhances ability, in part because of its impact on skills, 
then in a changing world as these skills date the impact of education on earnings should 
also decline. This is also consistent with the effect of schooling vintage. Thus, if we 
include an experience-education interaction variable in equation (4.2), a test for the 
impact of education on ability rather than simply proxying ability is provided by the 
existence of a significant negative sign on this variable. We will test this by panel data 
techniques which we are going to discuss in the next following section. It is important to 
emphasize that this rests on the view that the value of education, as a signal, does not 
decline over time. We reviewed the literature on this earlier, although not entirely 
unanimous, there is a tendency to accept this assumption. As Riley (1979) and Farber and 
                                                          
60 We reviewed the literature of returns to educational signals in section 4.2, here we incorporate 
the assumption that the return to an educational signal is constant over time (see Riley (1979) and 
Farber and Gibbons (1996)).  
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Gibbons (1996) argued that a basic condition for a signaling equilibrium is that 
employers find out that their predictions based on the education signals are correct on 
average: the return to an educational signal on average is constant over time. 
 
We acknowledge the possible endogeneity of the education attainment in the sense of 
unobserved ability in the OLS regressions and the bias it can cause. However, to some 
extent we question the hypothesis of endogeneity in the simultaneous sense. Education 
predates earnings and hence it is difficult to argue that they are determined by earnings 
per se. Yet there may be a linkage which goes beyond that of education enhancing skills, 
which further enhance earnings, but this will be because as we have argued, education 
may proxy ability. The special circumstances of China at this time further weaken the 
reverse link between education and earnings in that all the evidence is that prior to the 
1990s, the earnings or financial return to education was much more limited than in a 
market economy. Hence that part of ability which is reflected in motivation to earn high 
incomes would have been less influential in impacting on people’s human capital 
decisions prior to 1990 and these people constitute the bulk of our data base in all four 
years.  
 
4.4. Econometric Framework - Panel Data Analysis 
 
Data sets that combine time series and cross sections are called panel or longtitudinal data 
sets. Panel data provide information on individual behaviour both across time and across 
individuals. A major advantage of panel data is increased precision in estimation, more 
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efficiency and less multicollinearity (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Baltagi, 2005). 
Heterogeneity across units is central to the issue of analysing panel data. Baltagi (2005) 
summarises the core issues in terms of econometric methodology, and Greene (2003) 
demonstrates more accessible illustrations of its applications. The following discussion 
draws heavily on Greene (2003)’s analysis within the context of our empirical work in 
the next section. The basic framework is a regression of the form: 
 
Yit = Xitβ + Ziπ + εit              (4.7) 
 
Xit has k columns and does not include a constant term. The heterogeneity or individual 
effect is Ziπ where Zi contains a constant term and a set of individual specific variables, 
which may be observed or unobserved, all of which are taken to be constant over time t. 
We apply our regression equation to the panel data model: 
 
Ln(Yit) = βXit + Ziπ + εit                        (4.8) 
  
for i=1, 2, …,n (n=2891) and for each i, t=1, 2, …,T (T<=461). The dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of average monthly wages. β includes explanatory variables 
specified in equation (4.2). The residual εit has the normal properties. Ziπ denotes the 
unobservable individual specific effects. We consider two cases: 
 
                                                          
61 Unbalanced panel, we will explain this later in this section. 
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Fixed Effects (FE): If Zi is unobserved, but correlated with Xit, then the least squares 
estimator of β is biased and inconsistent as a consequence of an omitted variable. 
However, in this instance: 
 
Ln(Yit) = βXit + αi + εit          (4.9) 
  
Where αi = Ziπ, embodies all the observable effects, specifies an estimable equation. This 
takes αi to be an individual-specific constant term in the regression model. It should be 
noted that the term ‘fixed’ as used here indicates that the term does not vary over time.  
 
Random Effects (RE): If the unobserved heterogeneity, Zi, however formulated, can be 
assumed to be uncorrelated with Xit, then: 
 
Ln(Yit) = βXit + E[Ziπ] + {Ziπ – E[Ziπ]} + εit                
            = βXit + α + ui + εit                                 (4.10) 
   
This random effects approach specifies that ui is a group specific random element which 
although random between groups is constant for that group throughout the time period.  
 
4.4.1. Fixed Effects 
 
Fixed effects model assumes that differences across units of observation can be captured 
in differences in αi as shown in equation (4.9). Therefore, αi is the vector of individual 
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dummies62. Note that when n is very large as in our case, regressions including (n-1) 
dummies may not be feasible, and taking deviations from individual-specific averages is 
equivalent to taking residuals from regression of Ln(Yit) and Xit on individual dummies 
and then working with the residuals. Thus taking the average overtime yields: 
 
               (4.11) 
 
Subtracting this from Ln(Yit) in equation (4.9) yields the within model: 
 
Ln(Yit) – )( iYLn = β(Xit – iX ) + (εit – iε )                   (4.12) 
  
for i=1, 2, …,n (n=2891) and for each i, t=1, 2, …,T (T<=4). Equation (4.9), (4.11) and 
(4.12) provide the basis for estimating β. Estimation (4.12) is known as the within groups 
estimator also known as the fixed effects estimator and it is performed by OLS. This is a 
classical regression model and no new methodology is needed to analyse it. If we want to 
investigate the differences across individuals, then we can test the hypothesis whether 
these differences are all equal with an F-test. The null hypothesis is: 
0... 121 ==== −iααα  against the alternative hypothesis that all unobserved 
individual-specific effects exist. If the F-statistic rejects the null hypothesis, the F-test 
indicates that unobserved individual-specific effects are different, and then the fixed 
effects model is more appropriate than pooled OLS. 
                                                          
62 The model has been estimated with an overall constant and (n-1) dummy variables and each 
dummy variable coefficient will now be an estimate of difference with constant term where 
dummy “1” is the omitted group. 
iiii XYLn εαβ ++=)(
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There are two extensions: Firstly, the fixed effects model can be extended to include a 
time-specific effect as well. One way to formulate this is simply to add the time effect by 
the inclusion of an additional (T-1) dummies. This is implemented in our empirical work 
in the following section. Secondly, if we have missing data in the survey we have what 
we call an unbalanced panel. With an unbalanced panel the full sample size 
is∑=ni iT1 instead of nT, where Ti is the number of observations for the ith group. Thus 
group means must be based on Ti, which varies across groups.  
 
A major limitation of within estimation is that the coefficients of time-invariant 
regressors are not identified in the within model. Thus in our panel earnings regressions 
we are not able to estimate the gender or regional impact. Random effects estimators do 
however permit estimation of coefficients of time-invariant regressors. This is an 
important point, fixed effects only allows the case of time-variant explanatory variables.  
 
4.4.2. Random Effects 
 
If the individual effects are uncorrelated with the regressors, then it might be appropriate 
to model the individual-specific constant terms as randomly distributed across 
cross-sectional units. This view would be appropriate if we believed that sampled 
cross-sectional units were drawn from a large population. The gain to this approach is 
that it substantially reduces the number of parameters to be estimated. The cost is the 
possibility of inconsistent estimates should the assumption be inappropriate. Rearranging 
equation (4.10), we obtain: 
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Ln(Yit) = α + βXit + ui + εit                 (4.13) 
 
There is now a single constant term which is the mean of the unobserved heterogeneity, 
α=E(Ziπ), and is constant over time. ui (ui={Ziπ–E[Ziπ]}) is the random heterogeneity 
specific to the i’th observation. We assume further that:  
 
E[εit |X] = E[ui |X] = 0, 
E[εit2 |X] = σε2 ,  
E[ui 2 |X] = σu2 ,             
E[εit uj |X] = 0  for all i, t and j,               (4.14) 
E[εit εjs |X] = 0  if t ≠ s or i ≠ j, 
E[ui uj |X] = 0  if i ≠ j. 
 
Based on these assumptions, random effects model is performed by Generalised Least 
Squares (GLS)63. GLS based on the true variance component is a best linear unbiased 
estimator (BLUE) and all the feasible GLS estimators considered are asymptotically 
efficient when the number of observations is large.  
 
The crucial distinction between fixed effects estimation and random effects estimation is 
whether the unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the 
regressors in the model. There are two key tests to discuss. Firstly, Breusch and Pagan 
(1980) have devised a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for the random effects model based 
                                                          
63 Details of GLS see Greene (2003) pp.293-98. 
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on the OLS residuals. The null hypothesis of the test is that the variance of the individual 
effects equals zero against the alternative that it does not equal zero. Under the null 
hypothesis, LM is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of freedom. If we obtain a 
LM test statistic which exceeds the (for example, 95 percent) critical value, we conclude 
that the classical regression model with a single constant term is inappropriate, thus the 
result of the test is to reject the null hypothesis in favour of the random effects model. 
Secondly, the specification test devised by Hausman (1978) is used to test for whether the 
random effects are independent of the regressors. This is a general test to compare any 
two estimators. The test is based on the idea that under the hypothesis of no correlation, 
both fixed effects model and GLS are consistent, but the fixed effects model is inefficient, 
whereas under the alternative, the fixed effects model is consistent, but the GLS one is 
not. Therefore, under the null hypothesis, the two estimates should not differ 
systematically. To sum up, if based on a LM test, which is decisive that there are 
individual effects, and a Hausman test, which suggests that these effects are uncorrelated 
with the regressors in the model, we could conclude that of the two alternatives we have 
considered, the random effects model is the better choice. However, it is not possible to 
use the Hausman test to compare fixed and random effects for a model with dummy 
variables such as gender and region which are time-invariant.  
 
4.5. Empirical Results 
 
4.5.1. Changes in Returns to Education over Time 
 
We start by estimating equation (4.2) for each year respectively, and the coefficient 
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estimates are reported in Table 4-664. The results show that education is significant with 
the expected signs in all four years. Earnings increase with education, and this positive 
linkage is consistent with the research that has previously been done on this subject in 
China. In 1989 the marginal return is 4%65. This percentage declined from 1989 to 1993, 
and increased thereafter. Note that it has noticeably increased from 4% in 1997 to 7% in 
2000. Still, this is somewhat lower than some studies in China and studies in other 
developing countries as mentioned in the literature, and it may appear to be too low to be 
consistent with China’s recent development. However, this is consistent with the 
long-term egalitarian income distribution principles pursued by the Chinese government 
in urban areas, and further it may partly reflect the underdevelopment in China’s market 
economy in the transition period since economic reform is a continuous process and most 
policies take time to produce any changes. One reason for our relatively low estimates is 
that the dependant variable includes subsidies and bonuses which tend to flatten the 
distribution. To a large extent, our estimates reflect the income returns to education, but 
not the earnings, net of benefits, returns which may be higher.  
 
In addition, we also need to be concerned by the fact that we could not separate the 
rural-to-urban migrants from urban residents in our sample when estimating returns to 
education in urban China. As with many other studies the data was simply not available 
to allow us to do this. As mentioned in chapter 2, beginning with the reform period in the 
late 1970s and accelerating during the late 1990s, reforms to the household registration 
system have been implemented by Chinese authorities. Restrictions on rural-urban labour 
                                                          
64 The reported coefficients were estimated by STATA 9.0. 
65 The estimated change in earnings Yi for individual i is calculated by ( ie β –1). 
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migration, as well as on obtaining urban residence permits for rural migrants, have been 
gradually relaxed. According to Brooks and Tao (2003), the National Bureau of Statistics 
estimates there were about 80 million permanent rural-to-urban migrants (i.e., those 
living in urban areas for more than six months) between 1990 and 2000. Therefore, our 
estimates include a sample of rural-to-urban migrants that are likely to have a higher 
return to education66 (Meng and Zhang, 2001). Whether this is still true for current 
migrants is an empirical question that is difficult to answer since there are still too few 
studies on these issues given the available data. 
 
In order to test the robustness of the estimated increasing trend in the returns to education 
and to investigate whether the inclusion of different sectors67 changes the estimated 
coefficients of education, we add two sectoral dummies: state sector and private sector. 
People not in either of these sectors include, e.g., those in collectives. Table 4-7 shows 
that adding sectoral dummies reduced the estimated returns to education for 1989, 
however, it has a negligible effect in 1997 and 2000. In addition, the trend of increasing 
returns to education over time is robust to the inclusion of these sectoral dummies, except 
that the coefficient in 1993 fails to be significant. Hence, we conclude that in general 
rising returns to education do not specifically reflect sectoral changes in the labour 
                                                          
66 Meng and Zhang (2001) found that the rate of return to education is around 1% higher for rural 
migrants than for urban residents. 
67 In addition to the inclusion of different sectors, we have also added occupation variables in the 
regressions. Adding occupation dummies has a negligible effect on the coefficients of education 
in 1997 and 2000, but in 1989 and 1993, the coefficients of education fail to be significant. The 
latter to some extent is consistent with the discussions in the literature that a high degree of 
multicollinearity exists between education and occupation (Li, 2003). Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos (2002) also argued that the inclusion of occupation in the Mincer earnings function leads 
to ‘stealing’ part of the effect of education on earnings that comes from occupational mobility. 
Moreover, it seems also likely that occupations and wages are jointly determined, in other words, 
simultaneity may exist between them. We do not report results here. 
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market.  
 
Table 4-6 Wages Returns to Education in Urban China – Basic Equations 
 
Explanatory Var.  Ln(Wages) 
  1989 1993 1997 2000 
Education 0.042*** 0.020** 0.042*** 0.064*** 
 (4.87) (2.57) (6.46) (8.89) 
Experience 0.098*** 0.076*** 0.032*** 0.010 
 (15.09) (11.97) (5.61) (1.49) 
Expsq -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.00003 
 (-15.97) (-14.25) (-4.87) (-0.22) 
Gender 0.289*** 0.266*** 0.222*** 0.143*** 
 (5.54) (5.65) (6.07) (3.54) 
Liaoning -0.092 -0.530*** - -0.302*** 
 (-0.94) (-6.16)  (-3.66) 
Heilongj - - -0.102 0.022 
   (-1.48) (0.29) 
Shandong 0.026 -0.641*** -0.279*** -0.092 
 (0.26) (-6.55) (-4.11) (-1.12) 
Henan -0.132 -0.571*** -0.312*** -0.303*** 
 (-1.32) (-5.93) (-4.85) (-4.09) 
Hubei -0.116 -0.340*** -0.209*** -0.344*** 
 (-1.11) (-3.74) (-3.47) (-4.81) 
Hunan -0.043 -0.287*** -0.140** -0.094 
 (-0.42) (-3.17) (-2.26) (-1.34) 
Guangxi -0.528*** -0.541*** -0.310*** -0.444*** 
 (-5.14) (-5.63) (-4.25) (-5.30) 
Guizhou -0.899*** -1.199*** -0.504*** -0.293*** 
 (-8.18) (-12.62) (-6.76) (-3.53) 
R-squared 0.238 0.268 0.136 0.15 
Adj R-squared 0.233 0.263 0.128 0.14 
No. of the Obs. 1852 1496 1178 1063 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
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Table 4-7 Wages Returns to Education in Urban China – adding Sectors 
 
Explanatory Var.  Ln(Wages) 
  1989 1993 1997 2000 
Education 0.023*** 0.012 0.036*** 0.056*** 
 (2.60) (1.51) (5.40) (7.28) 
Experience 0.092*** 0.075*** 0.034*** 0.009 
 (14.25) (11.82) (6.06) (1.30) 
Expsq -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.00003 
 (-15.86) (-14.39) (-5.22) (-0.20) 
Gender 0.289*** 0.265*** 0.231*** 0.149*** 
 (5.61) (5.65) (6.46) (3.71) 
State 0.384*** 0.157*** 0.213*** 0.176*** 
 (6.37) (2.76) (5.02) (3.54) 
Private -0.277*** -0.166 0.448*** 0.094 
 (-2.68) (-1.61) (7.15) (1.55) 
Liaoning -0.207** -0.588*** - -0.351*** 
 (-2.12) (-6.68)  (-4.21) 
Heilongj - - -0.167** -0.029 
   (-2.43) (-0.38) 
Shandong -0.044 -0.667*** -0.283*** -0.102 
 (-0.44) (-6.82) (-4.27) (-1.23) 
Henan -0.190* -0.619*** -0.335*** -0.317*** 
 (-1.86) (-6.37) (-5.28) (-4.30) 
Hubei -0.206** -0.401*** -0.241*** -0.375*** 
 (-1.98) (-4.36) (-4.03) (-5.19) 
Hunan -0.074 -0.308*** -0.197*** -0.113 
 (-0.72) (-3.40) (-3.24) (-1.61) 
Guangxi -0.537*** -0.549*** -0.393*** -0.437*** 
 (-5.15) (-5.70) (-5.45) (-5.25) 
Guizhou -0.966*** -1.232*** -0.567*** -0.314*** 
 (-8.63) (-12.50) (-7.69) (-3.80) 
R-squared 0.267 0.276 0.176 0.160 
Adj R-squared 0.262 0.269 0.167 0.148 
No. of the Obs. 1852 1496 1178 1063 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%.  
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Table 4-8 Wages Returns to Education in Urban China 
– adding Interaction Terms 
   
Explanatory Var.  Ln(Wages) 
  1989 1993 1997 2000 
Education 0.031** 0.013 0.036*** 0.043*** 
 (2.16) (0.82) (2.83) (2.74) 
Experience 0.092*** 0.077*** 0.036*** 0.008 
 (14.15) (12.13) (6.36) (1.15) 
Expsq -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.00002 
 (-15.79) (-14.70) (-5.53) (-0.13) 
Gender 0.711*** 0.593*** 0.432*** 0.239* 
 (6.28) (4.81) (3.87) (1.77) 
Genedu -0.053*** -0.036*** -0.021* -0.009 
 (-4.17) (-2.83) (-1.89) (-0.72) 
State 0.185 0.025 0.118 -0.104 
 (1.50) (0.18) (0.94) (-0.64) 
Staedu 0.026* 0.018 0.012 0.028* 
 (1.80) (1.13) (0.90) (1.81) 
Private -0.725*** -1.144*** 0.039 0.001 
 (-3.58) (-4.29) (0.21) (0.01) 
Priedu 0.064** 0.118*** 0.046** 0.010 
 (2.47) (3.95) (2.42) (0.52) 
Liaoning -0.209** -0.592*** - -0.354*** 
 (-2.15) (-6.75)  (-4.24) 
Heilongj - - -0.166** -0.042 
   (-2.41) (-0.55) 
Shandong -0.063 -0.672*** -0.283*** -0.093 
 (-0.63) (-6.89) (-4.27) (-1.12) 
Henan -0.204** -0.622*** -0.340*** -0.324*** 
 (-2.01) (-6.42) (-5.37) (-4.38) 
Hubei -0.217** -0.406*** -0.241*** -0.367*** 
 (-2.10) (-4.42) (-4.05) (-5.08) 
Hunan -0.077 -0.315*** -0.199*** -0.106 
 (-0.75) (-3.47) (-3.28) (-1.50) 
Guangxi -0.540*** -0.571*** -0.397*** -0.431*** 
 (-5.18) (-5.94) (-5.51) (-5.16) 
Guizhou -0.974*** -1.221*** -0.580*** -0.318*** 
 (-8.74) (-12.37) (-7.88) (-3.84) 
R-squared 0.275 0.287 0.184 0.163 
Adj R-squared 0.269 0.280 0.172 0.149 
No. of the Obs. 1852 1496 1178 1063 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%.  
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Further, we examine whether the changes in the returns to education differ systematically 
by gender and sector. The coefficients of the interactions between education and gender, 
education and sector are shown in Table 4-8. The results indicate that men earn more than 
women in all four years and hence there is a large gender gap. The size of the coefficients 
suggests that the gap between men’s wages and women’s declined steadily from 1989 to 
2000. However, education modifies this basic gender gap. From the coefficient on the 
interaction term gender*education, we can see that the returns to education are lower for 
men than women, which is consistent with the literature. The size of the coefficient 
declines from 1989 to 2000, which suggests that the impact of education on the gender 
gap is also declining. Given that the gender gap itself is decreasing this is perhaps not too 
surprising. There are several possible explanations in the literature as to why educational 
returns are higher for women. Deolalikar (1993) argued that men have a comparative 
advantage in physical strength so that education becomes relatively more important to 
women who focus on more skill-intensive jobs. In addition, the sample distribution by 
genders in Table 4-5 shows that the average educational obtainments for women are less 
than for men, although the gap is less evident in 2000. This is to some extent consistent 
with the discussion that fewer women achieve high levels of education, which reduces the 
relative supply of high skilled women (Li, 2003). The gender gap may be less evident as 
we move up the salary, and hence occupational, scale. In other words, the gender gap is 
possibly partially caused by women, particularly those with relatively low levels of 
education, being crowded into specific and low paid occupations. As argued by Chow 
(1995), higher educational qualifications result in women being able to compete in 
occupations with men, escaping these low paid occupations. 
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To test the robustness of the results, we start by running separate regressions for men and 
women. As is shown in the odd columns of Table 4-9, returns to education are higher for 
women in 1989, 1993 and 1997, and in 2000, it is similar for men and women. These 
results, as expected, are consistent with the results shown in Table 4-8 with the inclusion 
of an interaction term between gender and education. However, as discussed in the labour 
supply literature, such estimates may be biased if the sample of people for whom we 
observe earnings is not randomly selected. More specifically, it is possible that the higher 
returns to education for women is due to greater self-selection of women into the labour 
force relative to men, whose labour force participation is nearly universal (Zhang, et al., 
2005). On average, the proportion of men participating in work is approximately 9% 
higher than for women in all four years68, although this difference declined from 1989 to 
2000. To test this hypothesis directly, we estimate a Heckman selection model for 
earnings. This included marital status and number of household members69 in identifying 
the selection equation. The results are shown in the even columns of Table 4-9. For 
women, the Mills’ ratios from the selection equations are not significant in the wage 
equations in all four years, and similar results applied for men, apart from 1989. Thus this 
source of bias may not be too important in the (urban) Chinese context, and therefore, this 
effect is not sufficient to explain the higher returns to education for women. In part this 
                                                          
68 These numbers are consistent with the figures published by Labour and Social Trends in Asia 
and the Pacific 2005. For men, the labour force participation rate (aged 15-64) is 89.6%, 90.0% 
and 89.5% in 1990, 1995 and 2000 respectively. For women, the proportion is 79.9%, 80.3% and 
80.0% respectively. 
69 The assumption regarding the number of household members is that the more of the members 
in household, the less participation by women due to the increased requirements for either 
childcare or eldercare. It has been largely used in identifying the selection equation in Chinese 
context (see, e.g., Li, et al., 2005; Zhang, et. al., 2005). 
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may be because the gap noted above between male and female participation rates is not 
that great compared to many developed countries, particularly in the recent past. 
 
Given the mixed economies in contemporary China, it seems logical to compare 
differences across sectors based on their level of closeness to the market. Table 4-7 shows 
that individuals working in the private sector earn less than those in the state and 
collective sectors, although this trend changes in 1997. When we further include 
state*education (staedu) and private*education (priedu) in the regression, Table 4-8 
shows the returns to education have been consistently higher for individuals in the private 
sector from 1989 to 1997 when the principles of human resource allocation are more 
governed by market mechanisms. Note also that returns to education in the private sector 
increased from 1989 to 1993, and declined significantly thereafter. In 2000, the higher 
rate of returns to education has shifted to individuals in the state sector. This may in part 
be due to substantial layoffs, retirements, and exits from SOEs since 1997, since when the 
connection between education and the corresponding reward system has been more 
visible in the state sector. One possible concern with this result is that the range of the 
private sector in the survey is defined too broadly as shown in Table 4-2. For example, 
domestic private enterprises and foreign invested enterprises both belong to the category 
of the private sector in the survey, but their characteristics may be sufficiently different to 
warrant separate treatment (Zhao, 2002). This may in part lead to the changes in the 
returns to education in the private sector.  
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Table 4-9 Wages Returns to Education by Gender 
 
Explanatory Var. Ln(Wages)_Female 
 1989 1993 1997 2000 
  OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
Education 0.030**  0.028  0.018**  -0.003  0.046*** 0.039**  0.051*** 0.055**  
 (2.31)  (0.86)  (2.01)  (-0.10)  (4.27)  (2.21)  (4.01) (2.26)  
Experience 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.058*** 0.067***  0.034*** 0.036*** -0.0004 0.0003  
 (10.57)  (7.75)  (8.91)  (6.55)  (3.79)  (3.57)  (-0.04)  (0.96)  
Expsq -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002***  -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.0002  0.0001  
 (-12.74) (-11.26) (-11.28) (-9.31)  (-3.28)  (-3.18)  (0.79)  (0.48)  
State 0.356*** 0.424*** 0.021  0.230***  0.256*** 0.253*** 0.215*** 0.264*** 
 (4.45)  (4.74)  (0.36)  (2.64)  (3.88)  (3.80)  (2.71)  (3.32)  
Private -0.665*** -0.493*** 0.515*** -0.456***  0.286*** 0.293*** 0.092  0.126  
 (-4.17)  (-2.80)  (4.44)  (-2.80)  (3.06)  (3.11) (0.96)  (1.26) 
Regional Dummies yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
Married  -0.324**  -0.310*   -0.440**  -0.420** 
  (-2.43)   (-1.89)   (-2.54)   (-2.30)  
No. of Household Members  -0.015   -0.134***   -0.127***  -0.023*  
  (-0.65)   (-3.86)   (-3.23)   (-1.65)  
No. of Household Members2  -0.0002  -0.001***   -0.001***  -0.0002 
  (-0.63)   (-3.64)   (-3.11)   (-1.28)  
λ (Mills ratio)  0.178   -0.271   -0.079   -0.013  
  (0.60)   (-1.05)   (-0.49)   (-0.06)  
R-squared 0.399    0.328    0.161    0.139       
Adj R-squared 0.390   0.315   0.141   0.114   
Wald χ2(22)  623.02  501.22  301.74  276.67 
No. of the Observations 810  1351  648  980  514  937  452  771  
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Table 4-9 continued 
Explanatory Var. Ln(Wages)_Male 
 1989 1993 1997 2000 
  OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
Education 0.024**  -0.016  0.007  0.006  0.029*** 0.039*** 0.052*** 0.055**  
 (2.15)  (-0.88)  (0.67)  (0.28)  (3.39)  (2.73)  (4.94)  (2.22)  
Experience 0.096*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.071***  0.032*** 0.036*** 0.011  0.012  
 (11.11)  (6.66)  (9.02)  (7.31)  (4.36)  (4.42) (1.16) (1.00)  
Expsq -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-11.20) (-8.01)  (-10.27) (-8.83)  (-3.68)  (-3.80)  (-0.34)  (-0.36)  
State 0.352*** 0.326*** 0.118  0.150*  0.193*** 0.184*** 0.119*  0.119*  
 (4.26)  (3.94)  (1.51)  (1.75)  (3.47)  (3.24)  (1.69)  (1.72)  
Private -0.203  -0.200  0.017  -0.090  0.590*** 0.620*** 0.090  0.089  
 (-1.57)  (-1.58)  (0.12)  (-0.62)  (6.93)  (7.04)  (1.06)  (1.06)  
Regional Dummies yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
Married  -0.352**  -0.214   -0.217   0.078  
  (-2.33)   (-1.18)   (-1.22)   (0.69) 
No. of Household Members  -0.246**  -0.066*   -0.873***  -0.013  
  (-2.38)   (-1.93)   (-4.93)   (-1.13)  
No. of Household Members2  0.015*   -0.001*   0.084***  -0.0001 
  (1.67)   (-1.64)   (4.53)   (-1.11)  
λ(Mills ratio)  -0.722***  0.058   0.144   0.038  
  (-3.04)   (0.18)   (0.89)   (0.12)  
R-squared 0.205    0.227    0.165    0.123       
Adj R-squared 0.195   0.216   0.150   0.104   
Wald χ2(22)  359.29  359.14  336.99  235.62 
No. of the Observations 1019  1372  818  958  664  1031  611  827  
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%.
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It is clear that returns to education differ significantly between genders and sectors as 
shown in Table 4-8, thus it is necessary to note that estimated returns to education are not 
directly comparable due to the selection of different samples and the inclusion of 
different control variables in model specifications. Apart from this, we will also look at 
the earning returns to experience and different regions, which also show strongly 
significant effects in the earnings equation. From the coefficients of experience and 
experience squared70 in Table 4-8, we can see that the effect of potential experience on 
earnings is convex, first increasing and then decreasing after reaching a given number of 
years. The highest return for years of experience varies between 24 (in 1993) and 29 (in 
1997), and it fails to be significant in 2000. Thus for someone leaving education at age 18, 
these peaks would be at age 42 and 47 respectively. These curves are illustrated in Figure 
4-2 from which it is noticeable that the curves have been systematically getting flatter. 
For example, wages’ returns for someone with fifteen-year experience decline 
significantly from 1989 to 1997. This may partly reflect a declining impact of seniority 
and an increasing role of market forces, which are both closely related to China’s 
economic reforms.  
 
To further examine whether this declining impact of experience on earnings over time is 
restricted across different ages, we split our sample into two age cohorts: the young – 
ages 18-35, and the middle aged and above – ages 36-6571. From Table 4-10, we can see 
                                                          
70 The coefficients of experience and experience-squared are extremely close in Table 4-6, Table 
4-7 and Table 4-8. 
71 Note that we have also tried to separate the cohorts of the ‘middle aged and above’ into the 
‘middle aged (36-50)’ and the ‘older (51-65)’, however, we do not find any significant 
differences between them for either experience or education respectively. We do not report results 
here. 
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that experience has a higher first-order impact for the young than the middle aged and 
above in all four years. This is consistent with the discussions by Mehta and Villarreal 
(2004). Experience provides on the job skill acquisition, thus it may correlate with 
obsolescence. In addition, the greatest rate of skill acquisition will come in the early years 
of employment. Thus the young experience high rates of skill acquisition and limited 
obsolescence effects, while comparatively older workers may experience lower marginal 
rates of skill acquisition and greater obsolescence, reducing the continuing impact of 
experience on their earnings. Indeed, as already emphasised, we find this for all four 
years. In addition, Table 4-10 also shows that the rate of returns to education diminishes 
for the middle aged and above compared to the young. Similar to the impact of 
experience, possible explanations for this difference include an education vintage effect 
which may reflect a higher return for more recently obtained education. We will discuss 
this education vintage later. Note that it is worth emphasising that we have relatively few 
observations in these regressions in Table 4-10. 
 
Regional impacts are estimated using separate dummy variables in the earnings equation. 
We take Jiangsu, one of the developed coastal provinces, as the reference province where 
the economic transition is comparatively advanced compared to the other provinces. The 
results in Table 4-8 show that almost all regional coefficients are significantly negative in 
all four years, which indicates that Jiangsu has the highest earning returns in China. This 
is also consistent with the focus of China’s economic reforms on mainly developing the 
coastal regions in the southern and eastern parts based on their readily accessible 
geographic location (Huang, et al., 2003). The results show that in 1989, individuals’ 
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earnings in Guizhou are about 37.9% of those in Jiangsu with assumed similar 
characteristics (education, gender, etc.). Although people in different provinces may not 
have on average similar characteristics, this still leads us to believe that people in 
Guizhou will be much more poorly paid than those in Jiangsu. However, there is a 
declining trend of the earnings differences, specifically between Jiangsu and two 
less-developed western provinces, Guangxi and Guizhou. This indicates that the earnings 
gap between those provinces is getting smaller, and people’ earnings in Guizhou increase 
to 72.6% of those in Jiangsu in 2000, other things being equal 72. 
 
Figure 4-2 The Impact of Experience 
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Source: Table 4-8 
Notes: We do not include the year 2000 in this figure as it fails to be significant in the estimate. 
 
                                                          
72 To the extent that shadow economy activity is a problem in China, these figures may also 
reflect differences between regions in shadow economy activity.  
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Table 4-10 Wages Returns to Experience by Age Cohorts 
 
Explanatory Var. Ln(Wages) 
 1989 1993 1997 2000 
  15-35 36-65 15-35 36-65 15-35 36-65 15-35 36-65 
Education -0.004  0.029**  0.046***  -0.004  0.047***  0.027***  0.057***  0.047***  
 (-0.26)  (2.45)  (2.86)  (-0.44)  (3.72)  (2.95)  (3.57)  (4.56)  
Experience 0.154***  0.094***  0.088***  0.056*** 0.027  0.018  0.051**  0.022  
 (7.54)  (3.96)  (3.51)  (2.81) (1.37)  (1.00)  (2.07)  (0.84)  
Expsq -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.002*  -0.001*** -0.0002  -0.0004  -0.002*  -0.0002  
 (-5.58)  (-5.69)  (-1.79)  (-5.32)  (-0.23)  (-1.44)  (-1.73)  (-0.39)  
Gender 0.100  0.485***  0.115*  0.397*** 0.245***  0.232***  0.128*  0.144***  
 (1.42) (6.51) (1.65) (6.32) (4.81) (4.70) (1.92) (2.63) 
State 0.510***  0.190**  0.046  0.218*** 0.147**  0.269***  0.113  0.182***  
 (6.34)  (2.13)  (0.56)  (2.77)  (2.47)  (4.53)  (1.36)  (2.71)  
Private 0.024  -0.750*** -0.054  -0.359** 0.469***  0.377***  0.112  0.049  
 (0.18)  (-4.74)  (-0.39)  (-2.36)  (5.80)  (3.94)  (1.23)  (0.54)  
Regional Dummies Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.181  0.361  0.164  0.356  0.236  0.147  0.118  0.166  
Adj R-squared 0.169  0.352  0.146  0.346  0.214  0.130  0.089  0.147  
No. of the Obs. 912 940 624 872 475 703 451 612 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
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4.5.2. Panel Data Analysis 
 
We further estimate the pooled data set where the panel is an unbalanced one. We begin 
by estimating equation (4.2) with the inclusion of sectoral dummies using OLS, FE and 
RE estimators. The individual effects are statistically significant through the F-test/ 
BPLM Test, thus justifying the use of panel methods. As mentioned in section 4.4, the FE 
and RE models allow for specific individual effects. The RE estimator treats the 
individual effects as being randomly distributed across individuals though, unlike the 
fixed effects procedures, it requires the individual effects to be independent of the error 
term. This assumption is tested using Hausman test. However, it is clear that the test is 
performed only with the coefficients of the time-varying variables included in both 
models. The inclusion of regional dummy variables as well as gender precludes the use of 
fixed effects per se (Bortolotti, et al., 2004). Regional dummies are crucial in the earnings 
equation as they capture the group differences by different regions. Statistically, the 
estimates of regional dummies are almost all significant at 1% level and Wald-tests 
further indicate that those as a group significantly explain much of the variation in 
earnings. Based on these, we will present only the results of the random-effects, and the 
overall significance of the model is established by the overall R-squared. The results are 
shown in Table 4-11. 
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Table 4-11 Wages Returns to Education in Urban China 
– Results of Random-effects  
 
Explanatory  Ln(Wages)  
Var. RE-reg1 RE-reg2 RE-reg3 RE-reg4 
Education 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.046*** 0.012 
 (4.03) (4.94) (4.15) (0.76) 
Experience 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
 (17.20) (17.30) (11.31) (11.60) 
Expsq -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-20.14) (-20.07) (-16.69) (-16.93) 
Expedu   -0.0007** -0.0008** 
   (-1.97) (-2.27) 
Gender 0.271*** 0.259*** 0.262*** 0.498*** 
 (8.07) (7.60) (7.69) (6.46) 
Genedu    -0.027*** 
    (-3.46) 
State 0.250*** 0.242*** 0.239*** 0.191*** 
 (8.28) (7.99) (7.89) (2.61) 
Staedu    0.006 
    (0.79) 
Private 0.071 0.064 0.062 -0.17 
 (1.63) (1.46) (1.41) (-1.52) 
Priedu    0.037*** 
    (3.08) 
Liaoning -0.358***    
 (-5.44)    
Heilongj -0.130    
 (-1.47)    
Shandong -0.243***    
 (-3.71)    
Henan -0.355***    
 (-5.55)    
Hubei -0.300***    
 (-4.66)    
Hunan -0.196***    
 (-3.06)    
Guangxi -0.607***    
 (-9.16)    
Guizhou -0.929***    
 (-13.60)    
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Table 4-11 continued 
 
Explanatory Ln(Wages)  
Var.   RE-reg1 RE-reg2 RE-reg3 RE-reg4 
Distbeij  -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0004** 
  (-2.30) (-2.26) (-2.33) 
Distshan  -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0009*** 
  (-8.01) (-7.95) (-4.92) 
Dbeiedu    0.00003** 
    (1.97) 
Dshanedu    0.00004** 
    (2.23) 
Year 1989 -1.006*** -1.025*** -1.023*** -1.007*** 
 (-29.65) (-30.53) (-30.51) (-30.81) 
Year 1993 -0.634*** -0.657*** -0.655*** -0.640*** 
 (-19.70) (-20.61) (-20.55) (-20.49) 
Year 1997 -0.330*** -0.330*** -0.330*** -0.326*** 
 (-11.10) (-11.06) (-11.05) (-11.08) 
Overall R-sq 0.356 0.347 0.346 0.352 
No. of the Obs. 5589 5589 5589 5589 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
Regressions estimated based on panel data with random-effects (RE-reg). RE-reg1 is the basic equation 
with regional dummies. RE-reg2 replaces the regional dummies to instances to Beijing and Shanghai. 
RE-reg3 further includes the interaction term experience*education. RE-reg4 is the full equation with all 
interactive variables included. 
 
The first two columns of Table 4-11 present results with both the inclusion of the regional 
dummy variables and the distance of the province from both Beijing (Distbeij) and 
Shanghai (Distshan) – although this made no noticeable difference to the other 
coefficients in this regression. Beijing is the capital of China and the country’s political, 
economic, cultural and transportation centre. Shanghai is the biggest port in China and is 
the most important centre of trade and finance and also information and culture. These 
two largest cities account for a large part of the variation in regional incomes as argued in 
chapter 2. We expect that the further a region is from either of these two centres, the less 
developed it will be with possible implications for earnings. In addition, Beijing, being 
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the political centre, may also have an impact which to some extent inhibits economic 
development, or more precisely, its policies specifically on opening to the outside world 
are not as wide as Shanghai’s. Based on this, we would expect the more significant 
linkage to be between the distance to Shanghai and earning implications. The overall 
R-squared indicates that these two variables largely explain the regional differences 
identified by the regional dummies. Note that the distances are calculated based on the 
capitals of the nine provinces to these two metropolises, so they might have some 
limitations which restrict the full explanation of the regional differences73. Note too that 
this is consistent with recent work in economic geography which emphasizes the 
importance of proximity to large population mass. However, our results go further than 
this and emphasize the importance of not simply mass but proximity to the two large 
power centres in China, one economic, and the other political.  
 
The results indicate that distance from Shanghai is significant at 1% level and its negative 
coefficient indicates that there is an inverse relationship between individuals’ earnings 
and the distance from where they work to Shanghai. Less pronounced, but still significant 
at the 5% level, is the negative coefficient of distance to Beijing. This means that during 
the transition period Shanghai has become the most ‘profitable’ economic centre in China. 
People earn less, the further they are far from Beijing, and more noticeable, Shanghai. 
This is consistent with our expectations. Economic reform and the opening up to the 
outside world made coastal regions the main development focus, and they have been 
much more able to attract FDI based on their locations. For example, Shanghai’s FDI 
                                                          
73 We have done the Cox-Pesaran test for these two (non-nested) models based on pooled data set, 
and results indicate that we could not reject the model specification with regional dummies. 
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volume in 2000 totalled 3.1 billion US dollars, 87.7% higher than Beijing’s74. Moreover, 
international migration in Shanghai now runs at the highest level in China. 
 
The third column of Table 4-11 aims to examine whether there is a possible vintage effect 
of education by the inclusion of the interaction term education*experience (eduexp) as 
argued by section 3. The essence of this exercise is to justify whether the impact of 
education on earnings declines as the time since the individual left formal education 
increases. We have hypothesized that education improves people’s skills, marginal 
product and hence their wages, but, that in an evolving labour market, the value of 
education declines with years since the individual left education. This may be so because 
skills date. Certainly at the beginning of the second millennium this is truer than even say 
50 years ago. The coefficient on education*experience is significantly negative, at the 5% 
level. This indicates that returns to education decline with time, i.e., the greater the period 
since people left formal education, the lower are the returns to education. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that in part at least education’s impact on earnings is by 
skill enhancement and it is not simply a proxy for ability. Assuming a working life of 
forty years, the coefficients suggest that approximately 61% of the returns to education 
are eroded during a working life and this provides a lower bound to the actual impact of 
education itself. Another way to take into account this possible vintage effect is to run 
separate regressions for different age cohorts (or years of work experience) as we have 
implemented in the last section. We split our sample into two age cohorts: the young – 
ages 18-35, and the middle aged and above – ages 36-65. These two methods give very 
similar results. The rate of return to education diminishes for the middle aged and above 
                                                          
74 Data come from China Statistical Yearbook, 2001. 
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(more experienced), and reflect a higher return for more recently obtained education. We 
do not report results in Table 4-11. 
 
The final column of Table 4-11 shows the results with the inclusion of the interactions 
between education and gender, experience, sector and distance to Beijing (dbeiedu) and 
Shanghai (dshanedu). The results show generally similar results on returns to education 
restricted by genders and sectors. Specifically, people earn less when they work further 
away from Shanghai and Beijing, however, they do have higher returns to education. This 
is to some extent consistent with Li (2003) and Zhang, et al.’s (2005) results which 
people have higher returns to education in less developed regions. Therefore, there is no 
single rate of return to education, and in a sense discussion on such ‘a return’ is 
misleading. For example, the rate of return to education (Re) for a man working in the 
private sector with 15 years of working experience in Jiangsu province is 3.4%, 
calculated as follows: 
 
Re = exp [0.012–0.027*1(man)–0.0008*15(experience)+0.037*1(private sector) 
    +0.00003*560(distance to Beijing)+0.00004*166(distance to Shanghai)] – 1 
   = 0.034   (4.15) 
 
Finally, the panel regressions also include year fixed effects which are all significant at 
the 1% level. The coefficients, which are reported in Table 4-11, suggest a steady 
increase from 1989 to 2000.  
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4.6. Conclusions  
 
In this chapter, we have used the panel data set including 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2000 
from the China Health and Nutrition Survey, to estimate the rate of private returns to 
education in urban China. The explanatory variables include education, experience and 
experience squared, as in the Mincer earnings function, but also gender, sector, region, 
distance to Beijing and Shanghai, and education-interaction terms. This is the first time 
this data source has been used in this context, although to a considerable extent our 
results are consistent with those of others for other countries and also with the limited 
amount of work that has been done on China.  
 
The estimated rate of return to education based on our baseline model is 4%, 2%, 4% and 
7% in 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2000 respectively. These results show that there is a 
noticeable increase, specifically from 1997 to 2000. In addition, the return depends on 
gender and also indeed sectors and regions. This is an important point, and there is no 
single rate of return to education. As with many other countries education reduces the 
gender earnings gap. Females earn less than males in all four years, but the gap appears to 
have been steadily declining. Again as with many other countries, education further 
reduces this basic gap, but just as the gap has been declining so the marginally greater 
return to education for women has also been declining. Nonetheless the existence of this 
difference in the returns to education both in China and indeed elsewhere suggests a 
greater incentive for women to pursue educational study, and to an extent one wonders 
why they do not, although that is the subject of a different study to ours.  
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One of the basic problems facing this type of research is the problem of whether 
education enhances ability or merely reflects ability. If the latter, the estimated impact of 
education on earnings is no more than correlation. However, we have argued that if the 
former is true then in a changing world, skills, including educationally enhanced skills, 
will date and enhance the value of education in enhancing earnings should decline as the 
period since formal education completed increases. We found strong evidence for this in 
the regression results and hence conclude that education enhances ability and does not 
simply reflect it. Once more we emphasize that this view depends on the assumption that 
the value of education as a signal does not decline with age. Still, controversies exist 
concerning whether the omitted ability variables bias the OLS estimates, as well as 
concerning the extent of the potential bias. Our analysis has added to this literature, but it 
does not by itself fully resolve the issue. It is an extra piece to the jigsaw and with the 
other pieces helps us see the complete picture. 
 
Another key result is the extent of regional differences and the impact of distance from 
Beijing and Shanghai on earnings. People earn less, the further they are far from Beijing, 
and more noticeably, Shanghai; however, they do enjoy higher rate of returns to 
education in more remote regions75. Although as with gender, we speculate that this can 
be a ‘correction or imbalance’ factor at work. The impact of distance has similarities to a 
gravity model, as well as other spatial or geographic models, whereby distance from 
major urban centres and/or ports impacts upon factors such as productivity, trade and 
                                                          
75 We have also implemented separate regressions (panel estimates with random effects) by 
different regions with the inclusion of year fixed dummies. We obtained statistically significant 
results for four regions: Liaoning, Jiangsu, Henan and Hubei. The coefficients for these regions 
are 2%, 3%, 3% and 4% for Liaoning, Jiangsu, Henan and Hubei respectively. We do not report 
results here. 
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even housing (Buch, et al., 2004; Roy and Thill, 2004; Rice and Venables, 2003; Redding 
and Venables, 2004). Our results suggest that the marginal productivity of labour and 
productivity is higher in Beijing and specifically Shanghai than other areas. The impact 
of large centres of population on productivity, e.g., is in part because of economies of 
scale and closeness to market. Closeness to ports and hence export markets is a further 
important geographical rational for the siting of firms, in particular multinational firms. 
Multinational firms tend to be more productive than non-multinationals and can by a 
demonstration effect impact upon the productivity of both supplier and competitor firms. 
The extent of this impact deteriorates with distance. Thus these results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that knowledge enhancement, e.g. through process innovation, tends to 
impact firstly on Shanghai and then become diffused across China at a speed inversely 
proportional to distance from Shanghai. Shanghai may be the epicentre of this process as 
this is where there is the greatest density of multinationals. This is consistent, as we have 
said, with recent work in economic geography.  
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Chapter 5 The Influence of Socio-Economic Status and 
Body Mass Index on Health 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
The interest in the relation between the components of socio-economic status (SES) and 
self-reported health (SRH) has been renewed within the recent years. Researchers have 
consistently demonstrated that people with higher socio-economic status have better 
health, no matter which measures of SES are included or how health is measured (Smith, 
1999; 2004). Socio-economic status is often measured by a person’s income, educational 
level, occupation, marital status, or a combination of these factors. Within them, 
educational attainment, occupational status and income are the three dominant 
components of SES, and their predictive influences on health have been found by 
researchers in the United States, the UK, and a number of other European countries. As to 
Asia, some similar research has been done in Thailand, Philippines and China, but most 
of the research on China has focused on elderly people only (Liang, et al., 2000; Yi, et al., 
2002; Zimmer and Kwong, 2004).  
 
The relationship between SES and health has been heavily researched in economics and 
the other social sciences. The health investment model developed by Grossman (1972) 
offers an important explanation that health can be viewed as a durable capital stock that 
yields an output of healthy time. Individuals inherit an initial stock of health that 
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depreciates with age and can be increased by investment. Grossman and Kaestner (1997) 
presented an overview on the relation between education and health, and their basic 
hypothesis is that education can affect a person’s knowledge and information on how to 
promote health. However, there exist plausible reasons why education related differences 
in health can not be interpreted causally as discussed in Chapter 3. We specifically focus 
on the hypothesis suggesting that the relationship between education and health may not 
be causal due to unobservables. Importantly, similar concerns relate to the relationship 
between income and health. Thus we pursue an approach, using panel data techniques to 
allow for the unobservables.  
 
Another important aspect of the research in this chapter is the concept of a healthy weight 
range, which is based on a measurement known as the Body Mass Index (BMI). It is an 
acceptable proxy for thinness and fatness, and a useful measure of determining obesity 
and the increased risk of an unhealthy life. The BMI is calculated as weight in kilograms 
over height in meters squared (weight (kg)/height (m)²). The World Health Organization 
(WHO) has devised a classification where by persons with BMIs below the range 19-25 
are considered underweight, those with BMIs above this range are considered overweight 
or “at risk”，and those with BMIs greater than or equal to 30 are considered obese (Bell, 
et al., 2002). In addition, recent studies have indicated that the BMI is age and gender 
dependent when used as an indicator of body fatness (see, e.g., Gallagher, et al., 1996; 
Burkhauser and Cawley; 2008). However, there are no clear cut-off points after adjusting 
for age and gender in the literature. 
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After the start of social economic reform in 1978 in China, there has been increased 
attention on how to improve the awareness of health problems, and how these problems 
are distributed across people with different personal and social characteristics. In this 
chapter, we use the panel data of the Physical Examination in China Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS) covering the years of 1991, 1993, 1997 and 2000. The main aim of this 
chapter is to determine how a variety of socio-economic factors influence SRH, and BMI, 
as an alternative measure of health which is more related to health behaviors. Given the 
use of a categorical measure of SRH, we estimate a (random-effects) ordered probit 
model. For comparison and testing purposes we also estimate a fixed-effects ordered logit 
model using the estimator recently developed by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004). 
We therefore attempt to make use of the panel element of the CHNS to particularly deal 
with the potential problem of unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, we attempt to 
develop a little further the issue on how to define the BMI with respect to the adjustment 
of gender and age. Based on our ‘new’ measure of BMI, we further examine its ‘healthy 
range’ based on self-reported measures of health and estimate its impact on SRH together 
with SES. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, we will provide a 
comprehensive literature review based on the impact of SES on SRH and BMI. In section 
3, we describe the model and data specifications. Preliminary statistics are also provided 
in this section. In section 4, we outline our econometric framework. Section 5 presents 
the empirical results. This will be in three stages. Firstly the determinants, especially 
education and income, of health, followed by the impact of SES on the documented 
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healthy BMI. Finally we develop a little further the issue on how to define the BMI and 
estimate its impact on SRH. We conclude this chapter in the final section. 
 
5.2. Literature Review 
 
5.2.1. SES and Health 
 
The association between SES and health has been well-documented in the literature, and 
one of the most consistent social epidemiological findings is the positive correlation 
between SES and health. In this section, we describe the linkage between a set of 
economic and demographic variables that are included in nearly every analysis of health 
status. These variables include education, income, occupation, age, gender and marital 
status which are correlated with health in one context or another as documented in the 
literature. For example, Groot and Maassen van de Brink (2007) reported that the health 
status declined with age and generally older people experience more risk of diseases. The 
health status of women tends to be less than that of men, although it has been argued that 
gender differences have more of a mixed impact (Matthews, et al., 1998, 1999). For 
example, gender differences can at least partly be ascribed to age differences between 
men and women (Groot and Maassen van de Brink, 2007). In addition, married people 
are healthier than their unmarried peers, and the linkage between marriage/cohabitation 
and health is much stronger for men than women (Janzen and Muhajarine, 2003; Fuchs, 
2004). 
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Some occupations are less healthy than others. The job demands and conditions of 
workers in different positions in the occupational hierarchy may differentially affect their 
health. Studies have clearly shown that job conditions such as high work strain, poor 
work support, low control in the work place, job insecurity, repetitive work, and exposure 
to uncomfortable working conditions are associated with elevated risks of health 
problems, including a general worsening of self-reported health and an increase in 
specific illnesses such as coronary heart disease, cardiovascular disease and mortality 
(e.g., Bosma, et al., 1997; Borg and Kristensen, 2000). For example, Fuchs (2004) 
concluded that work related mortality in construction and transportation are triple the rate 
for all workers. In addition, researchers have also argued that some of the variation in 
healthy life style choice appears to be related to the observed characteristics of 
individuals in certain occupations (Contoyannis and Jones, 2004). Winkleby, et al. (1992) 
reported that within occupations, men and women white-collar executives and managers 
exhibited lower levels of smoking. Among men, executives and managers showed the 
lowest mean levels of blood pressure. However arguably this reflects the impact of 
knowledge on behavior as much as the specific nature of the occupation.  
 
Note that the causal mechanisms underlying this relationship between SES and health are 
complex and controversial. Here we review the recent studies that have attempted to 
establish the causality, and we mostly focus on the linkage between education, income 
and health.  
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5.2.1.1. The Causality between Education and Health 
 
The education-health relationship has received more attention in this area. Different 
formal educational years or different levels of education have been one of the main 
determinants of different health status. A negative linkage from education to health is 
very unlikely (Fuchs, 2004). Just as education is believed to enhance market productivity, 
education may also enhance health productivity as argued by Grossman (1972). To put it 
differently, the more educated obtain a large health output from given amounts of inputs. 
A number of studies have looked at the direct effects of education on health, and almost 
all of them have reported that higher education strongly contributes to better health 
(Grossman, 1972; Hay, 1988; Gilleskie and Harrison, 1998; Arendt, 2005; Groot and 
Maassen van de Brink, 2007). Monden, et al. (2003) further argued that not only own 
education but a partner’s education influences health status. In addition, education may 
also enhance knowledge and information on how to live a healthy life, which is closely 
linked to healthy behavior. A positive relation between education and healthy behavior is 
well-documented in the literature. For example, Grossman and Kaestner (1997) presented 
a comprehensive overview of studies on this relation and reported that higher educated 
people are less likely to smoke, more likely to exercise more, wear seatbelts more often, 
and participate in screening programs for breast cancer and cervix cancer. More recently, 
Al Riyami, et al. (2004) reported that women’s education had the strongest effect on their 
use of contraception in Oman excluding traditional factors. There might be also 
non-behavior reasons for this linkage, related to psychological distress as described by 
Mulatu and Schooler (2002). Generally, lower SES people tend to be more vulnerable 
 146
than higher SES ones to psychological distress (e.g., depression), and that such 
psychological disturbances account, at least in part, for the disproportionate burden of 
disease among them (Gallo and Matthews, 1999).  
 
There exists the question of whether it is a unidirectional causal relation from education 
to health. We focus on hypotheses suggesting that the relationship between education and 
health may be due to unobservables, it thus gives rise to a standard missing variables 
problem. One important potential missing variable is childhood health, or health 
endowment shaped prior to educational attainment, which has a long history in the 
empirical work. Grossman (1975) corrected for this ‘omitted’ variable between education 
and health by including proxies, for example, using family background and test scores as 
control variables. He found large and significant direct impact of education on both 
health and mortality. Another approach is the use of household fixed effects. For example, 
Behrman and Wolfe (1989) used education of the respondents’ sisters as a control for 
endowment, and got an estimate of the true education effect as the difference between the 
coefficients on own education and sisters’ education as suggested by Chamberlain (1980). 
The result suggested that controlling for household unobservables does not alter 
education effects considerably. A second explanation for a correlation between an 
unobserved component and education states that individuals with higher preferences for 
the future are more likely to engage in activities with current costs and future benefits 
such as education and health investments. Grossman and Kaestner (1997) discussed 
studies investigating the time preference hypothesis. They argued that the previous 
studies tended to deal with health behaviour, notably smoking, and therefore did not deal 
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with the education effects on health per se. They concluded that the existing, sparse 
evidence does not favour the time preference hypothesis. 
 
A number of studies have dealt with endogeneity of education using instrumental variable 
techniques. Berger and Leigh (1989) used per capita income and per capita expenditures 
on education in the state of birth as instruments for education in their study of education 
effects on health on US data. They found that education effects are slightly reduced, but 
remain significant, when correcting for endogeneity. Adams (2001) adapted the 
identification strategy suggested by Angrist and Krueger (1991), using quarter of birth in 
a US cross-section of individuals from 1992. He used SRH and alternative measures 
which describe functional limitations. When instrumental variable estimation is applied, 
education effects increase slightly but are insignificant. Furthermore, F-values on the 
instruments are just above 1, indicating a problem of weak instruments (Arendt, 2005). 
Spasojevic (2003) used changes in compulsory schooling in Sweden in the fifties, 
analyzing education effects on a constructed index of bad health and on an index of 
healthy BMI range over the period 1981-1991. She found a positive and significant 
impact of years of education on both measures. Similarly and more recently, Arendt 
(2005) used Danish school reforms to instrument education effects on health and BMI. 
He argued that education is related to these two measures in the expected way and the 
relationships are amplified in magnitude when education is instrumented. However, as 
the standard errors also increase when using instruments, neither exogeneity nor the null 
of no effect of education can be rejected for health and BMI.  
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As it stands, the existing evidence suggests that there is a causal component running from 
education to health. However, the evidence is still sparse, and many studies suffer either 
from use of poor instruments, low precision or from a focus on very narrow samples 
(Arendt, 2005). 
 
5.2.1.2. The Causality between Income and Health 
 
The relationship between income and health is complex, and it is one of the most heavily 
research topics in economics and other social science. It relates to several aspects 
including a comparative analysis between countries and over time. Researchers have 
employed a range of different ways to measure income over time, which can be roughly 
grouped into income levels over a number of years, income change over time and 
duration of poverty experience (Benzeval, et al., 2000). Most of the studies that include 
measures of income levels over time and income change found a significant correlation 
with health outcomes. Greater income is associated with better health through, for 
example, a better lifestyle or diet, fewer monetary worries, better access to medical 
services and an improved living environment (Adler, et al., 1994; Smith, 1999). Fuchs 
(2004) argued that this correlation can vary from highly positive to weakly negative, 
depending on the context, covariates, and level of aggregation. For instance, Hemstrom 
(2005) reported that the lowest income quintile had better health than those in the second 
in Sweden, although only for men. In addition, Benzeval and Judge (2001) argued that 
there is a linkage between low income and poor health, and long-term income is more 
important for health than current income.  
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However, similar to education, the main direction of causality between income and health 
is open to debate. In order to establish the causal effect of income on health, recent 
studies have attempted to use ‘random variation’ in income, as well as more advanced 
panel data econometric techniques (Frijters, et al., 2005). To explore the effect of income 
on self-assessed health and chronic health limitations, Ettner (1996) adopted a two-stage 
IV method, where family income was instrumented by respondents’ wage rate and 
non-earnings income. The author assumed that these variables only impact on health 
through their effect on family income, and she found a large positive effect of income on 
health using all the various measures of health. However, as already noted by Meer, et al. 
(2003), this is a strong assumption because it seems intuitive that both employment and 
non-earnings income will have a direct effect on health. Meer, et al. (2003) used a 
balanced panel of just over 3000 individuals drawn from four waves of the US Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to explore the effect of recent changes in wealth on a 
binary measure of self-reported general health (which was collapsed down from a 5-point 
ordinal scale). The change in wealth was instrumented by information on the value of 
inheritance received over the last 5 years, and estimates suggest that increased wealth has 
a very small positive effect on health. Importantly, as discussed by the authors the validity 
of inheritance information as an instrument is also open to some debate. 
 
Individual heterogeneity plays an increasing role in explaining variation in health status. 
Benzeval, et al. (2000) used data from the first six waves of the British Household Panel 
Study to study the relationship between very low income, or poverty and a binary 
self-reported measure of health. Estimates from binary logit models suggested that recent 
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poverty was a strong predictor of health. However, the lack of controls in the analysis for 
unobservable heterogeneity, and the lack of exogenous variation in income, indicates that 
this result should be considered with some caution (Frijters, et al., 2005). Some recent 
studies have started to focus on this issue in the empirical analysis. Contoyannis, et al. 
(2004) used a categorical indicator of self-assessed health, and information on both 
equivalised and non-equivalised annual household income to explore the causal effect of 
income on health. They estimated random-effects ordered probit models which allowed 
for persistence in the observed outcomes due to state dependence and unobserved 
individual heterogeneity. They explored the issue of state dependence in health by 
conditioning on previous health status, and they controlled for the problem of initial 
conditions arising in dynamic panel data model by including individual-specific 
characteristic averages as suggested by Mundlak (1978). They presented evidence of 
persistence in self-assessed health explained in part by state dependence which is stronger 
amongst men than women, and by individual heterogeneity, it accounts for around 30% 
of the unexplained variation in health.  
 
More recent papers have started to apply the fixed-effects ordinal estimator proposed by 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity.  
Frijters, et al. (2003) use the unanticipated shift in permanent income for East German 
households, following the reunification of Germany, as a source of exogenous variation 
in income. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) between 1991 and 1999, 
they fit both random and fixed-effects estimators to the ordinal health measures. Their 
estimates from the random-effects model suggested that there is a significant positive 
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relationship between income and health. However, after controlling for heterogeneity, 
there is no evidence for a causal effect of income on health. Based on this discussion, 
Frijters, et al. (2005) further used the GSOEP between 1984 and 2002 and updated the 
results. They used only the fixed-effects estimator and concluded that there was evidence 
of a significant positive effect of income changes on health satisfaction, but the 
quantitative size of this effect is small. This is the case with respect to current income and 
a measure of ‘permanent’ income. A more recent study by Jones and Schurer (2007), used 
the same methodology with 22 waves of the GSOEP (1984-2005), and concluded that 
adjusting for unobserved heterogeneity accounted for the relationship between income 
and very good health, but not between income and poorer health status.  
 
5.2.2. SES and BMI  
 
The BMI is an intermediate health indicator and it is a measure of heaviness that reflects 
both lean and fat issues. The BMI is highly correlated with body fat, and obesity is 
defined as an excess accumulation of body fat. The BMI is generally calculated as weight 
in kilograms over height in meters squared (weight(kg)/height(m)²). As previously 
mentioned, the WHO has devised a classification where by persons with BMIs below the 
range 19-25 are considered underweight, those with BMIs above this range are 
considered overweight or ‘at risk76’ and those with BMIs greater than or equal to 30 are 
considered obese. These WHO BMI classifications of overweight and obesity are 
intended for international use. However, as discussed in the chapter 3, the BMI is age and 
                                                        
76 They reflect risk for type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular disease, which are rapidly becoming 
major causes of death in adults in all populations (WHO expert consultation, 2004). 
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gender dependent when used as an indicator of body fatness (see, e.g., Gallagher, et al., 
1996; Burkhauser and Cawley; 2008), and the BMI cut-off points appear likely to differ 
across ethic groups (see, e.g. Moon, et al., 2002). 
 
From the economic point of view, some researchers have taken BMI as an element of a 
life style which is closely related to health behaviours (Contoyannis and Jones, 2004). It 
is influenced by various factors including age, gender, race, SES and behaviour aspects of 
life style, such as diet, physical activity and smoking (Reddy, 1998). For example, black 
people often display higher BMIs than other races (e.g. Mokdad, et al., 1999; Lavie, et al., 
2004; Goodman, et al., 2005 ), and black females may be particularly at risk of becoming 
overweight (e.g. Crawford, 2001). Body mass and the prevalence of obesity have been 
shown to be inversely associated with SES in the United States and other industrialized 
countries (Sobal and Stunkard, 1989; Jeffery and French, 1996; Montgomery, et al., 1998; 
Wardle, et al., 2004). However, for developing countries, the positive association between 
SES and BMI has been observed in many studies. For example, de Vasconcellos (1994), 
using Brazilian surveys, reported a higher probability of having thin individuals at lower 
income levels. Delpeuch, et al. (1994) presented a large prevalence of low BMI in rural 
areas and high BMI in urban areas of the Congo. More recently, Reddy (1998) reported 
similar results for the India. 
 
For the relevance of this chapter, we are not going to review the impact of behaviour 
aspects on BMI, however, it is necessary to mention that most of the studies reviewed 
here considered these aspects together with SES on BMI.    
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5.3. Model and Data Specification 
 
5.3.1. Theoretical Foundation and Model 
 
Building on the human capital theory, Grossman (1972) provides a formal model to 
analyze health capital – the Grossman Model. Health is to be viewed as a dimension of 
human capital, similar but not identical to education. Health increases income through 
adding healthy working days while education through improving productivity (Zhao, 
2005). In this model, health depreciates over time but is maintained by health investment 
depending on consumed goods and activities that affect health (Arendt, 2005). Gross 
investment is produced by a household production function, which is affected by the 
efficiency or productivity of a given consumer as reflected by his or her personal 
characteristics. Specifically, efficiency is defined as the amount of health obtained from a 
given amount of health input, for example, years of education completed plays a large 
role in this context (Grossman, 2000). 
 
Our empirical study will test these theoretical implications, and our models should be 
viewed as reduced form specifications as they do not include objects of choice, such as 
medical care, or other health inputs, such as lifestyle. We hypothesize that a person’s 
health is linked to their socio-economic characteristics apart from their personal 
characteristics, such as education, income, etc. The rationale is found in the literature. An 
individual will attempt to maximize health capital subject to time, information constraints 
(the stock of knowledge) and financial status. To be consistent with the literature, we also 
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control other factors such as gender, marriage status, occupation and region, which 
potentially model life style. The specification is as follows:     
 
Health = β0 + β1age + β2age2 + β3gender + β4education + β5income + 
Β6married + β7occupation + β8urban + β9region + ε     (5.1) 
 
5.3.2. Data Specification  
 
The dataset we use comes from the Physical Examination in China Health and Nutrition 
Survey which is a four-year panel data survey including 1991, 1993, 1997 and 2000. This 
dataset was collected mainly by the Carolina Population Centre and it is designed to 
examine the effects of the health, nutrition, and family planning policies and programs 
implemented by national and local governments. It provides a valuable national sample 
for researchers in health and nutrition fields, so it is suitable for our purposes. CHNS 
utilizes a multistage, random cluster-sampling scheme. The sample households were 
randomly drawn from eight provinces including Liaoning/Heilongjiang, Shandong, 
Jiangsu, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou77, and in each province, both rural 
and urban residents are sampled. We restrict our sample to those between 15 and 75. 
After also excluding observations with less than full information, it provided 27882 
observations (14285 males; 13597 females) in the four years altogether. All the variables 
are defined in Table 5-1, and Table 5-2 shows sample means. 
                                                        
77 Liaoning was replaced by Heilongjiang in 1997 and both Liaoning and Heilongjiang were 
included in 2000. 
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Table 5-1 Data Description 
 
Variables  Data Description 
Education 
(Educ) A continuous value from 0 to 18 
Gender A dummy variable: Males (‘1’) & Females (‘0’) 
Age  A continuous value, restricted from 15 to 75. Age and age-squared are used in the main regressions. 
Marital Status A dummy variable: Married (‘1’) & Non-married (‘0’). Non-married includes never married, divorced, widowed and separated.  
Living Area  A dummy variable: Urban (‘1’) & Rural (‘0’) 
Household 
Income 
(ladhinc) 
Total deflated (by 1989 price index) annual household income, log value is 
used in the regression. 
Occupation 
Dummy variables. Seven occupations have been chosen based on the sample 
size, which include: Professionals1, Administrators, Office Staff, Farmers, 
Skilled-workers, Drivers and Service Workers. 
Regions  Dummy variables. Nine provinces include Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou.  
Illness A dummy variable reflecting any difficulty in carrying out daily activities and work due to illness: Yes (‘1’) & No (‘0’). 
BMI Body Mass Index (weight (kg)/height (m)²) – Healthy range is identified with BMIs of 19-252. 
Self-reported 
Health  Ordinal scales: Excellent (‘3’), Good (‘2’), Fair (‘1’), and Poor (‘0’)
3. 
Notes: 1 Professionals include senior professional/technical personnel (doctor, professor, etc.) and 
professional/technical personnel (editor, photographer, etc.); Administrators include executive/manager, 
factory manager, government official, section chief, director, administrative cadre; and Service Workers 
include housekeeper, cook, waiter, doorkeeper, barber/beautician, counter sales, launderer, and childcare. 
The remaining occupation is the base category in the regression which includes such as non-technical/ 
non-skilled worker (laborer), homemaker-with no other work, student and others. 2 The figures come from 
the World Health Organization. 3 We have reversed the scales of the health measure in the CHNS survey to 
emphasize that higher numbers correspond to better health. 
 
As mentioned before, educational attainment, occupational status and income are three 
dominant components of SES. In the survey, completed years of formal education were 
measured by primary school (1-6 years), lower middle school (1-3 years), upper middle 
school (1-3 years), middle technical or vocational school (1-2 years) and college/ 
university (1-6 years or more). We aggregate these discrete values based on China’s 
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education system to obtain continuous values of the formal education years78. It thus 
takes a value from 0 to 18 with an average value of 6.6 years (7.51 for males and 5.66 
females) for all four years together. From Table 5-1, we can see the information on 
different types of occupations in the survey. Because the number of the observations in 
some types of occupations is relatively small, we select seven occupations which are 
professionals, administrators, office staff, farmers, skilled-workers, drivers and service 
workers. Income is measured as deflated79 total annual household income (ladhinc). It is 
the sum of household incomes from all sections including income from wages, home 
gardening, household farms or farming collectives, raising livestock/poultry, collective 
and household fishing, household business, welfare subsidies or ration coupons, housing 
subsidies and other sources of income. This variable is transformed to natural logarithms 
to allow for concavity of the health-income relationship (see e.g. Frijters, et al., 2003; 
Contoyannis, et al., 2004). Table 5-2 shows that the average value for the logarithm of 
this variable is 8.36 for whole sample. We also include data on marital status, and being 
married is the included category for estimates. 
                                                        
78  In China, basic formal education includes primary education (normally six years) and 
secondary education. Secondary education is divided into academic secondary education 
(normally three years of lower and three years of upper middle school) and specialized/ 
vocational/technical secondary education, i.e., after graduated from the lower middle school, one 
can apply for upper middle school or middle technical/vocational school.  
79 According to CHNS, there is no published absolute consumer price index for China that 
provides a way to compare provinces or urban and rural areas. Rather the State Statistical Bureau 
publishes annually a consumer price index ratio that shows for urban and rural areas in each 
province the shift in the cost of living within that geographic area. The CHNS urban and rural 
price data are used to create a ratio of urban and rural costs for elements of the consumer goods 
basket, and they create their own costs (yuan) of the consumer basket for each time period for 
urban and rural areas in each province in the CHNS. Their deflator is based on 1988 prices.   
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Table 5-2 Sample Means 
 
Variables Whole Sample Males Females 
Self-reported Health 1.84   1.88   1.80   
Males (%) 0.51  -  -  
Education 6.60  7.51  5.66  
Age 40.24  40.62  39.84  
Married (%) 0.80  0.80  0.80  
Urban (%) 0.29  0.29  0.29  
Ladhinc 8.36  8.36  8.36  
Professionals (%) 0.05  0.06  0.05  
Administrators (%) 0.04  0.07  0.02  
Office Staff (%) 0.03  0.04  0.03  
Farmers (%) 0.57  0.51  0.62  
Skilled-workers (%) 0.07  0.09  0.05  
Drivers (%) 0.01  0.03  0.00  
Service workers (%) 0.07  0.05  0.08  
Liaoning (%) 0.07  0.07  0.07  
Heilongj (%) 0.05  0.06  0.05  
Jiangsu (%) 0.13  0.13  0.13  
Shandong (%) 0.11  0.11  0.10  
Henan (%) 0.12  0.12  0.12  
Hubei (%) 0.13  0.13  0.13  
Hunan (%) 0.11  0.12  0.11  
Guangxi (%) 0.14  0.14  0.14  
Guizhou (%) 0.14  0.14  0.14  
No difficulty in carrying out  
daily activities and work† (%) 95.68  95.94  95.41  
BMIs in healthy range (19-25) (%)  0.72  0.73  0.70 
BMIs underweight (<19) (%)  0.13  0.13  0.13 
BMIs overweight (>25) (%)  0.15  0.14  0.17 
No. of the Observations 27882 26366 14285 13356 13597 13010
Source: Physical Examination in China health and Nutrition Survey, various years.  
Notes: † No. of the observations for this variable are slightly less than others due to missing values. It is 
only used for the test of the validity and reliability of self-reported health in the empirical section. 
 
The main measure of health that we use is self-reported health status which is defined by 
a response to ‘how would you describe your health compared to that of other people of 
your age?’ The responses to this question take the ordered scale: poor, fair, good and 
excellent. SRH has been used widely in previous studies of the relationship between 
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health and SES (see e.g. Ettner, 1996; Smith, 1999; Adams, et al., 2003; Frijters, et al., 
2003; 2005). It is a simple subjective measure of health that provides an ordinal ranking 
of perceived health status, however, there is evidence to suggest that it is a powerful 
predictor of subsequent mortality (see e.g. Idler and Kasl, 1995; Idler and Benyamini, 
1997) and its predictive power does not appear to vary across socioeconomic groups (see 
e.g. Burstrom and Fredlund, 2001). SRH have also been shown to be a good predictor of 
future medical care usage (see e.g. van Doorslaer, et al., 2000; 2002). 
 
In addition, note that the BMI is more closely related to health behavior than SRH 
(Arendt, 2005), we also report some results using the documented BMI healthy range 
(19-25) as a robustness check. The BMI healthy range is calculated as follows: 
 
BMIu' = BMIs < 19 
BMIo' = BMIs > 25 
BMIu = BMIu'*(19-BMIs)              (5.2) 
BMIo = BMIo'*(BMIs-25) 
Healthy BMI = BMIu+ BMIo 
 
In equation (5.2), we assume that BMIu measures the distance of the individuals’ BMI 
values from 19 (if their BMIs are less than 19, underweight), and BMIo measures the 
distance of the individuals’ BMIs from 25 (if their BMIs are more than 25, overweight). 
The Healthy BMI indicates the greater the distance from either side the less healthy they 
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are. As expected, the BMIu and BMIo are negatively correlated with our SRH measure80. 
Figure 5-1 describes the distribution of SRH across all four years. The distributions show 
that the majority of observations reflect good health, and there is a trend for the 
distribution of health to become worse, specifically for the year 2000. Compared to the 
former three years, this can be seen by the increase in the proportions of observations in 
the poor and fair categories, while there is a decrease in the proportion reporting good 
health. Figure 5-2 describes the average health status across all four years and it shows 
the same trend as indicated in Figure 5-181.  
 
Figure 5-1 Self-reported Health Status by Year 
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Source: Physical Examination in China health and Nutrition Survey, various years. 
                                                        
80 The negative correlation between BMIo and self-reported health is not strongly significant. 
This is not surprising in developing countries, such as China, since ill-nutrition is still a major 
cause for poor health.  
81 To rule out the possible health-related attrition in the data, we redo Figure 5-2 using balanced 
data with 9216 observations, and we get a very similar figure. 
 
1991 1993 1997 2000 
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Figure 5-2 Average Status of Self-reported Health by Year 
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Source: Physical Examination in China health and Nutrition Survey, various years. 
 
Table 5-3 gives descriptive statistics on self-reported health across gender, urban/rural 
and province. 11.4% of urban residents reported to have excellent health, and this 
percentage is relatively lower compared to rural ones (14.3%). Compared to men, lower 
percentage of women reported to have excellent and good health. People in Guangxi and 
Guizhou (western provinces) have the lowest percentages of excellent health status. They 
are 4.4% and 8.3%, respectively. People in Liaoning, Heilongjiang (northeastern 
provinces), Jiangsu and Shandong (coastal provinces) have the highest percentages of 
excellent health. The difference is striking. However, if we combine the two categories of 
excellent and good health, the gap between western provinces and other provinces 
becomes smaller. In all provinces, less than 5% people report to have poor health. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that this kind of purely descriptive analysis that 
exploits solely the cross-sectional variation in the data is not able to reveal anything about 
the underlying causal relationship between these variables and health. 
1991 1993 1997 2000 
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Table 5-3 Self-Reported Health by Genders, Urban/Rural and Provinces 
 
    Liaoning Heilongjiang Jiangsu Shandong Henan Hubei Hunan Guangxi Guizhou 
Freq. 81 38 104 53 155 144 96 157 160 Poor 
% 3.9% 2.6% 2.9% 1.8% 4.7% 4.0% 3.1% 4.0% 4.0% 
Freq. 417 261 709 486 849 858 715 1179 855 Fair 
% 20.3% 18.0% 20.0% 16.5% 25.7% 24.1% 22.9% 30.2% 21.5% 
Freq. 1221 736 2058 1708 1810 2284 1961 2392 2636 Good 
% 59.5% 50.6% 58.0% 57.9% 54.7% 64.1% 62.7% 61.4% 66.2% 
Freq. 332 419 678 702 493 279 357 170 329 Excellent 
% 16.2% 28.8% 19.1% 23.8% 14.9% 7.8% 11.4% 4.4% 8.3% 
Freq. 2051 1454 3549 2949 3307 3565 3129 3898 3980 Total 
% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 5-3 continued 
 
      Whole Sample Liaoning Heilongjiang Jiangsu Shandong Henan Hubei Hunan Guangxi Guizhou
Freq. 512 39 20 54 31 84 73 50 90 71 Poor 
% 3.8% 3.9% 3.0% 3.1% 2.2% 5.1% 4.1% 3.5% 4.7% 3.6% 
Freq. 3352 227 139 397 260 442 449 355 639 444 Fair 
% 24.7% 22.7% 20.8% 22.6% 18.4% 27.1% 25.3% 24.5% 33.1% 22.5% 
Freq. 8130 596 332 1009 808 884 1141 911 1132 1317 Good 
% 59.8% 59.5% 49.7% 57.4% 57.3% 54.1% 64.4% 62.9% 58.6% 66.9% 
Freq. 1603 140 177 299 312 224 110 132 71 138 Excellent 
% 11.8% 14.0% 26.5% 17.0% 22.1% 13.7% 6.2% 9.1% 3.7% 7.0% 
Freq. 13597 1002 668 1759 1411 1634 1773 1448 1932 1970 
F
e
m
a
l
e
 
Total 
% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Freq. 476 42 18 50 22 71 71 46 67 89 Poor 
% 3.3% 4.0% 2.3% 2.8% 1.4% 4.2% 4.0% 2.7% 3.4% 4.4% 
Freq. 2977 190 122 312 226 407 409 360 540 411 Fair 
% 20.8% 18.1% 15.5% 17.4% 14.7% 24.3% 22.8% 21.4% 27.5% 20.4% 
Freq. 8676 625 404 1049 900 926 1143 1050 1260 1319 Good 
% 60.7% 59.6% 51.4% 58.6% 58.5% 55.3% 63.8% 62.5% 64.1% 65.6% 
Freq. 2156 192 242 379 390 269 169 225 99 191 Excellent 
% 15.1% 18.3% 30.8% 21.2% 25.4% 16.1% 9.4% 13.4% 5.0% 9.5% 
Freq. 14285 1049 786 1790 1538 1673 1792 1681 1966 2010 
M
a
l
e
 
Total 
% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 5-3 continued 
 
      Whole Sample Liaoning Heilongjiang Jiangsu Shandong Henan Hubei Hunan Guangxi Guizhou
Freq. 702 54 12 74 39 124 90 64 113 132 Poor 
% 3.5% 4.2% 1.2% 2.9% 1.7% 5.3% 3.6% 2.9% 4.2% 4.6% 
Freq. 4233 261 112 431 367 556 548 510 809 639 Fair 
% 21.4% 20.1% 11.1% 16.6% 16.1% 23.6% 22.0% 23.0% 30.1% 22.5% 
Freq. 12008 777 544 1511 1336 1297 1655 1419 1655 1814 Good 
% 60.7% 59.8% 53.7% 58.3% 58.7% 55.0% 66.6% 64.0% 61.5% 63.8% 
Freq. 2833 208 345 574 535 382 193 224 112 260 Excellent 
% 14.3% 16.0% 34.1% 22.2% 23.5% 16.2% 7.8% 10.1% 4.2% 9.1% 
Freq. 19776 1300 1013 2590 2277 2359 2486 2217 2689 2845 
R
u
r
a
l
 
Total 
% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Freq. 286 27 26 30 14 31 54 32 44 28 Poor 
% 3.5% 3.6% 5.9% 3.1% 2.1% 3.3% 5.0% 3.5% 3.6% 2.5% 
Freq. 2096 156 149 278 119 293 310 205 370 216 Fair 
% 25.9% 20.8% 33.8% 29.0% 17.7% 30.9% 28.7% 22.5% 30.6% 19.0% 
Freq. 4798 444 192 547 372 513 629 542 737 822 Good 
% 59.2% 59.1% 43.5% 57.0% 55.4% 54.1% 58.3% 59.4% 61.0% 72.4% 
Freq. 926 124 74 104 167 111 86 133 58 69 Excellent 
% 11.4% 16.5% 16.8% 10.8% 24.9% 11.7% 8.0% 14.6% 4.8% 6.1% 
Freq. 8106 751 441 959 672 948 1079 912 1209 1135 
U
r
b
a
n
 
Total 
% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Physical Examination in China health and Nutrition Survey, various years. 
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5.4. Econometric Framework 
 
Considering cross-sectional data, the ordered probit model arises when considering an 
independent sample of data (yi, xi) where the dependent variable yi has M possible 
outcomes (0, 1, 2, …, M) with a ‘natural’ ordering (Wooldridge, 2002). The ordered 
probit model for yi (conditional on explanatory variables xi) can be derived from a latent 
variable model. Assume that a latent variable y* is determined by  
 
uxy ii += β'*  for i=1, 2, …,n, u | x~ N (0,1)      (5.3) 
 
This applies to our measure of self-reported health, which has categorical outcomes of 
poor, fair, good, and excellent. The latent variable, *iy , is assumed to be a function of a 
vector of SES xi. Define the following observability criterion yi = λ if  
 
λk-1 ≤ y* ≤ λk  for k=1, 2, …K.       (5.4) 
 
Let λ0< λ1<…< λM be known cut points (or threshold parameters), and λ0 = –∞ and λK = 
∞. The conditional probability of observing yi = k is 
 
P(yi = k | xi) = P(λk-1 ≤ y* ≤ λk | xi) = P(λk-1≤ 'ix β+u ≤ λk | xi)           (5.5) 
 
Given the standard normal assumption for u, rearranging terms gives 
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P(yi = k | xi) = P(λk-1 – 'ix β ≤ u ≤ λk –
'
ix β | xi) = Φ(λk –
'
ix β) – Φ(λk-1 –
'
ix β)         (5.6) 
 
where Φ(.) is the cumulative normal distribution function. Other distribution functions 
can be used in place of Φ. Replacing Φ with the logit function (symmetrically assuming 
a logistic distribution), Λ, gives the ordered logit model.  
 
Both these models have been often used with cross-sectional data in analysis about 
health satisfaction and well-being (D’Addio, et al., 2003). The ordered probit/logit 
model has also been used in panel studies. In that case unobserved heterogeneity has 
been dealt within the random effects model. The fixed effects model has been rarely 
followed owing to the lack of suitable econometric approaches. However, some authors 
have adopted it by transforming the ordinal variable into a binary one that takes the 
value of one above or under a specific threshold. To estimate the impact of SES on 
health, we use pooled ordered probit, the random-effects ordered probit model and the 
fixed-effects ordered logit estimator recently proposed by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 
(2004).   
 
Our dependant variable, health, H ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} is an ordinal indicator of health as 
evaluated by individuals. This measure is available for a set of individuals indexed by 
i=1, 2, …,n, each observed over a given time-period indexed by t = 1, 2 ,..., T. More 
precisely, we observe a four-year panel data including 1991, 1993, 1997 and 2000. For 
each year in which Hit is observed, we also observed a (row) vector xit contain a set of 
covariates describing the characteristics and situation of individual i in year t as 
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mentioned in section 5.3.1. 
 
5.4.1. Random Effects Ordered Probit  
 
As our baseline model we begin with pooled ordered probit. Further we fit the ordered 
probit model with individual random-effects: 
 
 
Hi,t = k ⇔ *,tiH ∈ [λk, λk-1)    (5.7) 
 
where *itH  is latent health; Hit is observed health; λk is the kth cut-off point (increasing 
in k) for categories; xit are observable individual characteristics; iv  is an individual 
normally-distributed random characteristic that is orthogonal to x with unknown 
variance; and finally itε  is a time-varying error-term, normally-distributed, orthogonal 
to all x . As in the binary choice model, the underlying variance σ2 = σv2 + σε2 is not 
identified. We adopt the normalization σε2 = 1, thus the overall error variance equals 
(σv2+1).  
 
The associated log-likelihood function for this model is well-established and can be 
generalized from the arguments made by Butler and Moffit (1982). Individual 
heterogeneity is unobserved, and therefore to obtain the unconditional log-likelihood we 
need to integrate the conditional log-likelihood. The integration is done using the 
itititi vxH εβ ++= ' ,*,
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Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 12 evaluation points. Frechette (2001) provides a 
derivation of the likelihood function for this model and a further discussion of the 
Gauss-Hermite quadrature estimation.  
  
5.4.2. Conditional Fixed Effects Ordered Logit   
 
It is very likely that there are some unobservable individual traits and characteristics that 
are related to current health (Frijters, et al., 2003). For example, parental background 
plays an important role in determining both adult health and current income (Case, et al., 
2002). Moreover, the relationship between marriage and health may involve selection 
effects in that partners select each other on the basis of health. Similarly, healthier 
students may be more efficient producers of additions to the stock of knowledge through 
formal schooling, and healthier individuals may be more likely to have a job. In those 
cases, a spurious correlation between marriage, education, work and income and those 
unobserved characteristics may arise and thereby bias the estimation coefficients. While 
the random-effects ordered probit can to a certain extent indicate the direction of the 
effects of some determinants of health, the above-mentioned spurious correlation is still 
likely to be present (D’Addio, et al., 2003). Therefore, a fixed-effects approach seems to 
be more appropriate.  
 
The following fixed-effects ordered logit model was proposed by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and 
Frijters (2004): 
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itiitit fxH εβ ++= '*  
itH = k ⇔ *itH ∈ [λk, λk-1)    (5.8) 
  
where *itH  is latent health; Hit is observed health; λk is the kth cut-off point (increasing 
in k) for categories; xit are observable time-varying characteristics; if  is an individual 
fixed characteristics; and itε  is a time-varying logit-distributed error-term that is 
orthogonal to all x . This model is an ordered logit model with fixed individual effects 
and an individual specific threshold. 
 
This model is an extension of the conditional fixed-effects logit model by Chamberlain 
(1980) for dependant variables with more than two categories which recodes the data 
crossing over a barrier, that is the same for everyone, k. The fixed-effects estimator 
proposed by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) is the likelihood of observing which 
of the T satisfactions of the same individual are above ik , given that there are c of T 
satisfactions above ik . S( ik ,c)
82, which denotes the set of all possible combinations of 
{ 1iH , 2iH ,..., iTH } such that ckHI i
t
it =>∑ )( . Noteworthy is the fact that the model 
used in our analysis slightly deviates from theirs. In our case, the recording of 
observations to ‘high’ or ‘low’ health is also individual specific, however, it is based on 
the individuals’ average health scores in the panel83. In this case, only individuals with 
                                                        
82 For detailed discussions see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004).  
83 See also Brenner (2006), Böckerman and Ilmakunnas (2007) and Jones and Schurer (2007). 
Further, Dr. Ferrer-i-Carbonell has also mentioned that the two versions of this model presented 
very similar results.  
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changes in health status over time can be included.  
 
Finally, we add year dummies to these models to capture varying respondent behavior 
which is induced by institutional and other changes that affect each respondent in the 
same fashion (Brenner, 2006). Further, one important methodological point concerns the 
use of the fixed-effects estimators. According to Frijters, et al. (2005), one cannot 
simultaneously include age, time and fixed-effects in the analysis. Note that 
ageitβage=agei0βage+tβage, the effect of agei0βage is time-invariant and will therefore be in 
the individual fixed-effects that drops out, and tβage will be the same for everyone at t 
and hence be captured by year dummies. Consequently, the year dummies will also 
capture age effects. 
 
5.5. Empirical Analysis  
 
5.5.1. SRH – (Random-Effects) Ordered Probit   
 
The former two columns of Table 5-4 present the coefficient estimates for the ordered 
probit models based on pooled and random effects specifications. The estimated 
coefficients for these two models are extremely similar, although they are not directly 
comparable due to different scaling of the error variance. However, we can compare the 
relative effects of pairs of variables across these models. The coefficient of education on 
self-reported health is significantly positive at the 1% level for both models, which 
shows that a one-unit increase in education increases the probability of being in better 
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health. This is consistent with the literature as mentioned in section 5.2.  
 
As to the gender differences, our results show that males are more likely to have better 
health than females. Self-reported health declines with age, which is consistent with 
intuition, and the rate of decline increases as indicated by the negatively significant 
coefficient of age-squared. Surprisingly perhaps, marriage does not appear to be 
significantly associated with better health status. To estimate and further capture the 
impact of married status on SRH, we construct an interactive variable Married*Young84 
(age less than 4585). The coefficient estimates of this interaction term for the ordered 
probit models based on pooled and random effects specifications are shown in the third 
and fourth columns of Table 5-4. Married people are less healthy than non-married 
except for young couples who are healthier. To put it differently, the positive linkage 
between being married and better health status is only for young couples. The reasons 
behind this may be rather complex. One possibility is when people get older, they have 
more responsibilities and pressures from family and society as they have both children 
and parents to be taken care of, and they may also use their money differently compared 
to the young couples as they have to save for the future, for example, if they are not in 
one of the health care schemes, which is to some extent related to the nutrition intake 
and healthy life style. 
 
There has existed some urban-rural health inequality in China for many decades if not 
                                                        
84 We have also tried to include another interactive variable Married*Gender, however, it failed 
to indicate any significant results. Results have not been reported in this chapter. 
85 In late 20s, WHO redefined the age range: The Young (less than 45), The Middle (45-59), 
Slight Old (60-74), The Old (75-89) and more than 90.  
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centuries. Health care is more accessible and of better quality in urban areas compared 
to rural areas as discussed in chapter 2. However, the sign and significance of the 
‘urban’ variable indicates that rural people are more likely to have better health than 
urban ones, other things being equal. We could possibly explain this depending on 
environmental factors, such as the amount of physical activities. Individuals living in 
rural areas usually have more outdoor activities than urban ones based on the rural 
characteristics. In addition, there is comparatively less pollution and lower traffic 
volumes in rural areas which are also important factors in determining better health (see 
e.g., Frumkin, 2002). 
 
The positive linkage between household income and health has been largely observed as 
mentioned in the section 5.2. Our results are consistent with the literature and show that 
more household income significantly increases the probability of being in better health. 
In addition, most occupations have a significant impact on health status. Farmers are 
less likely to have better health. Except for professionals, five other occupations have 
more possibility to being healthy than the default case (i.e. the occupations apart from 
the seven included in the regression). The reasons are possibly related to a combination 
of factors including features of the work environment, social circumstances outside 
work, job control across occupational classes and life style factors. Those executives, 
office staff and skilled workers are so-called ‘white collar’, they have comparatively 
better work environment and higher socio-economic position. As to drivers, it is 
reasonable to say that they have an extremely high degree of control over their jobs. 
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Region is an important determinant of health. We take Shandong province, one of the 
developed coastal provinces in the survey, as the reference province. Table 5-4 shows 
that all regional coefficients are significantly negative except for Heilongjiang which 
failed to be significant. These results indicate that individuals living in coastal provinces 
(Shandong and Jiangsu) and the north-eastern province (Liaoning) have the highest 
possibility of being healthy, however, people living in Guangxi (one of the western 
provinces) have the lowest possibility of being healthy.  
 
The fifth and sixth columns of Table 5-4 present the coefficient estimates with the 
inclusion of a dummy variable which reflects any difficulty in carrying out daily 
activities and work due to illness. Several studies used the ability to perform normal 
“activities of daily living” (ADL) as another self-reported measure of health, but most of 
the research has focused on elderly people only (see e.g. Zimmer, et al., 2004; Beydoun 
and Popkin, 2005), since these ADL-based measures are closely related to physical 
functioning86 or disability. Our results show that the coefficient of this illness dummy 
on self-reported health is significantly negative at the 1% level for both models. We use 
this as a test for the validity and reliability of self-reported health in reflecting 
individuals’ general health87. The magnitude and significance of the other variables are 
largely as before.
                                                        
86 Physical functioning tasks are often classified either as “activities of daily living” (Katz, et al. 
1963), which include those necessary for personal care, or as “instrumental activities of daily 
living” (Lawton and Brody, 1969), which are necessary to maintain a living environment 
(Zimmer, et al., 2004). The detailed discussions on how to define these two measures is out of 
the scope of this section. 
87 Although different health indicators focus on measuring different aspects of health or the 
health is measured with different kinds of errors in the different indicators, they have similarities 
in reflecting individuals’ general health. 
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Table 5-4 The Impact of SES on Self-reported Health 
Explanatory Var. Self-reported Health  
  OProbit RE-Oprob OProbit† RE-Oprob† OProbit‡ RE-Oprob‡ FE-Ologit FE-Ologit‡ 
Gender 0.115*** 0.126*** 0.120*** 0.130*** 0.114*** 0.124***   
 (8.06) (7.33) (8.33) (7.57) (7.88) (7.26)   
Educ 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.053** 0.053** 
 (4.96) (4.70) (4.79) (4.56) (4.55) (4.34) (2.30) (2.25) 
Age -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014***   
 (-3.90) (-3.46) (-3.90) (-3.49) (-3.81) (-3.40)   
Agesq -0.00007* -0.00009** -0.00005 -0.00007 -0.00007* -0.00009* -0.00055*** -0.00057*** 
 (-1.91) (-2.08) (-1.32) (-1.54) (-1.76) (-1.94) (-2.59) (-2.62) 
Married 0.012 0.004 -0.057** -0.068** 0.014 0.007 -0.189** -0.183** 
 (0.54) (0.16) (-2.07) (-2.17) (0.61) (0.27) (-2.06) (-1.96) 
Married*Young    0.088*** 0.092***     
(age less than 45)   (4.16) (3.88)     
Urban -0.186*** -0.199*** -0.188*** -0.200*** -0.183*** -0.195***   
 (-11.37) (-10.23) (-11.49) (-10.33) (-11.06) (-10.09)   
Ladhinc 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.069*** 0.067*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.066*** 0.069*** 
 (7.11) (6.34) (7.54) (6.71) (6.82) (6.19) (2.64) (2.74) 
Profes -0.047 -0.047 -0.041 -0.041 -0.041 -0.040 -0.025 -0.042 
 (-1.29) (-1.14) (-1.12) (-0.99) (-1.13) (-0.97) (-0.17) (-0.28) 
Adminis 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.042 0.016 
 (3.40) (3.06) (3.50) (3.15) (3.48) (3.12) (0.32) (0.12) 
Staff 0.107*** 0.112** 0.106** 0.111** 0.113*** 0.117** 0.098 0.087 
 (2.60) (2.44) (2.57) (2.42) (2.71) (2.55) (0.74) (0.64) 
Farmers -0.048** -0.058** -0.045** -0.056** -0.040* -0.050** -0.184** -0.192** 
 (-2.24) (-2.42) (-2.12) (-2.31) (-1.86) (-2.07) (-2.34) (-2.39) 
Skilled 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.100*** 0.103*** 0.127 0.133 
 (3.06) (2.89) (3.06) (2.89) (3.19) (3.03) (1.48) (1.52) 
Drivers 0.164*** 0.163** 0.154** 0.153** 0.174*** 0.173** 0.31 0.326 
 (2.66) (2.36) (2.50) (2.22) (2.79) (2.50) (1.53) (1.60) 
Service 0.089*** 0.085** 0.089*** 0.085** 0.084*** 0.081** -0.035 -0.027 
 (2.82) (2.43) (2.81) (2.43) (2.61) (2.31) (-0.35) (-0.26) 
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Table 5-4 continued 
Explanatory Var. Self-reported Health  
  OProbit RE-Oprob OProbit† RE-Oprob† OProbit‡ RE-Oprob‡ FE-Ologit FE-Ologit‡ 
Liaoning -0.299*** -0.326*** -0.301*** -0.329*** -0.297*** -0.321***   
 (-8.98) (-8.30) (-9.05) (-8.37) (-8.85) (-8.21)   
Heilongj 0.047 0.054 0.044 0.051 0.057 0.066   
 (1.26) (1.24) (1.18) (1.16) (1.50) (1.50)   
Jiangsu -0.192*** -0.218*** -0.193*** -0.220*** -0.190*** -0.214***   
  (-6.74) (-6.37) (-6.78) (-6.41) (-6.60) (-6.28)   
Henan -0.361*** -0.396*** -0.360*** -0.395*** -0.349*** -0.380***   
 (-12.45) (-11.35) (-12.41) (-11.32) (-11.84) (-10.90)   
Hubei -0.487*** -0.531*** -0.489*** -0.534*** -0.482*** -0.522***   
 (-17.11) (-15.49) (-17.19) (-15.56) (-16.74) (-15.26)   
Hunan -0.372*** -0.408*** -0.373*** -0.409*** -0.364*** -0.397***   
 (-12.68) (-11.54) (-12.72) (-11.57) (-12.24) (-11.24)   
Guangxi -0.620*** -0.675*** -0.621*** -0.676*** -0.615*** -0.665***   
 (-22.05) (-19.93) (-22.10) (-19.98) (-21.60) (-19.70)   
Guizhou -0.396*** -0.439*** -0.393*** -0.436*** -0.401*** -0.440***   
 (-14.13) (-13.02) (-14.02) (-12.93) (-14.11) (-13.07)   
y1993 0.026 0.030 0.027 0.031 0.017 0.021 0.062 0.058 
 (1.40) (1.57) (1.43) (1.60) (0.92) (1.08) (1.18) (1.09) 
y1997 -0.005 -0.009 -0.002 -0.007 -0.018 -0.022 -0.001 0.004 
 (-0.25) (-0.47) (-0.12) (-0.33) (-0.92) (-1.11) (-0.01) (0.03) 
y2000 -0.061*** -0.078*** -0.056*** -0.072*** -0.064*** -0.079*** -0.143 -0.119 
 (-2.97) (-3.57) (-2.71) (-3.29) (-3.09) (-3.61) (-0.86) (-0.69) 
Illness     -0.910*** -0.947***  -1.005*** 
     (-27.20) (-26.22)  (-11.51) 
Pseudo R2 0.055  0.056  0.069  0.017 0.029 
Log-likelihood -27132.894 -26957.621 -27124.258 -26950.086 -26304.584 -26162.262 -5997.808 -5767.945 
No. of the Obs. 27882 27882 27882 27882 27420 27420 16585 16176 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, *** Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. Regressions are estimated by ordered probit (OProbit), 
random-effects ordered probit (RE-Oprob) and fixed-effects ordered logit (FE-Ologit). † Regressions with the inclusion of the interaction term Married*Young.  
‡ Regressions with the inclusion of an illness dummy reflecting any difficulty in carrying out daily activities and work due to illness. 
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Finally, both the ordered probit and random-effects ordered probit models replicated the 
downward trends in health status, specifically from the former three years to year 2000.  
 
5.5.2. SRH – Fixed-Effects Ordered Logit   
 
The fixed-effects model allows us to take account of unobservable heterogeneity, such 
as family background and personality traits, which might affect both education, income 
and health. Note that years of education completed for a large amount of individuals 
does not change much during the survey years, this model specifically allows us to 
establish how changes in income impact on health. The seventh column of Table 5-4 
shows the results. When we allow for fixed-effects, the significant positive relationship 
between household income and health found by the random-effects model still exists, 
and the magnitude and significance of the coefficients in these two models are very 
close. Therefore, the random-effects model has not been far away from the mark in the 
respect of unobservable heterogeneity.  
 
Moreover, some of the other relationships found in the random-effects model are still 
apparent. A one-unit increase in education significantly increases the probability of 
being in better health. Health declines with age at an increasing rate88, and being 
married appears to be significantly associated with worse health status, which to some 
extent is consistent with the results of the random-effects as shown in the fourth column 
                                                        
88 As argued in the section 5.4.2, age effects have been captured by the year dummies, thus we 
exclude age in our estimate of fixed effects.  
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of Table 5-489. However, we need to be careful in interpreting these results. The reasons 
for this negative linkage are clearly related to the changes in people’s marital status. 
Specifically, people are getting less healthy when they change from being married to 
being non-married. Potentially, there are two reasons for this change: 1) a spouse dies, 
or 2) couples are getting separated or divorced. In both cases, people are getting 
depressed prior to the change in status. Thus it is not too surprising that this change is 
linked to negative health outcomes, and it does not necessarily imply that marriage per 
se reduces health.  
 
As to the impact of occupations, being a farmer is still associated with worse health. 
However, the positive relationships found between other occupations, including 
executives, office staff, skilled workers, drivers and service workers, and health are no 
longer significant90. This could be partly due to the fact that a number of individuals do 
not change their occupations during the survey period, and hence to a large extent these 
are ‘fixed effects’. In addition, it may also imply that those significant correlations 
found under the random-effects specifications are most possibly due to selection. For 
example, the impact of individuals being executives was found to be strongly positive in 
the random-effects model, but low and insignificant in the fixed-effects model. This 
indicates that it is possible that those executives are relatively healthy themselves, i.e., 
the healthier are more likely to be executives in the first place, which would explain the 
positive correlation picked up by the random-effects result. 
                                                        
89 We have run the regression with the inclusion of the interaction term Married*Young. The 
coefficient is positive, however, it failed to be significant. The results have not been reported in 
this chapter.  
90 The coefficient of service workers in the fixed-effects model is negative and insignificant.  
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When we allow for fixed-effects, the significantly negative relationship between the 
dummy variable reflecting difficulty in carrying out daily activities and work due to 
illness and health found by the random-effects model still exists as shown in the last 
column of Table 5-4. Gender, urban and provinces do not enter the fixed-effects 
estimation due to their time-invariant characteristics. In addition, year dummies failed to 
be significant in the fixed-effects model. 
 
5.5.3. The Change of SRH – An Alternative Measure of Health 
 
As mentioned before, a simultaneous relationship may exist between education and 
health. We focus on the hypotheses suggesting that the relationship between education 
and health can not be interpreted causally due to unobserved variables. An important 
potential unobserved variable is inherent health or health endowments shaped prior to 
educational attainment, and it is the focus of this section. In addition, as argued by 
Grossman (2000) this unobserved inherent health is also linked to the reverse causality 
between health and education.  
 
In order to deal with potential simultaneity between education and health, we assume 
that the unobserved inherent health is individual specific and constant across time. We 
further make the following critical hypothesis: the change in health91 is independent of 
inherent health, i.e. that all people’s health (stochastically) deteriorates at the same level 
                                                        
91 We assume that health answers are ordinally comparable in the former sections of this chapter, 
i.e. that it is unknown what the relative difference between health answers is but all individuals 
do share the same interpretation of each possible answer. Here we assume the answers of health 
question can be interpreted as cardinal, and take it as a robustness check (see e.g., Ferrer-i- 
Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). 
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given their educational attainment. We start from the following equation: 
 
Hi,t = Hi,0 – αit + βEit                                     (5.9) 
   = Hi,0 – (αi – βEi)t  
 
Where Hit represents heath status for individual i at period t. Hi0 is individual i’s 
inherent health. Ei represents the education attainment for individual i and αi includes 
other SES variables. We assume that the individuals stay at this basic level of health 
until a certain age – could be 20 or 30. At this time health deteriorates (hence -αit), but 
the speed of deterioration depends upon the individuals’ level of education which we 
assume to be constant throughout their adult lives. The rate of decline of health is (αi – 
βEi). We believe this to be consistent with the commonly viewed interpretation of the 
impact of education on health. Now we assume that this basic level of education is also 
linked to inherent health:   
 
Ei,t = γ0 + γ1Hi,0                                          (5.10) 
 
Clearly this unobserved Hi0 affects both education and health, and makes the causal 
interpretation difficult. However, if we take the change in health from equation (5.9), we 
obtain: 
 
ΔHi,t = βEi – αi                                             (5.11)           
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By comparing equation (5.10) and (5.11), we can see that the basic underlying health 
Hi0 has an impact on education, however, it is independent of the change in health as we 
have defined it.  
 
Based on equation (5.11), we analyze whether SES has an impact on changes in health 
status. In a sense this is even more important to policy makers as the determinants of 
health change indicate a more direct way on how to improve people’s health. There is a 
four-year panel in the survey including 1991, 1993, 1997 and 2000, so we can estimate 
the changes from 1993/1991, 1997/1993, and 2000/1997, and this constitutes a clear 
three-period panel. 
 
The values of Health Change range from 0 to 692, where 0 represents the biggest 
negative change of health status and 6 represents the biggest positive change. We create 
a dichotomous variable Real Change93, which takes a value of one if the individuals 
have a positive change or no change of their health status (the value of Health Change 
more than or equal to ‘3’), and zero otherwise. Through this, we can find the SES 
pattern for people whose health statuses are getting worse. Out of a total of 15649 
person-year observations, 73% individuals’ health status is getting better or being the 
same, and 27% is getting worse. The independent variables included in the regression 
                                                        
92 The original values of health change are from -3 to 3. 
93 Based on the values of Health Change, we started by fitting the (random-effects) ordered 
probit. The results show almost no significant impact of SES on Health Change. We assume that 
this may be in part due to the fact that the change of health is not ‘ordered’. The construction of 
‘Real Change’ allows us to capture the determinants which make people’s health status getting 
worse. Note that we also tried to capture the determinants which make people’s health status 
getting better, and again, we did not find any significant impact. We did not report those results 
in this chapter.  
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are specified in equation (5.1). We use the pooled probit model and further allow for the 
random-effects. Table 5-5 shows the results, and the likelihood ratio test shows that the 
panel-level variance component is important. 
 
Table 5-5 The Impact of SES on Real Health Change 
(Random-Effects) Probit Model 
 
Explanatory Variable Real Health Change 
  Probit RE-Probit 
Gender -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.07) (-0.05) 
Educ 0.008** 0.008** 
 (2.25) (2.22) 
Log(age)1 -0.173*** -0.176*** 
 (-4.08) (-4.06) 
Married -0.012 -0.013 
 (-0.38) (-0.40) 
Urban -0.040 -0.041 
 (-1.49) (-1.49) 
Ladhinc 0.035** 0.035** 
 (2.56) (2.56) 
Farmers2 -0.061** -0.063** 
 (-2.27) (-2.27) 
Regional Dummies yes yes 
Year Dummies yes yes 
Log likelihood -9043.2706 -9075.4994 
Likelihood-ratio  64.46 
No. of the Obs. 15649 15649 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, *** Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
Regressions estimated by probit and random-effects probit (RE-Probit). 1 We have first tried to include age 
and age-squared in the regression to be constant with the main equations, and we failed to find the 
concave impact of age on health Real Change. So we substitute age and age-squared to log (age). 2 We 
included seven occupations as mentioned to begin with, and only the coefficient of farmers is significant. 
So we include farmers only and rerun the regressions.   
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Note that our model is similar, but not the same as the traditional first-differences model. 
In Table 5-5, we can see that generally the impact of SES on real health change works in 
the same way as for SRH with fixed-effects, except for marriage which fails to be 
significant. Education has a significant positive impact on the change of health status, 
which means that individuals with more education are less likely to experience a 
negative change in their health. Self-reported health declines with age, and the speed of 
decline also increases with age. Household income is another important factor on 
determining individuals’ health change as more household income decreases the 
possibility of negative changes. In addition, within the occupations, only being a farmer 
is closely linked to the negative change of health.  
 
5.5.4. The Documented Healthy BMI Range – An Alternative Measure 
of Health 
 
Because health has many dimensions, it is of interest to obtain results by using several 
health measures, although it is restricted by the data availability. In this section, we take 
the Healthy BMI calculated in equation (5.2) as the dependant variable, and run the 
regression with independent variables specified in equation (5.1). The Healthy BMI as 
shown in equation (5.2) measures the distance of the individuals’ BMI values from the 
healthy range (19-25), and the greater the distance from either side the less healthy 
people are. The total value range of BMI is from 9 to 47, and Table 5-2 shows that the 
BMI is within the healthy range for 72% of the individuals (73% of the men and 70% of 
the women). 
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In addition to the regression with the Healthy BMI (full sample), the variables ‘Healthy 
& Overweight’ and ‘Healthy & Underweight’ are also separately included. Based on the 
specification of the dependant variable, a Tobit model is selected for its ability to 
account for the effects of censoring at the lower bound of the BMI risk ladder (i.e., at 
value 0). We further allow for random-effects as the estimation of a fixed-effects Tobit 
model is problematic (see e.g. Greene, 2004). Table 5-6 presents the estimation results.  
 
The first two columns of Table 5-6 show coefficient estimates of the pooled and 
random-effects Tobit with the dependant variable of Healthy BMI. The likelihood ratio 
test shows that the panel-level variance component is important, thus we will focus on 
the results of random effects. Individuals’ gender is a significant predictor of healthy 
BMIs, and men are less frequently overweight/underweight than women94. People are 
more likely to have a healthy BMI when they are getting older, but this is only until age 
20. In other words, for the majority of our observations, older people are increasingly 
less likely to be in the healthy BMI range. As to the impact of SES, people with healthy 
BMIs are most common among individuals with lower household income. 
Overweight/underweight is overrepresented among administrators, whereas healthy 
BMIs are common among farmers. In addition, people’s education attainment fails to 
have significant effect on their BMIs for the full sample. 
 
The third and fourth columns of Table 5-6 show coefficient estimates of the pooled and 
random-effects Tobit with the selected samples on Healthy & Overweight. Not 
                                                        
94 This is predicted on the assumption that the same healthy range is applicable for both men 
and women. 
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surprising, compared to the second column of Table 5-6, results in the fourth column 
show a clearer trend of the impact of age and SES on healthy BMIs. People are more 
likely to be overweight when they are getting older till they are approximately 60. Being 
overweight is a characteristic most common among married people, and together with 
the results in the last two columns of Table 5-6, married people are generally less likely 
to be underweight. People living in urban areas tend to be overweight, and this is 
consistent with the results of its impact on SRH. In addition, people’s education plays a 
role in determining their BMIs as more educated people are less likely to be overweight. 
Compared to the results with the full sample Healthy BMI, the positive association 
between household income and being administrators and overweight is more robust. 
This is consistent with many other studies for developing countries. Reddy (1998) 
argued that this positive association is qualitatively different from the negative 
association characterizing contemporary Western populations. In the industrialized West, 
the richer upper strata of the populations, at least, are known to eat a more balanced diet, 
more possibly exercise during their leisure time and are more conscious of the need to 
check their weight. This to a large extent has been just the opposite in developing 
countries, such as China. 
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Table 5-6 The Impact of SES on Healthy BMI: (Random-Effects) Tobit Model 
 
Explanatory Var. Full Sample Healthy&Overweight Healthy&Underweight
  Tobit RE-Tobit Tobit RE-Tobit Tobit RE-Tobit 
Gender -0.431*** -0.343*** -0.953*** -0.677*** -0.069** -0.046* 
 (-8.93) (-7.56) (-11.10) (-10.55) (-1.97) (-1.91) 
Educ -0.016** -0.010 -0.032** -0.019* -0.002 -0.004 
 (-1.99) (-1.42) (-2.39) (-1.89) (-0.40) (-0.96) 
Age -0.041*** -0.020** 0.197*** 0.164*** -0.126*** -0.090*** 
 (-3.55) (-1.97) (8.78) (10.36) (-15.60) (-16.64) 
Agesq 0.0007*** 0.0005*** -0.0016*** -0.0013*** 0.0015*** 0.0011*** 
 (5.95) (4.37) (-6.40) (-7.74) (16.69) (17.54) 
Married -0.110 -0.063 0.459*** 0.299*** -0.248*** -0.139*** 
 (-1.49) (-1.02) (3.25) (3.07) (-4.92) (-4.12) 
Urban 0.079 0.091* 0.234** 0.205*** -0.050 -0.035 
 (1.47) (1.80) (2.55) (3.01) (-1.22) (-1.25) 
Ladhinc 0.091*** 0.068*** 0.244*** 0.165*** -0.060*** -0.039*** 
 (2.98) (2.92) (4.45) (4.52) (-2.72) (-2.77) 
Profes 0.296** 0.151 0.334* 0.200 0.113 0.062 
 (2.55) (1.56) (1.78) (1.51) (1.17) (0.96) 
Adminis 0.497*** 0.321*** 0.706*** 0.441*** -0.148 -0.078 
 (4.09) (3.26) (3.70) (3.34) (-1.31) (-1.07) 
Staff 0.023 0.001 -0.078 -0.049 0.109 0.070 
 (0.17) (0.01) (-0.36) (-0.34) (1.00) (0.99) 
Farmers -0.609*** -0.415*** -1.656*** -1.066*** 0.113** 0.077** 
 (-8.49) (-7.17) (-13.18) (-12.35) (2.10) (2.20) 
Skilled -0.028 -0.015 -0.039 0.01 0.010 0.002 
 (-0.28) (-0.20) (-0.23) (0.09) (0.13) (0.05) 
Drivers 0.26 -0.019 0.663** 0.28 -0.063 -0.109 
 (1.27) (-0.12) (1.99) (1.24) (-0.37) (-0.99) 
Service 0.180* 0.084 0.337** 0.183 -0.014 -0.025 
 (1.73) (1.04) (1.98) (1.59) -(0.17) (-0.48) 
Reg. Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Log likelihood -26970.73 -25240.07 -17027.71 -16236.79 -12117.40 -11754.57
Likelihood-ratio  3461.33  1580.83  725.68 
No. of the Obs. 26366 26366 22931 22931 22336 22336 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, *** Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
Regressions estimated by Tobit and random-effects Tobit (RE-Tobit). 
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5.5.5. An Alternative Measure of BMI and its Impact on SRH 
 
As argued before, the BMI is more closely related to health behavior than SRH, and 
some researchers have also taken it as an important element of a life style (see, e.g. 
Contoyannis and Jones, 2004). The BMI is generally calculated as weight in kilograms 
over height in meters squared (weight(kg)/height(m)²), and it is currently the most 
commonly used method in the empirical work. But this formula appears to be somewhat 
arbitrary. Why divide weight by exactly the square of height? Why not the cube, why 
not simply the ratio itself? In order to investigate this more closely, it is necessary to 
consider how to define BMI. Considering for cross-sectional data for simplicity, we 
started by estimating the following equation: 
 
Log (Wi) = β0 + β1log (Hi) + β2Xi                   (5.12) 
 
Where Wi and Hi denote the weight and height of the i’th individual, Xi is a vector of 
socio-economic characteristics and the log is to the base e. If we exponentiate both sides 
of equation (5.12), we get: 
 
Wi = eβ0Hiβ1eβ2Xi                  (5.13) 
  
According to the literature, it suggests that an individual’s Body Mass can be formulated 
by: 
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BMI0 = Wi / Hiβ1                      (5.14) 
         
where the subscript denotes that the equation (5.14) is linked to the ‘standard way’ of 
calculating BMI, indeed if β1=2, then it is exactly the equation documented in the 
literature. A potential problem revolves around this measure in whether there are 
systematic differences in people’s weight given their height. Thus whether an 
individual’s BMI should be adjusted for gender, age and SES? Arguably it should if it is 
to reflect an unambiguous measure of BMI to be used in evaluating health. In this case, 
equation (5.14) should be amended to: 
 
BMIa = Wi / (Hiβ1eβ2Xi)            (5.15a) 
 
Or viewed alternatively  
 
eβ2XiBMI0 = Wi / Hiβ1           (5.15b)             
 
Equation (5.15a) shows an amended BMI (BMIa) based on gender, age and SES, and 
alternatively equation (5.15b) shows a ‘standard’ BMI which should be adjusted by 
gender, age and SES when interpreting it. Xi presents the gender, age and SES of i’th 
individual as in equation (5.12). In what follows we shall first base our estimates on 
equation (5.14) without the gender, age and SES variables as is consistent with the 
traditional approach. The estimated regression based on panel data with random-effects 
is:  
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Log (Wi) = 3.04 + 2.09Log (Hi)   
         (289.816)   (94.878) 
R2 = 0.40, n=26366                     (5.16) 
  
Where the figures in parentheses represent t-statistics and the time subscript is implicit. 
From this we can calculate the BMI as: 
 
BMI0 = Wi / Hi2.09                   (5.17) 
 
The coefficient is close to, but slightly higher than, the standard measure of 2.00 in the 
literature. Still, it provides some justification for it. 
 
We now turn to consider the equations with gender, age and SES included, and we start 
by the inclusion of gender. We take Log(Wi) as a dependant variable and run the 
regression on Log(Hi) and gender, and we obtain a value for β1 of 2.27. The whole 
regression results are as follows: 
 
Log (Wi) = 2.97 – 0.029gender + 2.27Log (Hi) 
        (233.667)   (9.583)      (78.912) 
R2 = 0.40, n=26366                     (5.18) 
 
Based on these results, we can calculate BMI by: 
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BMI1 = Wi / (Hi2.27exp(-0.029*gender))            (5.19a) 
 
Or 
 
exp(– 0.029*gender)BMI0 =Wi / Hi2.27                (5.19b) 
 
Equations (5.19a) and (5.19b) could arguably contain a constant term, but β0 reflects 
other influences and hence should not perform this role. But if we assume that people on 
average are healthy this could be used to normalize (5.19a). Equation (5.19a) shows that 
the coefficient on height has increased. To put it differently, the coefficient on height 
changes when account is taken of gender. We also see that for a given height and weight, 
the healthy BMI is different for men than women. Note that gender and age are both 
reflecting people’s physical characteristics, and they should be both adjusted for, if we 
want to obtain an unambiguous measure of BMI to be used in evaluating health. Thus 
we now report a regression with both gender and age included, and we obtain a value for 
β1 of 2.40. In this way we define the BMI as: 
 
BMI2 = Wi / (Hi2.40exp(– 0.039*gender +0.011*age – 0.0001*age2))     (5.20a) 
 
Or 
 
exp(– 0.039*gender +0.011*age – 0.0001*age2)BMI0 = Wi / Hi2.40       (5.20b) 
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We can divide the part (exp(.)) in equation (5.20a) into two components: 
exp(–0.039*gender) and exp(0.011*age – 0.0001*age2), and we will look at them 
separately.  From the coefficient of gender in equation (5.20a), it suggests that for a 
given height, weight and age, a BMI2 value for a man (gender=1) is some 4% (= 1 – 
exp(-0.039)) lower than for a woman (gender=0). As to age, the coefficients indicate that 
the maximum value for exp(β2age + β3age2) is when age equals 5595. This suggests that 
BMI2 values are greatest for people aged 55, i.e., given an individual’s weight, height 
and gender, a BMI2 value for someone who is 20, 40 or 70 is systematically lower than 
for someone who is 55. To sum up, for example, the BMI2 value for a woman aged 50 is 
some 10% higher than a man aged 3096. This is consistent with the discussions in 
chapter 3 that the BMI values are age and gender dependent when used as an indicator 
of body fatness, and specifically they gradually increase with age, until after age 50 to 
60 (see e.g., de Vasconcellos, 1994).  
 
Finally we run the regression on Log(Hi) and all SES variables and from this way we 
obtain an estimate of β1 of 2.24 as shown in Table 5-7. In this case, more interesting than 
the significance of height, gender and age, is the significance of the other variables. 
Education, household income and administrative and service occupations are all 
significant at the 1% level and urban is significant at the 5% level. In all cases weight 
increases with the variable, i.e. it increases with education and income and is higher for 
executives or those in the service sector and/or those living in towns. Hence to answer 
                                                        
95 0)0002.0011.0(*)( )0001.0011.0()0001.0011.0(
22 =−=′ −− ageee ageageageage , within this equation, 
)0001.0011.0( 2ageagee − can not equal to 0, thus we can only let (0.011 – 0.0002age) = 0, and get 
age=55. 
96 (e(0.011*50-0.0001*50*50) – e(-0.039+0.011*30-0.0001*30*30))/e(-0.039+0.011*30-0.0001*30*30) = 0.104 or 10.4% 
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the question posed earlier there are systematic differences in people’s weight given their 
height which are unrelated to physical characteristics such as gender and age. We cannot 
say that the healthy values of BMI for more educated people, for example, should be 
lower or higher than less educated people, it depends upon their other physical 
characteristics. In addition, if height is correlated with education, urban, income, etc, 
then the exclusion of these variables in the equation will bias the coefficient on height97. 
In addition, it seems reasonable to suggest that all of these variables are ones which tend 
to be associated with less exercise. For example, people who live in towns will tend to 
have access to better public transport and walk less than people in rural areas. Similarly 
less well-educated people probably tend to have more manual jobs. 
 
What does this imply about the measure of BMI? In particular should it be adjusted for 
people’s socio-economic status as well as their physical characteristics – gender and age? 
The answer is no. There seems little reason why someone of a given age, gender, height 
and weight should have his optimal BMI adjusted because they are an executive or live 
in the city98. However, what it does suggest is that such socio-economic characteristics 
impact on people’s BMI values and hence on health, and also that failing to take 
cognizance of socio-economic characteristics when estimating the relationship between 
weight and height can lead to biased results. 
                                                        
97 Such correlations may exist because of inter-generational advantages, for example, the 
children of richer families tend to eat better during childhood and hence arguably become taller. 
98 Of course certain life styles are unhealthy which are linked to unhealthy BMI values. An 
executive life style, for instance, may be a stressful one – as indeed may be a coal miner’s. That 
is not the issue. Instead we are asking whether the characteristics of a 12 stone, 6 foot, 35 year 
old man should have different interpretations vis-à-vis BMI values, depending on the individuals 
level of education or geographic location and on this we believe the answer is no. 
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Table 5-7 Determinants of BMI Values 
 
Explanatory Variable Log(weight) 
  RE-REG RE-REG RE-REG RE-REG 
Gender  -0.029*** -0.039*** -0.036*** 
  (-9.583) (-13.252) (-12.392) 
Age   0.011*** 0.011*** 
   (35.446) (30.646) 
Agesq   -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
   (-27.440) (-23.485) 
Education    0.003*** 
    (10.646) 
Married    -0.0004 
    (-0.186) 
Urban    0.005** 
    (2.223) 
Ladhinc    0.002*** 
    (2.766) 
Profes    0.0001 
    (0.024) 
Admins    0.011*** 
    (3.627) 
Staff    0.002 
    (0.708) 
Farmer    -0.016*** 
    (-8.739) 
Skilled    0.0004 
    (0.193) 
Driver    0.009* 
    (1.955) 
Service    0.009*** 
    (3.658) 
Log(height) 2.094*** 2.272*** 2.395*** 2.247*** 
 (94.878) (78.912) (83.827) (76.840) 
R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.44 0.45 
No. of the Obs.  26366 26366 26366 26366 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, *** Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
Regressions are estimated based on panel data with random-effects (RE-REG). 
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Recalculating the Healthy Range 
 
So far we have developed a little further the issue on how to define BMI. We now face 
the question of examining the ‘healthy range’ based on the new measures of BMI and 
estimating its impact on SRH together with SES. We will start with BMI0 derived from 
equation (5.17), which is close to that used in the literature. However, our main focus is 
on the relatively complex one (BMI2) taking into account gender and age from equation 
(5.20a). The total value ranges of BMI measure based on equation (5.17) and (5.20a) is 
(8-42) and (5-33), but the main observations are within (15-35) and (10-25) respectively. 
For BMI0, we construct two variables BMI01 and BMI02 as follows: 
 
BMI01 = (αL – BMI0), operative if BMI0<αL  
BMI02 = (BMI0 – αH), operative if BMI0>αH                (5.21) 
 
and similarly for BMI2: 
 
BMI21 = (αL – BMI2), operative if BMI2<αL  
BMI22 = (BMI2 – αH), operative if BMI2>αH                (5.22) 
 
The range αL - αH is what we term the ‘healthy range’. People outside this range are 
unhealthy, and the greater the distance the less healthy they are. We identify the critical 
points αL and αH through regression analysis. Self-reported health is regressed on 
(BMI01, BMI02) and (BMI21, BMI22) by an iterative search technique where the critical 
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values for αL and αH included all possible combinations from (15-35) and (10-25), 
which amounted to 231 and 136 regressions based on equation (5.17) and (5.20a) 
respectively. We choose the optimal combination on the basis of i) significantly 
negative coefficients for both (BMI01, BMI02) and (BMI21, BMI22), and ii) by identifying 
the best fit by the highest log likelihood ratio. Based on this, two BMI healthy ranges 
have been identified: using BMI0 as in equation (5.17), we find critical values for αL of 
22 and αH of 2799; Using the modified BMI (BMI2) in equation (5.20a), we identify 
critical values of 15 to 19. Table 5-8 shows the random-effects ordered probit results100 
which underlie these calculations. 
 
At this stage, the ‘best’ results based on the log likelihood appear marginally to be those 
based on the standard measure. Note that the healthy BMI range based on BMI0 in 
equation (5.17), i.e., (22-27) per se is higher than (19-25) as documented in literature. 
The potential reason perhaps is that we are using different measure of health. People 
with BMIs above 25 are considered overweight or ‘at risk’, however, these risks are 
mainly relevant to obesity-related diseases, instead of self-report measure of health 
which we use in our estimate. In addition, there is some suggestion that BMI02 and 
BMI22 may have greater impact on health than BMI01 and BMI21, i.e. being underweight 
has less severe consequences than being overweight. Although this is not something we 
develop further in this section. The significance of the other variables is largely as 
before. 
                                                        
99 For a comparison purpose, we also use the traditional measure of BMI based on the formula 
weight(kg)/height(m)², we find critical values for αL of 23 and αH of 28.  
100 Note that we obtain the same healthy ranges based on pooled and random-effects results. 
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Table 5-8 The Optimal Calculations for (BMI01, BMI02) and (BMI21, BMI22) 
 
Explanatory Variable Self-reported Health 
 RE-OP1 RE-OP2 
0.253*** 0.224*** Gender 
(7.946) (7.067) 
0.024*** 0.024*** Education 
(4.737) (4.741) 
-0.043*** -0.025*** Age 
(-5.761) (-3.363) 
0.00003 -0.0001* Agesq 
(0.339) (-1.677) 
-0.011 -0.004 Married 
(-0.244) (-0.087) 
-0.385*** -0.385*** Urban 
(-10.578) (-10.582) 
0.109*** 0.108*** Ladhinc 
(5.945) (5.925) 
-0.123* -0.118 Profes 
(-1.648) (-1.581) 
0.186** 0.190** Admins 
(2.398) (2.449) 
0.148* 0.156* Staff 
(1.792) (1.884) 
-0.091** -0.094** Farmer 
(-2.019) (-2.070) 
0.171*** 0.177*** Skilled 
(2.725) (2.811) 
0.292** 0.304** Driver 
(2.128) (2.223) 
0.108 0.108 Service 
(1.582) (1.574) 
-0.123*** -0.192*** BMI01/ BMI21 
(-13.453) (-13.165) 
-0.103*** -0.119*** BMI02 / BMI22 
(-4.441) (-3.476) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -25497.53 -25504.45 
Restricted log likelihood† -25658.92 -25666.20 
No. of the Obs.  26366 26366 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, *** Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. † 
Log-likelihood ratio is calculated by 2(Lunrestricted – Lrestricted). Regressions are estimated by random-effects 
ordered probit. BMI01 and BMI02 are defined by equation (5.21), and BMI21 and BMI22 are defined by 
equation (5.22). The results of first column (RE-OP1) are based on (BMI01, BMI02), i.e. (22-27). The 
results of second column (RE-OP2) are based on (BMI21, BMI22), i.e. (15-19). 
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Moderating Influences on an Adverse BMI 
 
We now construct a New BMI variable based on BMI2 with the optimal value range of 
15 (αL) and 19 (αH) obtained from equation (5.22). It is defined as the sum of BMI21 and 
BMI22. The distance between the BMI2 values and either 15 (αL) or 19 (αH) represents a 
deviation of BMI2 from its healthy range. We attempt to estimate how this healthy range 
is associated with SES in its impact on health. We construct the following interaction 
terms: New BMI*gender, New BMI*age, New BMI*age2, New BMI*education, and 
New BMI*log(household income). Being as we are using panel data, we also include 
year dummies. Table 5-9 shows the results. 
 
Table 5-9 The Impact of New BMI together with SES on SRH 
 
Explanatory Var. Self-reported Health 
 OProbit RE-OProb OProbit RE-OProb 
Gender 0.205*** 0.223*** 0.261*** 0.286*** 
 (7.823) (7.053) (7.665) (7.135) 
Education 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 
 (4.789) (4.708) (5.223) (5.084) 
Age -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.013* -0.012 
 (-3.811) (-3.440) (-1.744) (-1.368) 
Agesq -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0003*** 
 (-1.512) (-1.623) (-2.513) (-2.752) 
Married 0.012 -0.003 0.012 -0.002 
 (0.290) (-0.060) (0.306) (-0.042) 
Urban -0.352*** -0.384*** -0.354*** -0.386*** 
 (-11.818) (-10.557) (-11.869) (-10.604) 
Ladhinc 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 
 (6.627) (5.982) (3.974) (3.603) 
Profes -0.119* -0.119 -0.127* -0.126* 
 (-1.781) (-1.599) (-1.899) (-1.696) 
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Table 5-9 Continued 
 
Explanatory Var. Self-reported Health 
 OProbit RE-OProb OProbit RE-OProb 
Admins 0.178** 0.191** 0.166** 0.178** 
 (2.536) (2.462) (2.354) (2.291) 
Staff 0.143* 0.154* 0.139* 0.149* 
 (1.885) (1.868) (1.822) (1.799) 
Farmer -0.084** -0.098** -0.083** -0.096** 
 (-2.137) (-2.168) (-2.101) (-2.119) 
Skilled 0.158*** 0.176*** 0.156*** 0.175*** 
 (2.770) (2.793) (2.750) (2.784) 
Driver 0.294*** 0.304** 0.285** 0.294** 
 (2.582) (2.220) (2.501) (2.147) 
Service 0.116** 0.108 0.117** 0.109 
 (1.984) (1.579) (2.009) (1.600) 
BMINEW -0.160*** -0.182*** -0.029 0.024 
 (-13.101) (-13.264) (-0.194) (0.143) 
BMI*gender   -0.062** -0.070** 
   (-2.531) (-2.535) 
BMI*age   -0.013*** -0.016*** 
   (-2.765) (-3.071) 
BMI*agesq   0.0001** 0.0002*** 
   (2.495) (2.820) 
BMI*education   -0.008** -0.008** 
   (-2.263) (-2.106) 
BMI*Ladhinc   0.028** 0.028* 
   (1.972) (1.790) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -25668.41 -25506.37 -25655.74 -25493.98 
Restricted log 
likelihood -27238.45 -25668.41 -27238.45 -25655.74 
No. of the Obs.  26366 26366 26366 26366 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, *** Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
Regressions are estimated by ordered probit (OProbit) and random-effects ordered probit (RE-OProb). 
 
The first two columns of Table 5-9 show the estimated coefficients for the ordered 
probit models based on pooled and random-effects specifications with the inclusion of 
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the New BMI variable. The coefficient of New BMI is significantly negative as 
expected, which shows that when a person’s BMI (based on the equation of BMI2) value 
moves away from the healthy range, he/she tends to be less healthy. We now look at 
whether the impact of this New BMI on health changes by different SES. Through the 
last two columns of Table 5-9, we can see that the impact of New BMI on health is 
affected by gender, age, education and income101. Males are basically healthier than 
females, but this is changed when account is taken of the interaction with the New BMI. 
The coefficient of New BMI*gender is significantly negative, which indicates that, for a 
given BMI, there is a greater adverse impact on health for a man than a woman. 
Similarly, the impact of New BMI on health also depends on age, and more specifically, 
it is convex, first increasing and then decreasing after reaching a certain age. Based on 
the random-effects results in the last column of Table 5-9, the impact of New BMI on 
health is highest for someone aged 40. In addition, higher income neutralizes to some 
extent an adverse New BMI. Finally and interestingly, a given value of New BMI has a 
greater adverse impact on health with more education. Viewed in another light, we have 
concluded that educated people tend to be healthier than less educated people, 
presumably because they have increased awareness of what constitutes ‘healthy living’. 
An adverse BMI with more education on health, however, suggests that they are not 
utilizing this knowledge, thus reducing the ‘educational advantage’ in health. These 
results give further credence to the view that in interpreting BMI we need to make 
distinctions in the basis of age and gender. In addition, there is the possibility that the 
consequences of an adverse BMI can be reduced by greater income, possibly because of 
                                                        
101 Note that we have also included the New BMI interactive variables with married, urban and 
occupations, however, all of them fail to be significant. Results do not report in Table 5-9. 
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better access to medical facilities. 
 
5.6. Conclusions 
 
It has been documented extensively that the impact of SES on health exists, and the 
most heavily researched topics focus on the relationships between education, income 
and health. Few studies apply datasets from outside the US/Europe or allow for 
individual specific heterogeneity over time, which we do in this chapter. We used a 
four-year (1991, 1993, 1997 and 2000) panel data set to estimate the impact of SES on 
self-reported health and BMI, as an alternative measure of health. We apply 
recently-developed statistical methods for estimating an ordered logit model with 
fixed-effects as well as an ordered probit model with random-effects. As to the impact of 
education and income on health, one of the main concerns of this chapter, entering 
individual fixed-effects do not make a significant difference. Specifically the income, 
the magnitude and significance of the coefficients in random-effects and fixed-effects 
models are very close. Thus the random-effects model has not been far away from the 
mark in the respect of unobservable heterogeneity. In addition, as with many other 
countries, we have also confirmed the impact of gender, age, living areas, etc. on health. 
To further deal with potential simultaneity between education and health, we used an 
approach based on the relationship between SES and health changes, which is similar, 
but not the same as the traditional first-differences model. Based on this, we find the 
SES pattern for people whose health statuses are getting worse. Further as a robustness 
check, this impact of SES on health change works in the same way as for SRH with 
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fixed-effects, except for marriage which fails to be significant.   
 
BMI is closely related to nutrition and health behavior as documented in the literature. 
In this respect, the estimation of the relationship between SES and BMI is even more 
important. We find consistent results with many other studies for developing countries 
on the positive association between income and certain occupations, such as 
administrators and farmers, and being overweight. As to the impact of education, we 
find that being overweight is least common among more highly educated. Thus 
education impacts positively not only on health and health change, but also on the 
possibility of individuals’ being in the documented healthy BMI range. Furthermore, we 
have confirmed that the concept of the BMI is a valid one in the literature, and have 
further argued that it is reasonable that it should be calculated in such a manner as 
adjusts for gender and age. We examine the healthy range of this adjusted measure of 
BMI based on the self-reported health. Note that we are using a different measure of 
BMI, thus the comparison of the healthy range with other studies is rather difficult. We 
admit the possibility that the self-reported measure may not be as accurate as the 
morbidity and mortality data which is mostly applied in this context, still, it is of interest 
in its own right. Importantly, variables such as income can modify the impact of an 
adverse BMI, possibly because of better access to medical facilities. 
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Chapter 6   SES, Social Capital and Subjective 
Well-being  
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The study of subjective well-being102 (SWB) has been an area of increasing interest over 
the last three decades by psychologists, sociologists and economists. Psychologists focus 
upon factors that keep one from being depressed and factors that lead one to becoming 
elated (see, e.g., Eddington and Shuman, 2005). Economists favor the concept of utility to 
explain individuals’ choices and behavior. Together with sociologists, they are mostly 
interested in establishing the determinants of SWB. Recent reviews can be found in Frey 
and Stutzer (2002) and Layard (2005). This is an important area of research, according to 
Hudson (2006), which economists have been somewhat ambivalent about. One of the 
hypotheses which has emerged from the recent literature is the impact of social capital on 
well-being. Specifically at the level of individual, associational involvement and 
interpersonal trust have been found to be related to self-assessments of individual 
well-being (see, e.g., Putman, 2000). 
 
Social capital has become a popular topic in the past decade and research linking it with 
                                                        
102 Subjective well-being is the psychological term for “happiness”, and within the literature, the 
terms are used interchangeably (Eddington and Shuman, 2005). 
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subjective well-being has come fast and furious. The most robust correlate of social 
capital variables across individuals is years of education completed, and more broadly, 
education closely linked with both social capital and SWB. Most of the relevant work has 
been conducted in the western countries, particular in the United Stated, and 
comparatively fewer studies have been done in other contexts. Because culture plays a 
potentially important role in this area, the relatively few studies based on Chinese 
participants is an obvious limitation when trying to reach conclusions with respect to 
China. With the deepening of Chinese economic reform and the possible increase in the 
quality of life, this topic will almost certainly receive more attention. Thus it is important 
to fill this gap and conduct a study based on Chinese culture to shed light on 
cross-cultural differences. This will be, as far as we are aware, the first time the impact of 
social capital (interpersonal trust and participation in voluntary associations in particular) 
has on SWB has been analyzed in the Chinese context.  
 
We aim to examine whether, and to what extent, SES and social capital have impacts on 
happiness and life satisfaction for China, as they do in other countries, using 
cross-sectional dataset of World Values Surveys (1990, 1995-1997, 1999-2000). It will 
be followed by an analysis of the determinants of social capital. As throughout the thesis, 
the main area of concern lies with the impact of education on both social capital and 
SWB. We will also look at the difference between happiness and life satisfaction.   
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This chapter is organised as follows: In the next section, we provide a comprehensive 
literature review on both SWB and social capital. In section 3, we describe the theoretical 
foundation and data specification. Section 4 presents the empirical results. This will be in 
two stages. Firstly the determinants, mainly SES and social capital, on SWB and 
secondly the determinants of social capital. Finally we conclude this chapter. 
 
6.2. Literatures Review 
 
6.2.1. Happiness 
 
Scientific definitions of SWB recognize an affective and a cognitive component of 
well-being. As Frey and Stutzer (2002) explained that “SWB is an attitude consisting of 
two basic aspects of cognition and affect. ‘Affect’ is the label attached to moods and 
emotions. Affect represents people’s instant evaluation of the events that occur in their 
lives. The cognitive component refers to the rational or intellectual aspects of SWB and it 
is usually assessed with measures of satisfaction”. Thus people are said to have high level 
of SWB if they are satisfied with their life-conditions, and experience frequent positive 
emotions and infrequent negative emotions (Eddington and Shuman, 2005).    
 
Several dimensions in current research have been applied to SWB including overall 
feelings of happiness, life satisfaction and some domains of life satisfaction, such as job 
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satisfaction, family satisfaction, and financial satisfaction, etc. Many studies, either from 
economics, sociology or psychology, have shown that demographic factors, such as age 
and gender, are important determinants of happiness and life satisfaction. Arygle (1987) 
mentioned that if the emphasis is on satisfaction or cognitive appraisal of well-being, 
there is a definite increase with age. Recently a U-shaped relationship has been found 
between age and happiness, with the young and old more satisfied than the middle aged 
(Namazie and Sanfey, 1999; Donovan and Halpern, 2002; Hayo and Seifert, 2003; 
Hudson, 2006). Donovan and Halpern (2002) argued that there are significant national 
differences. They mentioned that life satisfaction is highest amongst the over 65s in Japan, 
and by contrast, satisfaction is lower amongst older generations in Hungary103. In some 
western countries, such as Denmark and Britain, the difference between age groups is 
modest throughout the age range. Gender is a factor typically included in this context, 
and the levels of happiness and life satisfaction are generally found to be higher among 
women than men104 (Donovan and Halpern, 2002; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). 
However, Frey and Stutzer (2002) argued that this difference is not large and has tended 
to disappear in recent years.  
 
Apart from these, it is important to distinguish the following types of determinants. 
                                                        
103 This may be linked with the transition process from planned to market economy. 
104 Donovan and Halpern (2002) further argued that the notable exception is Russia, where 
women are less happy than men. Also, in South American countries men and women appear to be 
equally happy. 
 204
Economic Factors - Income and Unemployment 
 
Economic factors have been shown to be important contributors to individuals’ subjective 
well-being (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). In particular 
economists have been interested in establishing the relationships between income, 
unemployment and life satisfaction. The basic starting point for many analyses is income. 
The relationship between income and satisfaction is less clear, and the most widely 
accepted viewpoint is that income does matter, but not very much (Easterlin, 1995; 
Oswald, 1997; Frey and Stutzer, 2002). The former indicates that people with higher 
incomes are more satisfied than those with lower incomes, and an increase in personal 
income does bring higher levels of satisfaction. For example, Frijters, et al. (2004) have 
concluded that around 35-40% of the increase in life satisfaction in East Germany was 
attributable to the large increase in real household incomes. Further, investigations of 
longitudinal data on the effects of windfalls (lottery wins and inheritances) showed that 
the income does have a causal effect upon life satisfaction (Gardner and Oswald, 2001). 
The latter has mainly led to interest in the role of relative rather than absolute income in 
determining life satisfaction (see e.g. Clark and Oswald, 1996; McBride, 2001). The 
relative income discussion has been confirmed by Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), who 
concluded that the larger an individual’s own income in comparison with the income of 
the reference group, the happier the individual will be. Stutzer (2004) approached this in 
a different way, i.e. the higher the ratio of aspired income to actual income, the less 
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satisfied people are with their lives.  
 
Some researchers have reported on the effects of social class, which is closely linked to 
relative income, but is mainly based on different positions at work. Arygle (1987) pointed 
out that to a person in a certain occupation, satisfaction depends more on comparisons 
with what other people have, and on comparisons with their own past experience. In 
addition, there is a firm consensus based on both cross-sectional and longitudinal data 
that unemployment leads to a substantial loss of life satisfaction regardless of the exact 
definition of life satisfaction (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Frijters, et 
al., 2004). Specifically, Frey and Stutzer (2002) concluded that the main direction of 
causality appears to run from unemployment to less satisfaction. This linkage between 
unemployment and life satisfaction is not just simply due to the loss of income. Frey and 
Stutzer argued that unemployment needs to be seen in a wider context, the fate of being 
unemployed is less depressing when one compares oneself with others who are also out 
of work. Thus the significance of being unemployed per se may be explained by a 
combination of the loss of self-esteem and the change of the norms of one’s social group. 
There is another possibility, as argued by Hudson (2006), related to an aspirational 
standard of living. Regardless of their income whilst unemployed, it will have fallen 
compared to what it was when the individual was in work. In addition, given their income 
whilst unemployed they will be further from their aspirations than others on a similar 
income who are not unemployed.  
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Health and Choice or Control of One’s Own Life 
 
The existence of a significant linkage between health and SWB is well-documented. 
Helliwell (2003) reported that in the long run, a 1% increase in average self-reported 
health status is associated with just over 1% increase in SWB. However, it is important to 
note that strong correlation between health and SWB exists for self-reported health 
measures (Donovan and Halpern, 2002), but not for objective health ratings (see e.g., 
Diener, et al., 1999). Therefore, perceptions of health appear to be more important than 
objective health in their effects on SWB although of course there is a linkage between 
these two. A possible explanation for this, argued by Eddington and Shuman (2005), is 
that people in poor health downplay the importance of their health when evaluating their 
life satisfaction, and also people use cognitive coping strategies that promote a positive 
image of their health condition. Apart from this, it has also been suggested that 
self-reported health partly reflects optimism or general sense of control (Bobak, et al., 
1998). Individuals whose personalities are inherently more optimistic are more likely to 
give positive assessments of their health status and their SWB. As Helliwell (2003) 
argued although a large fraction of long-term interpersonal differences in personality is 
genetic in nature, optimism does create real linkages with health outcomes. However, in 
his more recent paper, Helliwell (2006) argued that with the inclusion of a variable which 
captures a standard measure of personality, the coefficient on subjective health drops only 
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slightly105. 
 
Control is important to psychological functioning (Skinner, 1996), and as suggested by 
Syme (1989), the concept of control may integrate many aspects of the social and 
psychosocial environment, including material, social and psychological well-being.  
There is a rich psychological literature showing that low perceived control, low ratings of 
self-efficiency and many other related concepts (see e.g., Skinner, 1996) are related to 
health status and behaviours, as the more general indicators of well-being (see e.g., 
Bobak, et al., 1998). Apart from the psychological literature, Peterson and Stunkard 
(1989) argued that control plays a crucial role in people’s choice of health behaviour. In 
social economics, the importance of a sense of control has been seen to have an impact on 
life satisfaction (Donovan and Halpern, 2002). This is not surprising. Loss of control 
constrains the welfare optimization problem, and should lead to sub-optimal outcomes. 
 
6.2.2. Social Capital and Human Capital 
 
A growing literature has focused on the impact of human capital and social capital on 
SWB. Studies which examine the linkage between human capital, specifically years of 
education completed, and SWB are mainly focused on the tendency for the more highly 
educated to have higher incomes, better health and more recently, more social capital (see 
                                                        
105 From 0.54 to 0.49. For detailed discussions see Helliwell (2006). 
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e.g., Donovan and Halpern, 2002; Hayo and Seifert, 2003). In addition, Scitovsky (1976) 
argued that education allows people to take more advantage of activities which generate 
happiness or positive emotions, including music, painting and literature, etc., this effect 
would be a direct one independent of any affect on income or health. Like human capital, 
social capital provides important benefits to individuals and societies, and perhaps the 
most convincing evidence of positive impact of social capital lies in the area of personal 
health. Large numbers of cross-sectional studies have reported the strong association 
between the size and quality of people’s social networks and their health, with people 
who are less socially isolated and more involved in social and civic activities tending to 
have better health. For example, Woolock (2001) argued that there is very strong 
evidence of powerful health effects of social connectedness, and the evidence is strong 
not only in the United States, but also in Finland, Japan and other countries. Controlling 
for a person’s blood chemistry, age, gender, exercise or not, and for all other risk factors, 
his/her chance of dying over the course of the next year is cut in half by joining one 
group, and cut to a quarter by joining two groups. Putnam (2001) further argued that it is 
not that people who are healthy become joiners, it is from joining to health.  
 
What are the direct effects of social capital on subjective well-being? Putnam (2000) 
confirmed marriage to be the most beneficial form of social interaction. Many researchers 
believed that marriage serves as a buffer against the hardships of life and it provides 
emotional support which produces positive states of well-being (Eddington and Shuman, 
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2005). The married are very substantially happier than the unmarried, and those living 
together are happier than those living alone (Donovan and Halpern, 2002). In addition, as 
some studies have indicated, this linkage appears to be different for men and women, and 
also at their different ages (Namazie and Sanfey, 1999; Donovan and Halpern, 2002; 
Dockery, 2004). Other measures of social connection also have significant effects on 
happiness, like being a member of voluntary associations (Argyle, 1987; Helliwell, 2003). 
Another factor which needs to be mentioned is dyadic trust, which is closely linked to 
inter-personal trust or social trust. Sometimes measures of trust are included as part of 
what is meant by social capital, while other researchers prefer to treat trust as something 
that is generated and supported by a more valuable sort of social capital (Helliwell, 2001; 
2003). The preliminary conclusion is that people who trust others are generally happier 
and more satisfied with their lives (Donovan and Halpern, 2002). As Helliwell (2001) 
explained, high levels of inter-personal trust, particularly to the extent that this trust is 
matched by trustworthy behavior in others, do make many aspects of life more enjoyable 
and more productive, in part by reducing the costs of dealing with risk and uncertainty. In 
addition, Hudson (2006) specially focused on institutional trust and argued for an impact 
of institutions upon happiness as measured by their intermediary impact upon individual 
trust. 
 
It is instructive to compare the relative importance of income on happiness with that of 
human and social capital. Putnam (2000) used a large sample from the DDB Needham 
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Life Style Survey to simultaneously assess the effects of education, income, and various 
kinds of social and civic engagement, so that each effect is an estimate of the marginal 
impact flowing directly rather than through one of the other. According to his results, 
four years of education has the happiness equivalent of a doubling of income, and further, 
a significant association between social engagement and happiness, with monthly club 
meetings and monthly volunteering both having the happiness equivalent of four extra 
years of schooling or a doubling of income. Evidence from the United States and Britain 
reviewed by Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) supported the view that social 
connectedness may be more important for happiness than education and income - at least 
for average to above-average levels of income. Myers (1999) found similar results for the 
United States on the impact of close personal relations and social connections on 
subjective reporting of quality of life.   
 
Evidence has shown that social capital has an impact on SWB. However, as argued in 
chapter 3, these are not free of the risk of the confounding role of personality differences. 
For example, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) examined the robustness of the 
literature findings on the determinants of happiness. Using panel data, they argued that 
allowing for fixed personality traits does change results substantially. More specifically, 
optimists will tend to be more satisfied with their lives. They may well have ‘rosy 
evaluations’ of their health status. They may also be more likely to be married, and spend 
time with their neighbours, all of which have been found to be positively correlated with 
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life satisfaction. However, according to Helliwell (2006), the 2003 Canadian General 
Social Survey (GSS) provides a good candidate measure, a ‘mastery scale’ based on 
answers to several questions designed to measure psychological coping resources. The 
results based on GSS show that the mastery variable is highly significant. There are no 
changes in the marital status coefficients when a personality-based variable is added for 
each individual; and the coefficients on other social capital variables, such as the trust 
placed in neighbours, are unaffected by the inclusion of the personality variable. These 
results indicated that these relationships are not solely or even predominantly attributable 
to personality differences.  
 
What we have mentioned so far is the linkages between human and social capital and 
SWB. There is also a two-way relationship between social capital and human capital. 
There is a positive association even at a cross-country level, for example, between social 
and civic engagement and trust on the one hand, and levels of education on the other 
(OECD, 2001). As argued in chapter 3, the most robust correlate of social capital 
variables across individuals is years of education. According to Glaeser (2001), the raw 
correlation of years of education with membership in organizations is 34 percent in the 
GSS. Using the World Values Survey (an international version of the GSS), Glaeser, et al. 
(2000) found a positive relationship in almost every country. There is also an extremely 
strong connection between education and social trust. As Nie, et al. (1996) argued, 
individuals’ trust levels are indeed pushed upward by both individual and average 
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education levels.  
 
6.2.3. Related Analysis on Happiness and Life Satisfaction for China 
 
As mentioned before, relatively few studies have been done in the Chinese context or 
indeed in developing countries in general. Existing studies for China in this area are 
mostly focused on Hong Kong, one of the special administrative regions of China. These 
studies cover relatively broad issues on the quality of life, and with respect to specified 
age cohorts, such as adolescents and older adults (Shek, et al., 2005; Cheung, et al., 
2005). One study by Shen and Choy (2005) focused on the comparison of the social 
well-being of Hong Kong residents before and after the change of sovereignty (on July 
1997) by analyzing six sets of survey data between 1990 and 2001. They concluded that 
the residents were most satisfied in 1997, and the sovereignty change had major impacts 
on many life domains. Another study by Lu and Lin (1998) on Taiwan, China, examined 
four family roles: spouse role, parental role, filial role and worker role and their 
relationships with SWB, and reported that based on the traditional Chinese culture, role 
experiences were important to adult happiness.  
 
Two recent studies have focused on mainland China. One study is by Zhang (2005), who 
looked at 1347 mainland Chinese across three generations aged from 14 to 88. Zhang 
estimated whether collective self-esteem had added value in prediction of life satisfaction 
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beyond established predictors, i.e., demographic predictors, personality predictors and 
individual self-esteem. The results indicate that collective self-esteem added 1% 
explained variance to general life satisfaction and 3% explained variance to life domain 
satisfaction beyond those predictors. In a further study, Knight and Gunatilaka (2007) 
linked the literature on rural-urban migration and the literature on subjective well-being 
and examined the question of why rural-urban migrant households settled in urban China 
have an average happiness score lower than that of rural households. Based on a 2002 
National Household Survey, their results indicated that rural-urban migrants’ high 
aspirations in relation to achievement, influenced by reference groups, specifically make 
for unhappiness. One reason for the lack of studies on mainland China may partly be 
because of the lack of available datasets. 
 
6.3. Model and Data Specification 
 
6.3.1. Theoretical Foundation  
 
As mentioned before, scientific definitions of SWB recognize an affective and a cognitive 
component of well-being. Thus it is not easy to formalize it. The following equation 
reflects a general approach often adopted in the economics literature (Frey and Stutzer, 
2002; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004):  
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W = H [U(X, t)] +ε               (6.1) 
 
where W denotes the self-reported number or level of well-being (either on a cardinal 
scale or on an ordinal happiness scale, such as “very happy”, “quite happy”, etc.). U (…) 
is to be thought of as the person’s true well-being or utility, and is observable only by the 
individual themselves. Its structure is hidden from any other individuals. X denotes the 
determinants of reported subjective well-being. t indicates that the relationship between X 
and subjective well-being may vary over time, and ε is an error term which serves to 
capture other hidden factors influencing the difference between actual well-being and 
reported well-being. H [...] is a continuous non-differentiable function relating actual to 
reported subjective well-being, and the function H [...] rises as U increases. Blanchflower 
and Oswald (2004) concluded that the structure of equation (6.1) is suitable for 
estimation as an ordered probit. Thus, ‘true’ utility is the latent variable, and the 
subjectivity of responses can be thought of as being captured by the error term. 
  
Ferrer-I-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) examined the robustness of the literature findings 
on the determinants of happiness. There are two main methodological issues: i) whether 
to treat reported happiness levels as cardinal (as psychologists generally do) or ordinal (as 
economists generally do); and ii) the influence of the unobserved determinants of 
happiness. As to the former issue, the authors argued that the results are not sensitive to 
the choice between OLS and latent variable methods. Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) 
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also reported similar results between these two. With respect to the second issue, the 
results are sensitive to individual fixed personality traits. The implications are, for 
example, that having a personality which is conducive to happiness is also associated 
with having high income, being healthy, and being married. Although this is not 
consistent with Helliwell’s (2006) argument in which these relationships are not solely or 
even predominantly attributable to personality differences, possibilities may still exist. 
Given that we lack panel information on happiness over time, the results thus are more 
illustrative than conclusive.  
 
In our analysis, X will include SES, social capital variables and a set of demographic 
variables which are generally included in this sort of work. Specifically, we will give 
attention to social capital variables including participation in voluntary associations, party 
membership and social trust. These impact on SWB in two possible ways: indirectly 
those effects of social capital may flow through health, or even economic outcomes to 
well-being; and the direct linkage from social capital to well-being is related to affecting 
the efficiency of the individuals’ welfare maximization problem, and people do gain 
significantly from social interactions in the social domain. Take social trust for example, 
failure to trust people means an inability to make use of potential help. A very simple 
example of this would be the reluctance to use a taxi because of a distrust of taxi drivers.  
 
We will also be distinguishing between happiness and life satisfaction. Some researchers 
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have argued for a similar structure of the happiness and life-satisfaction equations (see, 
e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004), as well as the possible difference which happiness 
is more responsive to the short-term circumstances compared to the life satisfaction 
(Helliwell, 2003). In terms of the earlier discussion we regard the former as reflecting 
‘affect’ and the latter more cognitive or underlying level of happiness. In general, it 
seems reasonable to hypothesize a causal linkage from life satisfaction to happiness, 
although a reverse, probably weaker link from happiness to reported life satisfaction is 
possible. In addition, variables which facilitate an ability to ‘enjoy life’ may also impact 
on happiness.  
 
6.3.2. The Data  
 
We use the cross-sectional microdata of World Values Survey (1990, 1995-1997, 
1999-2000), which is designed to enable a cross-national, cross-cultural comparison of 
values and norms on a wide variety of topics including economic conditions, social 
attitudes, social networks, quality of life, trust levels, and traditional values. We select the 
China part only, and estimate what we believe to be some of the first micro-econometric 
equations of happiness and life satisfaction for mainland China.  
 
There are two dependant variables in our estimate to measure subjective well-being: how 
happy people feel and how satisfied with their lives. The former is based on the question 
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of “Taking all things together, would you say you are......?” Possible responses are: i) 
very happy, ii) quite happy, iii) not very happy and iv) not at all happy106. A fifth 
possibility was ‘don’t know’, and the regression analysis excludes it. The latter is based 
on the question of “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a 
whole?” The responses are composed of 10 scales with only two extreme values, where 
‘1’ represents “dissatisfied” and ‘10’ represents “satisfied”. Not unexpectedly, 56.1% of 
survey respondents place themselves in the category of “quite happy (quoted ‘3’)”, and 
also a relatively high general life satisfaction with an average of ‘6.9’ out of 10 points. 
Figure 6-1 shows the histograms of happiness and life satisfaction, and Table 6-1 shows 
cross-tabulations between them. From the cross-tabulation between happiness and life 
satisfaction, we can see that within the category of people who choose ‘very happy’ 
(quoted ‘4’), the highest percentage (29.0%) of them tend to be the most satisfied with 
their lives (quoted ‘10’), whereas people who are in the category of the most satisfied 
with their lives (quoted ‘10’) tend to be just ‘quite happy’ (quoted ‘3’, 47.7%). Clearly 
these two concepts are closely correlated, but not identical. It is thus necessary to look at 
both measures to obtain a complete view of SWB for China. 
 
Following the literature review and theoretical foundation, the independent variables in 
our regression analysis will include SES, social capital variables and a set of 
                                                        
106 We have reversed the scale of the happiness measure in the regression to emphasize that 
higher numbers correspond to higher level of happiness. 
 218
demographic variables. The respondents were chosen by means of the random sampling 
selection covering 24 provinces107, almost all the provinces of mainland China. The 
surveys use different codes107 for regions between 1990, 1995-1997 and 1999-2000, thus 
it gives ambiguous information on the inclusion of provinces in each year. Hence, the 
regional dummies are not included in the regressions. We restrict our sample to those 
between 18 and 65. A large number of (around 81.8%) respondents are married and it is 
the included category for marital status. The other category combines the never married, 
those current widowed or separated, and those divorced. In addition, there is a slightly 
lower percentage (around 43.9%) of females than males in the survey. After also 
excluding observations with less than full information, it provides 2657 observations 
altogether. All the variables are defined in Table 6-2. 
 
Table 6-1 Cross-tabulations between Happiness and Life Satisfaction 
 
  Life  
Sat=1 
Life  
Sat=2 
Life 
Sat=3
Life 
Sat=4
Life 
Sat=5
Life 
Sat=6
Life 
Sat=7
Life  
Sat=8 
Life  
Sat=9 
Life 
Sat=10
Total
Hap=1 13 13 2 3 6 2 3 6 3 2 53 
Hap=2 33 43 44 44 68 90 60 64 37 41 524
Hap=3 21 18 50 60 195 212 235 332 173 195 1491
Hap=4 8 4 15 12 34 65 62 133 85 171 589
Total 75 78 111 119 303 369 360 535 298 409 2657
Source: World Values Surveys (1990, 1995-1997, 1999-2000). 
 
                                                        
107 The survey in year 1999-2000 covers 24 provinces, in year 1991 covers 11 regions without 
clear indication of which provinces, and in year 1995-1997 covers 6 main parts of China, still, 
without clear indication of which exact provinces.  
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Figure 6-1 Histograms of Happiness and Life Satisfaction 
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The SES included in our analysis is composed of the education level, main occupation as 
a farmer, financial status and unemployment. Education level is captured by ages at 
which individuals finished full-time education, and the values are restricted from 8 to 30 
in our estimate108. Financial status takes two forms: one is the objective gross household 
income, i.e. all income included last year, and the other is the subjective household 
financial satisfaction. We assume that the latter is picking up a comparison effect with 
their peers when respondents answer this question. Both total household income and 
household financial satisfaction are reported on a scale of 10 categories with ascending 
order, and on average, total household income is around 3000-4000 yuan per year. 
 
In addition, self-reported health and choice or control of one’s own life are also included 
in the estimate. Possible responses for self-reported health are: i) very good, ii) good, iii) 
fair and iv) poor109. The choice or control question is based on the questions of “Some 
people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while others 
feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use the scale 
where ‘1’ means ‘none at all’ and ‘10’ means ‘a great deal’ to indicate how much choice 
and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.”. There is a relatively high 
level of choice or control of life with an average of ‘7’ out of 10 points.   
                                                        
108 Basic formal education includes primary education (normally six years), academic secondary 
education (normally three years of lower and three years of upper middle school) and academic 
higher education (normally four years of undergraduate degree, three years of master degree and 
three years of PhD).  
109 We have also reversed the scale of the health measure in the regression. 
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Table 6-2  Sample Size and Distribution of Happiness and Life Satisfaction 
(1990, 1995-1997, 1999-2000) 
 
Whole Sample Male Female Variables 
 (%)  (%)  (%) 
Dependent Variables    
Happiness    
  Not at all Happy ('1') 1.99 1.74 2.32 
  Not very Happy ('2') 19.72 22.03 16.64 
  Quite Happy ('3') 56.12 55.40 57.03 
  Very Happy ('4') 22.17 20.72 24.01 
Life Satisfaction    
  Dissatisfied ('1') 2.82 3.15 2.40 
  '2' 2.94 2.88 3.00 
  '3' 4.18 4.49 3.77 
  '4' 4.48 4.83 4.03 
  '5' 11.40 11.07 11.84 
  '6' 13.89 14.08 13.64 
  '7' 13.55 14.08 12.86 
  '8' 20.14 18.78 21.87 
  '9' 11.22 10.66 11.92 
  Satisfied ('10') 15.39 15.96 14.67 
    
Other Variables    
Female ('0') 43.88 - - 
Age 18 - 65 18 - 65 18 - 65 
Married (Dummy) 81.78 82.23 81.22 
Education - 'Age Left School' 8 - 30 8 - 30 8 - 30 
Income    
  Less than 500 Yuan ('1') 4.93 5.30 4.46 
  501-1000 yuan ('2') 12.46 13.41 11.23 
  1001-2000 yuan ('3') 16.75 17.84 15.35 
  2001-3000 yuan ('4') 12.95 13.48 12.26 
  3001-4000 yuan ('5') 17.43 15.63 19.73 
  4001-6000 yuan ('6') 13.59 13.41 13.81 
  6001-10000 yuan ('7') 10.99 10.60 11.49 
  10001-20000 yuan ('8') 7.72 7.04 8.58 
  20001-50000 yuan ('9') 2.78 2.55 2.40 
  50001-100000yuan ('10') and more 0.72 0.74 0.69 
Unemployed (Dummy) 13.06 9.66 17.41 
Farmer (Dummy) 36.88 35.35 38.85 
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Table 6-2 Continued 
  
Variables 
Whole Sample
 (%) 
Male 
 (%) 
Female 
 (%) 
Financial Satisfaction with Household    
  Dissatisfied ('1') 6.03 6.58 5.33 
  '2' 4.22 4.90 3.35 
  '3' 7.65 8.33 6.79 
  '4' 6.64 6.78 6.45 
  '5' 16.78 17.26 16.17 
  '6' 14.18 14.57 13.67 
  '7' 13.39 12.89 14.02 
  '8' 14.56 13.16 16.34 
  '9' 6.15 5.64 6.79 
  Satisfied ('10') 10.41 9.87 11.09 
Self-reported Health    
  Poor  ('1') 6.25 4.83 8.06 
  Fair ('2') 29.36 28.17 30.87 
  Good ('3') 29.96 31.12 28.47 
  Very Good ('4') 34.44 35.88 32.59 
Choice/Control of People's Own Lives    
  No Choice/Control of life ('1') 3.42 3.22 3.69 
  '2' 2.56 2.35 2.83 
  '3' 3.76 3.22 4.46 
  '4' 3.84 3.82 3.86 
  '5' 11.93 11.60 12.35 
  '6' 12.19 11.60 12.95 
  '7' 13.81 13.75 13.89 
  '8' 18.67 19.18 18.01 
  '9' 9.41 9.59 9.18 
  A great deal of Choice/Control ('10') 20.40 21.66 18.78 
Social Capital variables    
  Participation in '0' Vol. Org. or Activities 76.67 76.53 76.84 
  '1' 16.18 16.16 16.21 
  '2' 5.01 5.30 4.63 
  '3' 1.73 1.61 1.89 
  '4' 0.41 0.40 0.43 
  Party Membership (Dummy) 13.81 16.50 10.38 
  Most people can be trusted (Dummy) 54.99 55.67 54.12 
No. of the Observations 2657 1491 1166 
Source: World Values Surveys (1990, 1995-1997, 1999-2000) 
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We also include data of social capital variables based on the individual level. Two 
participation variables separately relate to each individual’s own participation in 
voluntary organizations and his/her party membership 110. Party membership is not 
voluntary in the Chinese context, and here is mainly Communist party membership111. 
Given the data availability, participating voluntary organizations and activities included 
in our estimate are: conservation, environment, animal rights groups, sports or recreation, 
arts, music or cultural activities and other voluntary organizations and activities. We 
aggregate these four to one variable which measures the total number of organizations 
participating by each respondent. In addition, social trust is a binary variable included in 
our estimate, and it takes a value of ‘1’ if respondents think that generally speaking, most 
people can be trusted. This relates to, as argued by Helliwell (2001), whether people think 
other people are trustworthy, rather than whether the respondents are trusting.  
 
                                                        
110 Note that both the questions of participation in voluntary organizations and political party 
membership were asked differently in the third wave compared to the former two waves. In the 
third wave, these variables are binary variables taking a value of ‘1’ if individual belongs to the 
associations and political parties. In the former two waves, however, it responds to three 
possibilities: i) belong to, ii) an active member and iii) not belong to. Therefore, to make three 
waves consistent, we recode them into binary variables based on the specifications of these two 
variables respectively. For participating voluntary organizations, we recode i) and ii) to take a 
value of ‘1’, and iii) to take a value of ‘0’; for political party membership, we recode i) to take a 
value of ‘1’, ii) and iii) to take a value of ‘0’.  
111 We have contacted one of the data-collecting staff by email, who was working in the Research 
Center for Contemporary China, Peking University. She replied our email and said that as far as 
they are aware, the party membership here is mainly Communist party membership. 
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6.4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
 
6.4.1. The Impact of SES, Social Capital on SWB 
 
Since the econometric framework of ordered probit model has already been discussed in 
the last chapter, we will directly start presenting the empirical results. Table 6-3 shows 
the estimated coefficients in separate equations of happiness and life satisfaction. The 
estimation was done in LIMDEP and checked in STATA. Beginning with the impact of 
gender, we can see that the coefficients are significantly negative for both equations, 
which indicates that females are happier and more satisfied than males. This is consistent 
with the results in the literature. From the statistical perspective and especially for 
happiness as shown in Table 6-2, we see that the percentage reporting “very happy” for 
females and males is 24.0% and 20.7% respectively. This is consistent with the 
regression results.  
 
What about age? Our results show a strong U-shape pattern for life satisfaction, but not 
for happiness. The lowest point for life satisfaction is age 36 as shown in Figure 6-2. 
After reaching this point, life satisfaction rises significantly, with those around 45-50 as 
happy as those around 21-25, and those age 60 and up much happier still. This U-shape 
pattern for age is consistent with Blanchflower and Oswald’s (2004) finding for British 
and the United States. However, the lowest age 36 is less than the study by Sanfey and 
 225
Teksoz (2006), who examined SWB in transition countries and obtained the result that 
happiness declines with age until the early-fifties.  
 
Figure 6-2 Age Impact on Life Satisfaction 
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Source: From Table 6-3. 
 
Another variable which has a different impact for happiness and life satisfaction is the 
education level, captured by ‘age left school’. ‘Age left school’ has a significant positive 
impact on the equation of happiness, but not on life satisfaction. This may be not too 
surprising. As mentioned before, life satisfaction may be more reflective of the long-term 
circumstance compared to happiness. Thus from a long-term perspective the beneficial 
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effects of education may flow though higher incomes, better health, and higher perceived 
trust levels which have been already taken into account (see, e.g., Helliwell, 2003). Note 
that if we exclude these variables, and run a separate regression with the inclusion of 
gender, age, and year dummies, the estimated coefficient of ‘age left school’ changes to 
become significantly positive at 5% level. We do not report the estimated coefficients in 
the Table 6-3. As to the significant positive impact of ‘age left school’ on the equation 
relating to happiness, it may reflect a direct impact on happiness, which is consistent with 
the view in Scitovsky’s (1976) joyless economy, that education facilitates abilities for 
people to enjoy life, through a great ability to enjoy paintings and culture for instance. 
 
As in other research, marriage appears to be very conductive to SWB. Our results in 
Table 6-3 show that married people are more satisfied with lives than those who were 
never married, divorced, separated or widowed, and this positive linkage is more 
significant with respect to the equation of life satisfaction than to happiness. Following 
the early reviewed literature, we construct an interactive variable Married*Young (i.e., 
the 18-30 age group) to explore the potential age difference in the impact of being 
married on SWB, and we assume these are couples being newly-married. The reason we 
chose this age cohort is because we expect that many unstable factors which related to 
young couples may influence the results. The second and the fifth columns of Table 6-3 
show that the coefficients of these interactive variables are significantly negative for both 
happiness and life satisfaction. Married people are happier and more satisfied than the 
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non-married, but not for young couples. This may suggest the difficulties newly-marrieds 
face in both adapting to new lives and setting up home on their own. To an extent, the 
differential impact of being married and being newly-married confirms the causality 
running from marital status to SWB. In addition, it is also not clear, as some studies have 
argued, whether men or women benefit more from marriage. Separating married effect by 
gender showed no significant difference between men and women, and we do not report 
the estimated coefficients here.  
 
As to the impact of economic factors on SWB, the unemployed are much less satisfied 
with their lives than others, and this linkage is only significant with respect to the 
equation of life satisfaction, but not to happiness. We lack the information on the regional 
rate of unemployment as well as how long the respondents have been unemployed, thus 
we can not comment on whether it is possible that people in regions with high 
unemployment feel less distressed than those living in areas with low joblessness. Note 
too that we also lack the information of respondents being in rural or urban areas, 
however, our results show that being a farmer is significantly negatively related to less 
happiness and lower levels of life satisfaction. To some extent, as the survey has defined 
the farmer as agricultural workers, the results capture some rural-urban differences on 
SWB.  
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Table 6-3 Determinants of Happiness and Life Satisfaction 
 
Explanatory Variables Life Satisfaction Happiness 
Gender -0.151*** -0.151*** -0.135*** -0.185*** -0.186*** -0.144*** 
 (-3.645) (-3.653) (-3.243) (-4.097) (-4.114) (-3.166) 
Age -0.046*** -0.062*** -0.034*** -0.008 -0.036*** 0.002 
 (-3.304) (-3.847) (-2.422) (-0.520) (-2.084) (0.122) 
Agesq 0.0006*** 0.0008*** 0.0005*** 0.0001 0.0004** -0.00001 
 (3.778) (4.261) (2.902) (0.635) (1.998) (-0.080) 
Married 0.235*** 0.333*** 0.196*** 0.105* 0.275*** 0.076 
 (3.461) (3.959) (2.854) (1.921) (3.015) (1.029) 
- -0.151** - - -0.264*** - Newly-married 
(Married*age less than 30)  (-1.970)   (-3.171)  
Education-'Age Left School' 0.001 0.0002 -0.0002 0.016** 0.015* 0.018** 
 (0.111) (0.026) (-0.022) (2.072) (1.936) (2.263) 
Total Household Income 0.045*** 0.045*** - 0.039*** 0.040*** - 
 (4.578) (4.611)  (3.222) (3.293)  
- - 0.281*** - - 0.097*** Household Financial 
Satisfaction   (30.951)   (9.983) 
Unemployed -0.218*** -0.233*** -0.107 -0.074 -0.098 -0.050 
 (-3.309) (-3.504) (-1.593) (-1.026) (-1.348) (-0.687) 
Farmer -0.177*** -0.179*** -0.106** -0.115** -0.116** -0.123** 
 (-3.806) (-3.847) (-2.277) (-1.995) (-2.024) (-2.144) 
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Table 6-3 continued 
 
Explanatory Variables Life Satisfaction Happiness 
Self-reported Health 0.244*** 0.244*** 0.185*** 0.236*** 0.237*** 0.213*** 
 (10.924) (10.933) (8.153) (9.625) (9.650) (8.638) 
0.158*** 0.157*** 0.097*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.043*** Choice/Control of One's 
Life (18.425) (18.410) (10.812) (7.707) (7.669) (4.421) 
Social Trust 0.133*** 0.130*** 0.124*** 0.089** 0.084* 0.082* 
 (3.283) (3.211) (3.040) (2.025) (1.907) (1.861) 
0.049* 0.049* -0.005 0.085** 0.085** 0.073** Participation in Voluntary 
Organizations  (1.654) (1.651) (-0.158) (2.508) (2.516) (2.153) 
0.178*** 0.173*** 0.168*** -0.003 -0.012 0.0004 Party Membership 
(2.904) (2.830) (2.713) (-0.039) (-0.174) (0.006) 
Year 1990 0.652*** 0.654*** 0.283*** 0.137* 0.140* -0.038 
 (9.146) (9.178) (4.513) (1.773) (1.813) (-0.555) 
Year 1995-1997 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.084 0.278*** 0.277*** 0.184*** 
 (5.831) (5.818) (1.572) (4.728) (4.709) (3.194) 
Log Likelihood -5330.809 -5328.870 -4899.277 -2664.906 -2659.881 -2613.365 
Restricted Log Likelihood -5645.513 -5645.513 -5633.728 -2806.941 -2806.941 -2801.262 
No. of the Observations 2657 2657 2652 2657 2657 2652 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, *** Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. Regressions are estimated by ordered probit. 
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The idea that income buys happiness is one of the assumptions in microeconomics, see 
any textbook, and made for deductive reasons112. Studies on the effects of income on 
SWB provide an ambiguous picture and the main debate is based on the role of relative 
rather than absolute income in determining SWB. We include both objective household 
income and subjective household financial satisfaction in the estimate. Table 6-3 shows 
that both objective and subjective measures are significantly positive in impacting on 
SWB, although the latter is more significant than the former. This is consistent with 
others’ results which emphasize the importance of relative income. In addition, the 
magnitude of the coefficients indicates that the linkage is stronger for life satisfaction 
than for happiness. Note that the significance of the other variables is largely as before in 
the equation for life satisfaction when we include subjective financial satisfaction instead 
of objective household income, however, the impact of unemployed status fails to be 
significant as shown in the third column of Table 6-3. As we assume that the subjective 
financial satisfaction is picking up a comparison effect with their peers, this indicates that 
from a long run perspective, the impact of unemployed status on life satisfaction is not 
just simply due to the loss of income, but, following the literature, to a large extent 
related to the comparison with others or an individual’s aspirational standards of living.   
 
Self-reported health and choice or control of one’s own life are two particularly 
                                                        
112  Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) argued that an indirect utility function is of course 
increasing in income, and consumer theory can be done using revealed preference alone.   
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significant determinants of happiness and life satisfaction. This is again consistent with 
others’ results. People with very good health are happier and more satisfied with their 
lives, as are people with a great deal of choice or control which, as suggested, is closely 
related to people’s choice of health behaviour (see, e.g., Bobak, et al., 1998). Shields and 
Price (2005) argued that lower levels of individual well-being are correlated with 
different measures of poor health or disability, thus we may obtain more reliable results if 
we could include other indicators of health as a robustness check. As previously 
mentioned in the literature, the strong correlation between health and SWB exists for 
self-reported health measures, but not for objective health ratings by physicians113. 
However, individuals with a severe disabling condition or multiple or chronic health 
problems may report low SWB114 (see e.g. Mehnert, et al., 1990; Shields and Price, 
2005). In this sense, it is worthwhile to examine whether the findings from the use of 
self-reported health still hold when some objective controls, such as acute/chronic 
physical illness, are included in the SWB estimate. However, as with many other studies 
the data was simply not available to allow us to do this. Finally there may also exist the 
possibility that these health-related coefficients may overstate the size of long-term 
effects of health status on SWB, since they may be both affected in the same direction by 
personality differences. 
                                                        
113 Perceptions of health appear to be more important than objective health in their effects on 
SWB, although it is reasonable to assume that there is a linkage between these two. 
114 Several studies find evidence of partial adaptation to these circumstances over time. In 
addition, short-term effects may be larger than long-term outcomes as people adapt to their new 
health status and find new peer groups (see e.g. Kahneman, et al., 1999). 
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Earlier research has found a strong correlation between an individual’s participation in 
voluntary organizations, trust levels and SWB. There are two participation variables 
included in the estimates as mentioned in the data section. One variable is related to the 
participation in voluntary organizations, which is the typical variable included in this 
context based on the individual level; the other is related to an individual’s party 
membership. However, since the party membership is not voluntarily participated in 
China, its interpretation is rather complex. The Chinese Communist party is the ruling 
political party of the China, and its position is guaranteed by the country’s constitution115. 
For the individual, joining a party in the West may be seen as primarily marking an 
ideological affiliation, however, Communist party membership in China is likely to have 
a direct effect on one’s career or economic circumstances. Thus in this sense, the 
Communist party membership as we assume is one type of ‘social network’, but not a 
typical indication of social capital. 
 
Table 6-3 shows the results. The estimated coefficients for respondents’ trust level are 
significantly positive for both the equation of happiness and life satisfaction, which 
indicates that those who think most people can be trusted are happier and more satisfied 
with their lives. As to the two participation variables, results are different for happiness 
                                                        
115 There are eight ‘democratic’ parties in China, but these are relatively small and, as virtual 
satellite organizations of the Chinese Communist party, do not provide genuine political 
competition. Historically, these parties have tended to recruit people from non-labouring classes 
who are nonetheless supportive of the Chinese Communist party. Detailed discussions see 
Appleton, et al. (2005).  
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and life satisfaction. Individuals who are involved in more voluntary organizations have 
higher levels of happiness, and those who are a member of Communist party are more 
satisfied with their lives. Following the literature, the most convincing evidence of 
positive impact of social involvement on SWB is captured through health outcomes. In 
part the impact of participation in voluntary organizations on life satisfaction may flow 
though better health and control which have already included in the estimate.  
 
If we exclude health status and control variable116 and run a separate regression for both 
life satisfaction and happiness, results shown in Table 6-4 indicate that both participation 
variables are significantly related to life satisfaction, and the results for happiness remain 
unchanged. To put this differently, the significantly positive impact of party membership 
on life satisfaction does, apart from flowing through health outcomes, appear to go 
beyond the impact of general social involvement. This is consistent with our assumption 
and the fact the Chinese Communist party has a monopoly on political power and 
historically has maintained its grip on power. In addition, as with a direct impact of 
education on happiness, voluntary involvement also facilitates the ability and opportunity 
for people to enjoy life.  
 
                                                        
116 Note that we start by excluding self-reported health status only, and the coefficient of 
participation in voluntary organizations is not significant. Similarly, when we exclude the control 
variable only, the coefficient is significant at 10% level. This indicates that the impact of social 
involvement on SWB flows through both health status and related control variable which is 
associated with people’s choice of health behaviour.  
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Table 6-4 Determinants of Happiness and Life Satisfaction  
– excluding Health Status and Control Variable 
 
Explanatory Variables Life Satisfaction Happiness 
Gender -0.064 -0.121*** 
 (-1.559) (-2.705) 
Age -0.059*** -0.019 
 (-4.300) (-1.287) 
Agesq 0.0007*** 0.0002 
 (4.374) (1.099) 
Married 0.291*** 0.154** 
 (4.306) (2.105) 
Education-‘Age Left School’ -0.001 0.015* 
 (-0.113) (1.869) 
Total Household Income 0.070*** 0.063*** 
 (7.319) (5.337) 
Unemployed -0.273*** -0.110 
 (-4.164) (-1.525) 
Farmer -0.139*** -0.074 
 (-3.012) (-1.304) 
Social Trust 0.147*** 0.104** 
 (3.650) (2.375) 
0.073** 0.102*** Participation in Voluntary 
Organizations  (2.480) (3.043) 
0.240*** 0.037 Party Membership 
(3.954) (0.557) 
Year 1990 0.667*** 0.200*** 
 (9.424) (2.628) 
Year 1995-1997 0.303*** 0.308*** 
 (5.688) (5.311) 
Log Likelihood -5574.570 -2752.435 
Restricted Log Likelihood -5645.513 -2806.941 
No. of the Observations 2657 2657 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, *** Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
Regressions are estimated by ordered probit. 
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6.4.2. The Determinants of Social Capital 
 
In this section we turn to an analysis of the determinants of social capital variables 
including participation in voluntary associations, party membership and social trust. We 
estimate the former by the ordered probit model and the latter two by the probit model 
based on the specifications of their dependant variables. The regression results are shown 
in Table 6-5. Unquestionably, the most significant impact on the social capital variables 
across individuals is the education level. This is consistent with the literature, and it is a 
powerful result, as we have estimated the impact of social capital on well-being, the total 
benefit of investment in education has been broadened.  
 
We include age and age squared in the first column of Table 6-5 where these two 
variables are significant, and we simply report the results of including the log of age in 
the latter two columns. There is a significant nonlinearity for participation in voluntary 
associations, it first declines and then increases with a turning point of year 46. Note that 
this is not consistent with Glaeser’s (2001) argument as he presented an inverted U-shape 
relationship between age and social capital. However, this fits China, and other 
developing countries’ situations as people are fighting much harder to survive at a 
reasonable level when they are younger, and it is reasonable for them to participate in 
more voluntary organizations as they age. In addition, social trust, and specifically party 
membership significantly increase with age. 
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Table 6-5 The Determinants of Social Capital Variables 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Voluntary 
Organizations 
Party Membership Social Trust 
Gender 0.009 0.167** -0.028 
 (0.154) (2.385) (-0.550) 
Age or Log(age) -0.037** 0.672*** 0.156* 
 (-1.994) (5.365) (1.685) 
Agesq 0.0004* - - 
 (1.784)   
Married -0.143 0.076 0.062 
 (-1.635) (0.678) (0.805) 
0.052*** 0.090*** 0.046*** Education-'Age Left 
School' (5.719) (7.634) (5.202) 
Total Household Income -0.003 0.055*** 0.012 
 (-0.209) (2.923) (0.895) 
Unemployed -0.035 -0.190* -0.144* 
 (-0.401) (-1.684) (-1.857) 
Farmer -0.224*** -0.111 0.051 
 (-3.201) (-1.124) (0.794) 
Self-reported Health 0.045 0.016 0.030 
 (1.471) (0.431) (1.079) 
0.019 0.048*** 0.014 Choice/Control of One's 
Life (1.628) (3.129) (1.314) 
Year 1990 0.438*** 0.736*** 0.185** 
 (4.075) (6.308) (2.150) 
Year 1995-1997 1.123*** -0.145 -0.057 
 (12.718) (-1.502) (-0.883) 
Log Likelihood -1792.948 -897.495 -1797.806 
Restricted Log Likelihood -1969.603 -1066.909 -1828.455 
No. of the Observations 2657 2657 2657 
Notes: When agesq is not reported age represents the log of age. t statistics in parentheses, *** Significant at 
1%; **Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. The first column is estimated by ordered probit, the second 
and the third columns are estimated by probit. 
 
Two economic factors need to be mentioned here: being a farmer is negatively linked 
with fewer involvements in voluntary associations, and total household income is 
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positively related to the possibility of being party members. Both of them are significant 
at 1% level. The former is not too surprising as more generally social involvement or 
connectedness is restricted by occupational characteristics117 and location; and the latter 
is to some extent consistent with our assumption that participation in political parties goes 
beyond simple social involvement. Finally, as shown by year dummies, the participation 
rates and trust levels have declined specifically compared to the year 1990.  
 
6.5. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have examined the extent to which social capital and SES impact upon 
subjective well-being using three waves of the World Value Survey covering 1990, 
1995-1997 and 1999-2000. This is the first time this issue, specifically the impact of 
social capital, has been analyzed in mainland China. We included both life satisfaction 
and happiness in our analysis, and our results show similar results between them. But 
there are differences, in particular and as expected, we found socio-economic variables to 
be more significant in explaining life satisfaction compared to happiness. In this sense, 
we have confirmed the argument in the literature that happiness is more related to the 
short-term circumstances compared to the life satisfaction. Noticeable too in this context 
is the significance of education in explaining happiness, but not life satisfaction. This 
                                                        
117 Individuals who work in occupations with more social contact are more likely to invest more 
in social connections.  
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impact is in addition to any impact of education on income or health which is separately 
included in the regression. This supports the view put forward by Scitovsky that 
education facilitates the enjoyment of cultural activities which can lead to short-term 
happiness, e.g. when reading a book or going to the theatre. 
 
As with many other countries, we found a U-shaped relationship with respect to age and 
life satisfaction. Females are happier and more satisfied with lives, so are married people, 
but not young married people. We expanded the research to include a variable which 
reflects the degree of choice or control over people’s lives and find it to have a positive 
impact. This variable which has been suggested to be closely related to people’s choice of 
health behaviour, together with health status is the most significant of all the explanatory 
variables in determining SWB. Again as with others’ results, we found the subjective 
measure of income, which as we assume is picking up a comparison effect with their 
peers, has more significant impact on happiness and more noticeable, life satisfaction.  
 
We also found the impact of social capital on SWB. The impact of trust is consistent with 
findings of well-being research in general in which people who think most people can be 
trusted are happier and more satisfied with lives. We separated participation in voluntary 
associations and political party membership based on Chinese context and we found, as 
we expect, that individuals who are involved in more voluntary organizations have higher 
levels of happiness, and those who are a member of Communist party are more satisfied 
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with their lives. Being a member of the Chinese Communist party is utterly different from 
being a member of any political party in the Western sense. The dominant position of the 
Chinese Communist party and its occupation of important administrative positions imply 
that the membership may bring additional benefits to the individual. According to 
Appleton, et al. (2005), the Chinese Communist party membership can be regarded as an 
investment of ‘political capital’ and subsequent benefits include additional income, 
additional perks, higher status and greater power or influence. In addition, as with others’ 
results for different countries, education levels are the strongest and most consistent 
explanatory factors of both social and political involvement and trust levels. It is the key 
variable closely linked with both social capital and well-being. Thus it offers another 
route by which SWB can be enhanced.  
 
Overall it is noticeable how similar in many, not all but many, respects our results are to 
those done in richer, market economies. This gives greater credence to this research in 
that the results appear valid in very differently cultural, economic and political contexts.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
China’s transition from a planned to a market economy began at the end of 1978, and 
since the 1990s China has made rapid progress in economic growth. Economic reforms 
have brought significant changes in China’s labour market and market determined wage 
rates. At the same time, higher education in China has experienced a massive expansion, 
especially over the last two decades, and the majority of high school graduates in China 
go on to attend college. Thus this reality has encouraged great interest in the new 
implications for the returns to education. The benchmark model for the development of 
empirical estimation of the returns to education has been developed by Mincer (1974), 
and a great deal of work based on this model has been done for many countries. Many 
studies have confirmed that education raises individual’s productivity and subsequently 
future earnings. There has also developed the signaling/screening hypothesis of Arrow 
(1973) and Spence (1973, 1974) that employers use educational attainment to identify 
individuals with certain valuable innate traits that cannot be observed directly. Simply 
speaking, education acts as a signal of individuals’ innate traits which enable employers 
to identify workers. This hypothesis has also been well-documented in the literature (see 
e.g., Brown and Sessions, 1998).  
 
For decades, the primary argument for justifying education has been based on its direct 
impact on labour market productivity and earnings. Yet it is widely perceived that the 
effects of education spread beyond this to include social benefits for both individuals and 
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societies, such as better health or higher levels of well-being. The health investment 
model developed by Grossman (1972) offers an important explanation that individuals 
inherit an initial stock of health that depreciates with age and can be increased by 
investment. Specifically, years of formal education completed is the most important 
correlate of good health and a healthy life style. Although there is a possibility that the 
direction of causality runs from better health to more education, or differences in one or 
more ‘third variables’ affect both education and health in the same direction. In addition, 
education is the strongest and most consistent explanatory factor for individuals with 
respect to their social capital, such as social connectedness and trust. A large number of 
empirical studies have reported a positive linkage between social capital and health, and 
subsequently well-being (see e.g., Putnam, 2000; Helliwell, 2001). 
 
This study drew heavily on the work of these scholars, and our analysis expanded 
previous work in several important ways. We will discuss this in the next section of this 
chapter. Section 2 outlines the related policy implications, and in section 3, we will 
discuss the direction of further research.  
  
7.1. Summary and Discussion 
 
In this section, we structure the major findings of this thesis around six issues. First, there 
is a noticeable increase in returns to education over time in China, and the return 
depends on gender and also indeed sectors and regions. There exists an extensive 
literature on changes in returns to education associated with economic transition in other 
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transitional economies. However, few studies have examined this issue in connection 
with the period of China’s economic reform process. Previous studies have suggested that 
there are at least two competing hypotheses with respect to the returns to education 
during transition from centrally planned to market economy: one hypothesis is that labour 
market reforms at the onset would entail immediate increases in returns; the other is that 
the skills hitherto acquired can not be easily transferred to a changed economic situation, 
thus one would expect to see a temporary decline in returns during transition. Our results 
indicated that in 1989 the marginal return is 4%. This percentage declined from 1989 to 
1993, and increased thereafter, specifically it has noticeably increased from 4% in 1997 
to 7% in 2000. This is largely consistent with the latter hypothesis, although it is 
somewhat lower than some studies in both China and in other developing countries. We 
have discussed that one reason for our relatively low estimates is that the dependant 
variable includes subsidies and bonuses which tend to flatten the distribution. To a large 
extent, our estimates reflect the income (earnings and benefits) returns to education. As 
such they do not fully reflect productivity gains, but they do accurately reflect incentives.  
 
Recent work in economic geography has emphasized the importance of proximity to 
large population mass in determining variables such as productivity. However, our results 
go further than this and emphasize the importance not simply of mass but proximity to 
the two large power centres in China, one economic, Shanghai, and the other political, 
Beijing. The impact of distance has similarities to a gravity model, as well as other spatial 
or geographic models. Our results indicated that people earn less, the further they are far 
from Beijing, and more noticeably, Shanghai; however, they do enjoy higher rate of 
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returns to education in more remote regions. This suggests that the marginal productivity 
of labour and productivity is higher in Beijing and specifically Shanghai than other areas. 
We believe this is the first time this issue has been discovered in the Chinese context.  
 
Second, we found strong evidence that education enhances ability and does not simply 
reflect it with the assumption that the value of education as a signal does not decline with 
age. It is open to debate in the literature whether education enhances productivity or just 
reflects it118. Researchers have also contested whether or not returns to education signals 
should decline as workers gain increased labour market experience. Followed the 
arguments of Riley (1979) and Farber and Gibbons (1996), a basic condition for a 
signaling equilibrium is that employers find out that their predictions based on the 
education signals are correct on average. We assume that on average the return to an 
educational signal is constant over time. The impact of education itself on wages may be 
because education either (i) enhances ability and productivity or (ii) because it reflects 
ability. We argued that when we have no direct measure of innate ability and simply 
include education on the right hand side it is picking up the influence of both innate 
ability and the impact of education in enhancing ability. We included an experience-
education interaction variable in the earnings equation, and the impact of education on 
ability rather than simply proxying ability is confirmed by the existence of a significant 
negative sign on this variable. The implications are that education enhances ability, in 
part because of its impact on skills, then in a changing world as these skills date the 
                                                 
118 As mentioned before, There exists the possibility that education both augments and signals 
individual productivity based on weak screening hypothesis as mentioned in chapter 3 (see e.g., 
Brown and Sessions, 1998). Thus our hypothesis (i) indicates the primary role of education is to 
augment marginal productivity.  
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impact of education on earnings should also decline. Note that the inclusion of interacted 
variables of education and experience has been implemented in the literature to test 
whether there is a ‘vintage effect’ of education (see, e.g., Liu, 1998), or whether there is 
greater depreciation in the return to experience for the better educated (see, e.g., Neuman 
and Weiss, 1995). However, our approach is based on this and further takes this declining 
rate of return to education over time as a sign for the impact of education in enhancing 
ability and productivity.   
 
Third, a one-unit increase in education increases the probability of being in better health, 
and more educated people are also less likely to see a negative change in their health 
status. The observed correlation between education and health has been well-documented 
in the literature. An extensive review conducted by Grossman and Kaestner (1997) 
suggested that years of formal education completed is the most important correlate of 
good health. This is the health benefit of education which goes beyond the impact on 
individuals’ earnings, but perhaps too helps to explain that impact. In that a healthier 
worker is often a more productive one. There also exists the question of whether it is a 
unidirectional causal relation from education to health. There is a possibility that the 
direction of causality runs from better health to more education, or alternatively, 
differences in one or more ‘third variables’ which affect both education and health in the 
same direction. A number of studies have dealt with the endogeneity of education using 
instrumental variable techniques. The implications are to employ variables that are 
correlated with education but not correlated with such omitted third variables as ability, 
other inherited genetic traits, and time preference to obtain consistent estimates of 
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education effects (Grossman, 2006). The difficulty here is that researchers must uncover 
instruments that plausibly are not correlated with third variables. In addition, if the 
instrument is weak, it may provide little or no useful information (Imbens and 
Rosenbaum, 2005). The problem of weak instruments is quite prevalent in recent IV 
studies, and researchers have pointed out that some IV studies have been undermined by 
a lack of precision in their first stage estimates (see, e.g., Bound, et al., 1995).   
 
Apart from looking at the direct effects of education on health, we also focused on 
whether the effect of education truly represents a causal effect. We focused on the 
hypothesis suggesting that the relationship between education and health can not be 
interpreted causally due to the unobserved inherent health. We deal with this in a slightly 
different way to others as we do not have suitably strong instruments in our dataset. We 
made the assumption that the changes in health119 are independent of inherent health, i.e. 
that all people’s health (stochastically) deteriorates at the same level given their 
educational attainment and possibly other variables too. We analyzed whether SES, 
especially education, has an impact on changes in health status. We create a dichotomous 
variable of health change, which takes a value of one if the individuals have a positive 
change or no change of their health status, and zero otherwise. Through this, we can find 
the SES pattern for people whose health statuses are getting worse. Note that our model is 
similar, but not the same as the traditional first-differences model. Our results indicated 
that education has a significantly positive impact on the change of health status, which 
means that individuals with more education are less likely to experience a negative 
change of health. Put literally education slows down the aging process. 
                                                 
119 As mentioned, here we assume the answers of health question can be interpreted as cardinal. 
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Fourth, more household income significantly increases the probability of being in better 
health, and there is a significantly positive effect of income changes on an individual’s 
health status. The relationship between income and health is one of the more heavily 
research topics in economics and the other social sciences. Greater income is associated 
with better health through, for example, a better lifestyle or diet, fewer monetary worries, 
better access to medical services and an improved living environment (Adler, et al., 1994; 
Smith, 1999). Similar to education, there are two main issues that need to be tackled in 
order to establish causality. These relate to: i) there are likely to be unobserved individual 
characteristics, which jointly determine both income and adult health; and ii) there exists 
the issue of reverse-causality. In order to establish the causal effect of income on health, 
recent studies have attempted to use more advanced panel data econometric techniques. 
For example, Frijters, et al. (2005) used the fixed-effects estimator, developed by Ferrer-
i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004). Based on the GSOEP between 1984 and 2002, they 
concluded that there was evidence of a significant positive effect of income changes on 
health satisfaction, but the quantitative size of this effect is small. We applied the same 
methodology, estimating an ordered logit model with fixed-effects as well as an ordered 
probit model with random-effects. Our results indicated that the magnitude and 
significance of the coefficients in random-effects and fixed-effects models are very close. 
Thus the random-effects model has not been far away from the mark in the respect of 
unobservable heterogeneity.  
 
Fifth, an individual’s BMI should be adjusted for gender and age. We have identified the 
healthy BMI range after gender and age adjustment, and this healthy BMI has a 
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significant impact on health together with SES. BMI is generally calculated as weight in 
kilograms over height in meters squared (weight(kg)/height(m)²), and it is currently the 
most commonly used method in the empirical work. The WHO has devised a 
classification where by persons with BMIs below 19-25 are considered underweight, 
those with BMIs above this range are considered overweight or ‘at risk’ and those with 
BMIs greater than or equal to 30 are considered obese. The same healthy BMI is 
applicable for both men and women at different ages. Recent studies have indicated that 
BMI is age and gender dependent when used as an indicator of body fatness (see, e.g., 
Gallagher, et al., 1996). However, there are no clear cut-off points after adjusting for age 
and gender in the literature. Our analysis explored this by taking Log(weight) as a 
dependant variable and running the regression on Log(height), gender and age. Our 
results indicated that the power of height (in weight(kg)/height(m)²) increases when 
account is taken of gender and age. For a given height, weight and age, a BMI value for a 
man is lower than for a woman; and similarly, for a given height, weight and gender, an 
individual’s BMI value gradually increases with age, until after around age 55. It is 
necessary to mention when we take Log(weight) as a dependant variable and run the 
regression on Log(height) only, the power of height is close to the standard measure of 
2.00. In addition, education, household income and certain types of occupation also have 
impact on people’s BMI values, however, we cannot say that the healthy values of BMI 
for more educated people, for example, should be lower or higher than less educated 
people, it depends upon their other physical characteristics.  
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So far we have developed a little further the issue on how to define the BMI. We further 
identified the healthy BMI range based on this adjusted measure of the BMI. We assumed 
two critical values of αL and αH, and the range αL - αH is what we term the ‘healthy 
range’. People outside this range are unhealthy, and the greater the distance the less 
healthy they are. We identify the critical points αL and αH through regression analysis. 
Self-reported health is regressed on (αL – BMI), operative if BMI<αL, and (BMI – αH), 
operative if BMI>αH, by an iterative search technique where the critical values for αL and 
αH included all possible combinations of individuals’ BMI values. We chose the optimal 
combination on the basis of i) significantly negative coefficients for both (αL – BMI) and 
(BMI – αH), and ii) by identifying the best fit by the highest log likelihood ratio. Based 
on this, we identified the healthy range of 15 (αL) to 19 (αH).  
 
We then constructed a new BMI variable based on the optimal value range of 15 (αL) and 
19 (αH), defined as the sum of (15 – BMI), operative if BMI<15, and (BMI – 19), 
operative if BMI>19. The implications are the distance between individuals’ BMI values 
and either 15 (αL) or 19 (αH) represents a deviation of BMI from its healthy range. Based 
on self-reported measure of health, our results confirmed that when a person’s BMI value 
moves away from either 15 (αL) or 19 (αH), he/she tends to be less healthy. More 
importantly, we also found that the impact of this new BMI variable on health is affected 
by different SES.  For a given BMI, there is a greater adverse impact on health for a man 
than a woman. Similarly, it also depends on age, and more specifically, it is convex, first 
increasing and then decreasing after reaching a certain age. In addition, higher income 
neutralizes to some extent an adverse new BMI. Finally and interestingly, a given value 
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of new BMI has a greater adverse impact on health with more education. We have 
concluded that educated people tend to be healthier than less educated people, 
presumably because they have increased awareness of how to live a healthy life. An 
adverse BMI with more education on health, however, suggests that they are not utilizing 
this knowledge, thus reducing the ‘educational advantage’ in health.  
 
Sixth, social capital has an impact on subjective well-being, and a key variable closely 
linked with both social capital and well-being is education. Most of the relevant work has 
been conducted in the Western countries, particular in the United States, and 
comparatively few studies have been done in other contexts. Because culture plays a 
potentially important role in this area, the relatively few studies based on Chinese 
participants is an obvious limitation. We identified three social capital variables based on 
the individual level: participation in voluntary organizations, Communist party 
membership and trust levels. We did not combine the former two based on the reasons 
that the party membership is not voluntary in the Chinese context. The Chinese 
Communist party is the ruling political party of the China, and being a Communist party 
member is likely to have a direct effect on one’s career or economic circumstances. In 
this sense, it is one type of ‘social network’, but not a typical indication of social capital.  
According to Appleton, et al. (2005), the Chinese Communist party membership can be 
regarded as an investment of ‘political capital’. To measure the subjective well-being, our 
analysis separated happiness and life satisfaction, and our results indicated that these two 
participation variables have different impact on happiness and life satisfaction 
respectively. Individuals who are involved in more voluntary organizations have higher 
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levels of happiness, and those who are a member of Communist party are more satisfied 
with their lives. The dominant position of the Chinese Communist party and its 
occupation of important administrative positions imply that the membership may bring 
benefits to the individual, including for example additional income and higher social 
status.  
 
We have confirmed the argument in the literature that happiness is more responsive to the 
short-term circumstances compared to life satisfaction. Education level, measured by ‘age 
left school’, has a significant positive impact on happiness, but not on life satisfaction. 
We have argued, also tested by the regression results, that from a long-term perspective 
the beneficial effects of education may flow though higher incomes, better health, and 
higher perceived trust levels which have been already taken into account. In addition, the 
significant impact of education on happiness may reflect a direct impact on happiness, as 
suggested by Scitovsky’s (1976) joyless economy, that education facilitates abilities for 
people to enjoy life. Furthermore, the most significant impact on the social capital 
variables across individuals is the education level. This is a powerful result, as we have 
estimated the impact of social capital on well-being, the total benefits of investment in 
education has been broadened.  
 
7.2. The Implications for Educational Policy 
 
In concluding this thesis, we also look at the implications of our results. This is a difficult 
task due to the fact that establishing a link between research results and policy initiatives 
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is not always straightforward. However, we believe that the implications of our results 
warrant some detailed consideration by policy-makers.  
 
Increased returns to education suggests there is an increasing demand for higher educated 
workers, given that they benefit from a wage premium when compared to those less 
educated. This is consistent with the situation, at least to the extent, that the higher 
education attainment of the Chinese labour force is low by international standards. In this 
respect, education is still a valuable investment from the private point of view. 
Educational attainment of the Chinese population has increased substantially during the 
transitional period. However, the returns rate to education is still low in international 
terms, and the total employment population ratio is also relatively low. According to the 
Ministry of Personnel, at the end of 2000, the national secondary and higher education or 
professionals of all personnel accounted for 8.9 percent for the nation’s total employed 
population. This indicates that it is important to establish a unified labour market with fair 
competition and freedom of movement. This also illustrates the potentially important 
interactions between the supply of the educated and labour market outcomes. More 
specifically, the focus should be on which specific, and also levels of, education are in 
high demand and should therefore be prioritised in the allocation of public resources.  
 
We have found some evidence suggesting that returns to education date since the 
individual left formal education. This may be more noticeable for a transitional economy 
like China where skills acquired under the old regime are sometimes of little use in the 
new environment, and specifically for older people. Thus it is important for the Chinese 
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government to offer some re-training or further-training programmes. On the other hand, 
it is also important for prospective students to know how to improve themselves, 
especially from a younger age. In this respective, some resources should also be devoted 
to the development of generic skills such as analytic ability, problem solving, and similar 
‘learning skills’.   
 
The benefits of education are larger than just earnings. Our results indicated that a one-
unit increase in education increases the probability of being in better health. If, as we 
argued, this impact reflects a causal effect on health, a shift in public expenditure from 
health care to education may be more effective in improving both the level of education 
and the health status of the population. This suggests that the monetary value of the 
benefits of investing in education, including the health benefits, may be much larger than 
the cost of the investment. According to Groot and Maassen van de Brink (2006), the 
individual is the main beneficiary of a reduction in morbidity and mortality because of 
the higher educational attainment. In addition, investments in health behaviour by higher 
educated people may create positive externalities. Higher educated people, for example, 
are more likely to take exercise and eat healthy food (less likely to be overweight), and 
their healthy behaviour may encourage others to adopt similar behaviour.  
 
Importantly, even if a large part of the association between education and health is causal, 
as suggested by our results that more educated people are indeed less likely to experience 
a negative change of their health status, questions may still remain. Individuals may be 
unaware of the health benefits of education when they make their education decisions. It 
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is also possible that they do not fully utilize the knowledge to implement the ‘educational 
advantage’ in health. This is suggested by the significance of the interaction term 
between education and BMI, which indicates an adverse BMI reduces the health 
advantage of education.  
 
According to Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006), education policies do have the potential to 
have a substantial effect on health. Although there may be some uncertainly about the full 
causal linkage, it is far better for policy-makers to put efforts on more educational 
subsidies as opposed to less. At the same time, it is also important to introduce public 
awareness programmes on ‘healthy living’ which may diffuse the educational advantage 
across a wider range of people. 
 
7.3. Future Research 
 
The years since 1990 have brought major changes in many dimensions of China’s 
economy. The rate of return to education has noticeably increased from 1989 to 2000. 
Still, it is somewhat lower than some studies in China and studies in other developing 
countries. We have argued that this may in part reflect the underdevelopment in China’s 
market economy in the transition period since economic reform is a continuous process 
and most policies take time to produce any changes. China’s labour market has indeed 
undertaken rapid changes, specifically after China entered the World Trade Organization 
in 2001. Important new developments include the emergence of private business as a 
leading source of new jobs and increased job mobility, especially among well-educated 
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workers (Rawski, 2005). Thus it would be desirable to update estimates of returns to 
education. Future updates based on more recent data could not only provide more robust 
estimates, but also provide evidence on whether the performance of China’s labour 
market is improving over time.  
 
Furthermore, different from Western populations, our estimates indicated that there is a 
positive association between household income and being overweight. Similarly, 
according to Wang, et al. (2007), the prevalence of overweight and obesity increased in 
all gender and age groups and in all geographic areas between 1992 and 2002. Over the 
past decade, together with China’s impressive economic developments, people have also 
experienced many dramatic changes in their lifestyles related to an increase in family 
income and an increasing availability of food owing to advances in agriculture and 
increased global trade. This may have some new implications on the linkage between 
SES and overweight status. Updated results based on more recent data will also provide 
clearer information to contribute to the formulation of national strategies and programmes 
based on the obesity and obesity-related diseases. Further it is also important to know 
whether these results are replicated for other developing/transitional countries. 
    
We have confirmed that the concept of the BMI is a valid one in the literature, and have 
further argued that it is reasonable that it should be calculated in such a manner as adjusts 
for gender and age. Note that we identified this adjusted BMI through purely an 
economic point of view, it may still worth further analysis by either health economists or 
anthropometrists. Based on the data availability when doing this research, we did not 
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include the behavioural variables in our analysis for either identifying the healthy BMI 
range, or the impact of this healthy BMI on health. It is as suggested that the BMI, as an 
element of a life style, is closely related to health behaviour. Thus more robust results 
would be obtained if one estimates the impact of BMI on health together with different 
health behaviour. For example, we concluded that the impact of BMI on health is affected 
by gender, age, education and income, and we expect it may also be affected by whether 
people are smoking, taking regular exercises, etc. Another concern is that we examined 
the healthy range of this adjusted BMI based on the self-reported measure of health. 
There is evidence in the literature suggesting that it is a powerful predictor of subsequent 
mortality (see e.g. Idler and Kasl, 1995; Idler and Benyamini, 1997), still, it may not be 
as accurate as the morbidity and mortality data. To put it differently, it will be of value to 
further confirm the healthy BMI range based on morbidity and mortality data, although 
care will need to be taken as the BMI may experience sharp changes in the months prior 
to death. Finally, for a comparison purpose, it is also important to examine the cut-off 
points based on this adjusted measure of BMI across different ethic groups. We believe 
this to be a generally new contribution to the literature, and one which has the potential to 
be built upon in other economies, including the developed ones such as in North America 
and Europe. 
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Appendix I Tobit Model 
 
The Tobit120 model is a well-known econometric regression model used in the presence 
of censored data. In econometric research, there are frequently subjects for whom we do 
not observe the true response or dependent variable, all that is known is that the true 
response, if it had been observed, would have been above, (or below) some threshold. 
The Tobit model is a special case of a censored regression model, as the index variable, 
sometimes called the latent variable, *iy  cannot always be observed while the independent 
variable ix  is observable. 
 
The general formulation of the Tobit model is usually given by: 
 
,'* iii uxy += β        )N(0,~ 2σii xu  
yi = 0       if *iy ≤ 0, 
yi = *iy      if 
*
iy > 0.       (A.1) 
 
where *iy  is a latent variable generated by the classical linear regression model. ix is a 
vector of regressors, possibly including 1 for the intercept, and β  is the corresponding 
vector of parameters. The error term ui is assumed to be independent )N(0, 2σ distributed. 
According to Wooldridge (2002), for the model (A.1) to make sense, the variable *iy  
should have characteristics of a normal random variable, which indicates that the variable 
                                                 
120 Tobit estimation was originally developed by Tobin (1958). 
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of interest *iy  should have a homoskedastic normal distribution. This applies to our 
analysis in the section 5.5.4, where *iy denotes the ‘true’ distance of individuals’ BMI 
values from the healthy range (19-25). An individual with an observed value of 0 (i.e. 
his/her BMI value is within (19-25)) has a true *iy ≤ 0. Thus the OLS estimation will 
produce biased and inconsistent estimate ofβ . 
 
The log-likelihood for the Tobit model is121: 
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The two parts in equation (A.2) correspond to the classical regression for the nonlimit 
observations and the relevant probabilities for the limit observations, respectively.  
 
Further we fit the Tobit model with individual random-effects:  
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Similarly the observed variable is:  
 
                                                 
121 For detailed discussions, see Greene (2003). 
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yit = 0       if *ity ≤ 0, 
yit = *ity      if 
*
ity > 0.       (A.4) 
 
The composite error term itu  is assumed to be normally distributed with the 
characteristics described by (A.3). It is composed by a time-invariant individual random 
effects, iv , and a time-varying idiosyncratic random error, itε .  
 
Empirically, the output (e.g. estimated by STATA) statistically includes the overall and 
panel-level variance components together with ρ  calculated as follows: 
 
22
2
εσσ
σρ += v
v               (A.5) 
 
It is the percent contribution to the total variance of the panel-level variance component. 
When ρ  is zero, the panel-level variance component is unimportant and the panel 
estimator is not different from the pooled estimator. 
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Appendix II Probit Model 
 
A Probit model is defined by: 
 
)()  1Pr( 'βxxY Φ==                        (A.6) 
 
The function Φ (.) is a commonly used notation for the standard normal distribution. 
Other distribution functions can be used in place of Φ . The parameters β  are typically 
estimated by maximum likelihood. 
 
The Probit model can be generated by a latent variable model: 
 
,'* iii uxy += β        )1 N(0,~ii xu            (A.7) 
 
In this formulation, β'ix  is called the index function. Suppose that yi is an indicator for 
whether the latent variable *iy  is positive: 
 
yi = 1       if *iy > 0,  
yi = 0       if *iy ≤ 0.       (A.8) 
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This applies to our analysis in the section 5.5.3, where *iy denotes the change of 
individuals’ health status. In our case, an individual with an observed value of 1 if the 
he/she has a positive change or no change of his/her health status, and 0 otherwise.  
 
The log-likelihood for the Probit model is: 
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Further we fit the Probit model with individual random-effects:  
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              itiit vu ε+=               (A.10) 
 
and  
 
yit = 1       if *ity > 0, 
yit = 0       if *ity ≤ 0.     (A.11) 
 
where *ity  denotes the unobservable variable and yit is the observed outcome, β  is the 
vector of coefficients associated with the xit, iv  denotes the individual specific effects and 
the itε  is a random error. The underlying variance σ2 = σv2 + σε2 is not identified. We 
adopt the normalization σε2 = 1, and thus the overall error variance equals (σv2+1).  
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Empirically, the standard deviation σv is also included in the output (e.g. estimated by 
STATA) together with ρ  calculated as follows: 
 
12
2
+= v
v
σ
σρ             (A.12) 
 
It is the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level variance 
component. When ρ  is zero, the panel-level variance component is unimportant and the 
panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator.  
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